

sources are already predicting that this will lead to an all-out confrontation with organized labor next year.

But amidst the crisis in Washington, the Congress can be shaped to take bold action for the first time in many years if constantly directed by constituency pressure. Under such circumstances the administration could be brought in line.

Ironically, institutions which are most directly affected by the current economic situation and high interest rates have left the battle before it has begun. The National Association of Home Builders and the U.S. League of Savings and Loan Association have already agreed, under the tutelage of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to endorse the administration's program for increased budget cuts as the only way to reduce interest rates. The so-called national leaders of these tottering institutions look like Aaron Burrs; but witness the recent developments within the other major institution with the ability to shape Congress: the AFL-CIO.

At a Sept. 8 meeting of the newly created "National Coalition to Lower Interest Rates," an amalgam of national associations, the AFL contingent blocked a proposal urging support of the Melcher resolution, and instead offered as an alternative the Socialist International-endorsed program of credit controls. Sources close to the AFL report that the president of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), Kenneth Blaylock, will become the next secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, enhancing "left-wing power" within the labor federation. In addition, organizational control over the Sept. 19 mass demonstration against budget cuts in Washington, D.C. will be delegated to the Socialist International-controlled unions as the first step in a series of nationwide demonstrations, all with riot potential. Further, the "left-wing" unions within the AFL-CIO, including the AFGE, the United Auto Workers, (UAW) and International Association of Machinists (IAM), have relocated their top political intelligence operatives throughout the federation's bureaucracy to maintain fingertip control over such deployments. Sources now fear that one extraordinarily dangerous step in this leftist strategy will be to launch IAM strikes against defense plants, under the leadership of the union's president, William Winpisinger, an outspoken socialist and deindustrialization advocate.

Surface analysts of the Washington scene might take the emerging weakness of both the conservative Democratic "Boll Weevils," who voted in the House for Reagan's previous economic legislation, and of the liberal Republicans called the "Gypsy Moths," who also backed his proposals, as proof that the next round of the President's budget-cutting spree will lack the votes to succeed. In truth, it is only through broader new economic policy counterinitiatives that the opportunity in the current crisis can be effectively seized.

Weinberger embraces Global 2000 doctrine

by Lonnie Wolfe

For all the debate over proposed cuts in the Reagan administration's five-year, \$1.6 trillion defense spending program, a most significant point is being overlooked: for all practical purposes, the U.S. military is in the process of reshaping its force structure to meet the demands of the Carter administration's discredited *Global 2000 Report*, a document that proposes the elimination of 2 billion people in the developing sector.

That is not to say this policy is either understood or supported by a majority of military professionals within the services or the Pentagon. It *is* to say that it is the de facto policy of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who as Nixon's Health, Education, and Welfare secretary, in 1974 at the World Population Conference sponsored by the progenocide Club of Rome announced that the United States was committed to achieving world zero population growth.

The thinking behind this transformation is as follows. The principal flashpoints for wars in the coming decades will be regions of the "overpopulated" developing sector. U.S. forces are to umpire these population-induced wars either through heavily armed surrogates or through the yet-to-be functional Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). As population impinges on scarce resources in coming years, both the threat and actuality of such warfare will intensify.

The leading spokesman for these ideas within the U.S. defense establishment is the Vietnam-era chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, a member of the board of directors of the Draper Fund, which is devoted to population reduction, and an associate of the organization's founder, the late Gen. William Draper. It is Taylor's opinion that the United States and the Soviet Union will never fight a strategic nuclear exchange. The Soviets, Taylor has indicated in several published locations, will not deploy their considerable strategic nuclear forces against the United States, risking

U.S.-NATO retaliation, no matter how greatly provoked. Taylor further believes that the Soviets have no intrinsic vital or strategic interests in the developing sector, except to deny certain resources to the West; they are therefore quite willing to tolerate the butchery of populations in the Third World, provided such butchery does not occur in countries on the immediate border of the Soviet Union. In those latter cases, the Soviets might be induced to hasten the population reduction themselves, through involvement in long civil wars.

It is under these premises that Taylor thinks U.S. military posture should be re-organized. He therefore strongly emphasizes a conventional force buildup, but with technology suitable for fighting conventional warfare in the developing sector and not for the European theater. Such interventionary forces need not be enormous, hence the possibility of limiting the size of the proposed RDF. Smaller, well-equipped, forces are required here, and overall readiness of the smaller military unit is to be stressed.

The corollary of the "Taylor doctrine" is that, if cuts are required in overall defense spending, they must come from strategic weapons systems. Why, goes the thinking, build more bombers, missile systems such as the MX if they are not going to be deployed? The type of strategic approach that Taylor proposes is the ludicrous deployment of potential first-strike systems such as the cruise and Pershing missiles. With these systems it becomes possible to play what amounts to a strategic chicken game with the Soviets, threatening them with a first strike, though manifestly lacking the ability to fight an in-depth war.

The Taylor doctrine is the summation of the two most incompetent aspects of current strategic thinking: the limited nuclear war, flexible response bluff associated with former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his RAND Corporation protégé James Schlesinger, and British colonial doctrine that enforces backwardness and depopulation through local wars. It is based on a fundamental and wishful miscalculation of Soviet thinking, the hysterical belief that the Soviet Union will never deploy its superior in-depth capabilities, however provoked.

Weinberger's policy

Taylor claims to have substantial support for his thinking inside the Weinberger Pentagon, a place currently overpopulated with RAND scenario planners. His claim is substantiated by recent developments and policy statements.

First, there is the so-called Weinberger secret five-year guidance to the services, leaked to the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, and other papers, which reflects the mix in limited nuclear war-fighting, and conventional, interventionary force structures emphasized by Taylor, along with an overt emphasis on the ability to

respond to alleged Soviet threats anywhere in the world by taking action in the developing sector.

Second, there is the leaked discussion of proposed cuts in the Reagan defense program. The Taylor scheme is precisely the type of proposal appropriate to economic austerity policies associated with Robert McNamara, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. It is the implementation of the IMF-World Bank austerity policies which implement the Global 2000 genocide in the developing sector. The initial proposals for cuts in the defense budget prepared by Weinberger's staff cohere in large part with both IMF recommendations and with recommendations made by Taylor in a Sept. 1 op-ed in the *Washington Post*. Furthermore, Taylor told reporters last week that he sees the budget crisis as a means to speed up his planned reassessment of U.S. military requirements, focusing on the need to deal with population crises in the developing sector.

Third, Fritz Kraemer, the man who trained and created Henry Kissinger and is now a key adviser to Weinberger's Defense Department, told an elite group of specialists in Kiel, West Germany two weeks ago that there *is not and never will be* a threat of strategic nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. The policy of the Reagan administration, Kraemer told his audience, is to prepare for regional wars in its own back yard and confront the Soviets and their Cuban allies with conventional forces.

Finally, there is the publication in the August issue of the official U.S. Army journal, *Military Review*, of a lead article by Lt. Col. John Wilcox titled "The Military Implications of the *Global 2000 Report*." The article, reflecting the openness of debate on the subject within the military, proposes to fulfill the Taylor doctrine, without referencing the retired general. Wilcox calls for the creation of forces capable of fighting wars in urban battlefields in the developing sector because that is where population pressure will create battle situations. *Global 2000* should become a military planning document, he maintains.

For the time being, Weinberger is arguing that strategic force improvements be continued despite budgetary restraints. In part his argument is due to the need to maintain a credible bluff vis-à-vis not only Soviets, but also the U.S. NATO allies. But Defense Department sources say that the only thing the secretary is firmly committed to is the deployment of the limited-war systems such as the cruise missile and the Pershing II. The other systems will be scaled back, like the MX, if necessary, to meet budget requirements. The conventional forces buildup, along the lines proposed by Taylor, who has openly advocated writing off 1 billion people in the Third World, will continue, as the United States moves closer to carrying out Global 2000's military precepts.

Maxwell Taylor: 'write off a billion'

The following excerpts are from an interview with Maxwell Taylor, provided to EIR, which originally appeared in our April 14, 1981 issue.

Q: Have you and the other Draper Fund people considered what will happen to the countries that are not on your list as important to U.S. needs? Won't the Soviets have a free hand to come in and aid them and extend their influence?

A: We are of one mind that there is a Soviet faction who for the last 30 years has been perfectly willing to let parts of the Third World go under. You have to understand the mind of the Soviet "Mother Russia" faction. They care about their country. They care about the countries on their immediate borders. They don't give a damn, really, about the rest of the world. They have no desire to develop anything outside this limited area. Their view is that the Soviet Union and its immediate colonies are totally self-sufficient energywise and in minerals. They have no use for the minerals supply of the Third World. Their goal is to deny this to the West. They will use the population crisis to foment rebellion and coups d'état in these countries. They may take over a country here and there for a time, but their only really policy is continuous destabilization to deny resources to the West.

Q: Is your paper intended for circulation within the new administration?

A: It was written as a strategic document. You should note that my report is already quite selective about what can be saved. I have already written off more than a billion people. These people are in places in Africa, Asia, Latin America. We can't save them. The population crisis and the food-supply question dictate that we should not even try. It is a waste of time. The Soviets are not about to save them, either.

There will be horrible consequences for our failure to heed the warnings of General Draper and others. These people will suffer from continuous cycles of natural disaster, famine, hunger, floods, drought. Upwards of 500 million people will try to escape, become refugees, flee across borders. Most of them will never make it. Some old fools and young ones may talk of trying to mount a noble effort to help these people, and I am sure we will try to do the humanitarian thing. But they can't be saved, and we must be selective.

Q: How is population policy shaping up elsewhere in Washington?

A: For now, decisions will be made through the NATO command, which thinks demographically. Their decisions must be imposed with the full weight of the West. The Soviets are aware of this; they will conduct limited surrogate warfare for certain areas. They will not fight a world war over areas of the world they don't need. These are the rules of the modern game.

'Growth means war'

From the revised January 1981 draft of "World Population Growth and U.S. Security Interest," written by Gen. Maxwell Taylor for the Population Crisis/Committee Draper Fund:

The relationship between U.S. security interests and rapid population growth abroad can be stated very simply: nearly all those Third World countries in which the United States has one or another vital security interest have very serious population problems. These population problems, because they threaten the long-range economic and political viability of such countries, undermine their dependability as U.S. allies and trading partners. Included prominently are countries in Latin America, East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. . . . Any number of them could become the next Iran. . . .

[N]o amount of aid will keep these countries from eventually going under if population growth continues unchecked. . . . If, as a result of horrendous population pressures, U.S. allies are unable to satisfy the most basic needs of their countrymen over the long run, they will be able to contribute little to U.S. efforts to block communist expansion and maintain a peaceful balance in strategic regions of the world like the Middle East. . . .

Regional political conflicts are likely to intensify as population pressures increase the scramble for land, water, and other essentials and as unemployment spills over national borders in the form of larger labor migrations. . . . As resentment and frustration grow, new opportunities are created for extremist forces to foment civil unrest and ultimately to bring down governments friendly to the U.S. . . .

'An illusory need'

From a guest editorial by Maxwell Taylor, titled "How Much for Defense? Only What's Essential," in the Sept. 1 Washington Post:

Like the Gilbert and Sullivan policeman, the life of a secretary of defense is rarely a happy one. Caspar Wein-

berger is verifying this fact as he tries to find a mode of deploying the MX missile capable of satisfying the numerous critics, political, military and industrial. At the same time, he faces the strong possibility of sharp reductions in the funds to be available for his military programs.

Weinberger is already being criticized for having invited cuts by delaying decisions not only regarding the MX but also the new bomber, the big carrier issue and other pressing matters. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for further deliberate delay. Now would be an excellent time to take a recess and review the essentiality of all high-priced military programs. By doing so, when the cuts come, our leaders would have solid evidence of the programs' relative importance and rational priority in distributing budget reductions.

If the secretary undertook such a review, he would need a practical measure of essentiality to apply to the projects to be tested. I have one such measure to propose in the form of a definition: an essential military program is one that produces effective military means to cope with a real and urgent danger at a price deemed acceptable. Price may be expressed in many ways; money, manpower, industrial output, scarce natural resources and the effect of reductions on other programs. In short, for essentiality the danger must be great, the planned counter-measures seemingly efficacious and the price right.

If such a measure were strictly applied to some of the major defense programs, I would expect many to flunk the test. Let me illustrate how several tests might turn out.

In the case of the MX, the urgency of the threat can be challenged because of the extremely low probability that the cautious leaders of the Kremlin would ever risk an attack on our silo-based ICBMs, given the uncertain performance of their own missiles and the losses to be expected from an American retaliation. In the absence of an urgent danger, there is an unproved requirement for an MX or any other weapon basing its need on the vulnerability of our ICBMs.

The administration is proposing a new bomber in replacement of the B52, capable of penetrating heavy Soviet air defenses. For test purposes, it would be necessary to show that such a bomber could penetrate more effectively and/or at lesser cost than cruise missiles launched from aircraft, submarines or surface craft . . . In the case of the Army, I would question the essentiality of the two additional divisions under consideration to raise the Army total from 14 to 16. While there may be a definite need for more Army divisions later on, no such expansion can be justified now until each of the 14 divisions is made task-ready—that is, prepared to undertake its primary mission on schedule and stay with it as long as required. It would make much more sense for the

Defense Department to expend its resources for task-readiness than to add to the divisional structure and thereby the “hollowness” that the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. E. C. Meyer, deplors in the Army at present.

If Secretary Weinberger were inclined to undertake such an essentiality review, he might hope for certain gains. Such a review would verify the soundness or reveal the vulnerabilities of programs in time to correct or jettison them. This would strengthen the defense of the surviving programs against the assault of critics bent on reducing military budgets. Perhaps of longer-term importance, it might establish a permanent practice of demanding evidence of the essentiality of all future military programs as demonstrated by their contribution to forestalling real and urgent dangers rather than to the illusory need of equaling or surpassing what the Soviets have or do.

‘The jungles of some LDC’

From “Military Implications of the Global 2000 Report” by Lt.-Col. John G. Wilcox in the August 1981 issue of Military Review. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilcox is study director for international programs at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency in Bethesda, Maryland. Emphasis is in the original.

Despite changing social and scientific trends which indicate a vastly different threat environment in the year 2000, the Army continues to structure and train its forces for conventional war on the plains of Europe. Even “contingency” missions such as those associated with the Rapid Deployment Force are in terms of conventional battle as we knew it in World War II and as we perceive it will be in Central Europe. . . .

The Army has become too inflexible in its rigid adherence to the concepts of fighting a mechanized battle in a sophisticated conventional war of the future. Rather than preparing our Army to defend the United States and our national interests, this fixed strategic model limits U.S. power to apply force in differing situations in differing areas of the world. This article examines some specific demographic trends that indicate a vastly changed world situation in the future in which our Army may be called upon to defend this nation in ways beyond today's comprehension.

The recently published *Global 2000 Report* contains some very stark realities and serious military implications.

Our conclusions . . . are disturbing. They indicate the

potential for global problems of alarming proportions by the year 2000. Environmental, resource, and population stresses are intensifying and will increasingly determine the quality of life on our planet.

Only one aspect of the *Global 2000 Report*, demographic trends, is addressed in a very limited analysis of the impact of these trends on the U.S. Army of the year 2000. Considering the fact that approximately 20 years are required to develop and field a weapons system, such as the *M1 Abrams* tank, and that the babies born today will be the soldiers of the year 2000, a study of the *Global 2000 Report* is both timely and relevant.

World population trends

This could pose a serious challenge to U.S. leaders and the U.S. Army in that the enemy we face may well be a mass army with relatively unsophisticated weapons and whose soldiers are inured to hardship and the rigors of combat—an army other than the Red army. Moreover, the objective of combat may not be a military defeat of the enemy but a negotiated settlement. The battlefield may not be the plains of Europe but, rather, the jungles, mountains or cities of some LDC.

Thus, with population inflation in many regions of the world by the year 2000, the enemies of today may not be nearly so threatening as the enemies of tomorrow. Moreover, the weapons of today and those now being designed for tomorrow may be inappropriate for the targets of tomorrow. Just as tactical nuclear weapons were judged politically inappropriate in Vietnam, likewise sophisticated and highly lethal conventional weapons may be politically inappropriate in the future.

... In addition, increasing urbanization and the possibility of conflict within urban areas call for a rethinking of strategy, doctrine and force structure. Conflicts may take place entirely within cities. For example, how does an army fight a war in an urban area of 30 million people where there are constraints on space, weapons employment and mobility? The size of the force required to subdue a significant enemy force by conventional means in such a city would exceed the present authorized strength of the U.S. Army, 775,000. Refugees would present uncalculated problems for all-too-few civil affairs and military police units. Again, one recalls the Vietnam experience of dealing with civilians and paramilitary units.

But, most important, fighting in such areas would call for a restructuring of Army forces from tank-heavy divisions to light infantry forces, trained to fight in builtup areas and educated in civil affairs. While technology can aid in making forces lighter or providing valuable information, it cannot be the focus of force structuring, doctrine or strategy in such a conflict—as it was in Vietnam . . .

One of the major considerations which results from an analysis of the *Global 2000 Report* is that the population explosion projected for the LDCs preordains a changing locus of conflict. The perceived enemies of today may not be the enemies of tomorrow. One of the present tasks that faces the United States in this regard is to prevent the Soviet Union from disassociating itself from the “have” nations and siding with the “have-nots.” If the U.S.S.R. is successful in persuading the LDCs that the Soviets are not among the industrialized have nations, it will be in a position to manipulate the LDCs selectively against the remaining industrialized world. . . .”

The population explosion in the LDCs will alter the way we think about the purposes of our Army and its organization. Many will still cling to the “worst-case” theory—that is, we must have heavy formations for defeat of the enemy’s heavy formations. Increasingly, however, concerns will be how to fight in the cities, how to limit damage and how to control populations, all of which call for lighter forces. The dilemma is that these capabilities are not all compatible, and the predominance of the “worst-case” theorists may well ensure that the U.S. Army finds itself in another Vietnam—not knowing how to fight and overorganized. On the other hand, high technology may provide light forces a more general-purpose capability.

Wars of the year 2000 will require new strategies and new concepts. There will be entirely new dimensions to warfare as the 21st century approaches that will limit the U.S. Army’s ability to perform its mission unless we anticipate change. Space warfare will add to the Air Force mission and limit the role of ground forces. Already the principles of surprise and mass may be impossible to achieve. The Air Force will enjoy an increasing portion of the budget pie for space technology at the expense of the Army. Scarce manpower resources will reduce the size of the Army, and proxy armies may become a necessary combat multiplier.

One of the great paradoxes in the coming decades is that there will be decreasing utility for the have nations to resort to force against the poorer nations. Conversely, there will be increasing motivation and capability for the have-not nations to challenge the rich nations to combat—another new dimension. . . .

Any attempt to perceive the future is subject to criticism, and this analysis is no exception. The trends projected by the *Global 2000 Report* may be totally wrong or overcome by dynamic events. The deductions and implications derived for the U.S. Army may be equally wrong. Nevertheless, now is the time to start thinking and talking about the year 2000. This appointment with the future is closer to us than World War II and Korea of the past.