

The lesson of Nazi jet aircraft development

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

There is a presently accelerating opinion among policy-influentials affecting the Reagan administration's decisions, that the United States can imitate successfully the precedent of the German war economy under Nazi Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht and Albert Speer. In brief, that the United States can continue to tolerate the monetarist austerity of Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, and nonetheless mobilize military expenditures in the proportions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1938-1945 effort.

Most of the leading senior specialists supporting that presumption would agree that the case of achievements of both the aeronautical and rocket-research divisions at Peenemünde are the preferred topic of choice for examination of their adopted theses. That topic demonstrates with shattering force that the thesis is suicidally absurd.

Like the Nazis of yesteryear, the present drift of Pentagon doctrine does not originate in military or scientific thinking. It originates as a classical psychic *reaction-formation* among key military specialists and scientists who have responded to a Nazi-modeled Friedman-Volcker Schachtian policy of austerity, and in much the same pathetic manner the psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim analyzed the reasons some Jewish inmates of Nazi concentration camps (among other inmates) came to identify with the automobiles, shepherd dogs, uniforms and mannerisms of their SS guards. They have accepted the authority of the federal government's commitment to a Nazi-modeled austerity policy, and have restricted their proposed technological and related mili-

tary choices to those choices which do not conflict with the Nazi-modeled Volcker monetarist dogma.

The case of Dr. Edward Teller is exemplary of this problem. Teller came to the United States as a refugee from the fascist regime of Admiral Horthy in Hungary. A brilliant engineer whose knowledge was significantly influenced by the diluted version of Riemannian physics prevailing at Germany's Göttingen University into the World War II period, Teller's achievements—in opposition to the Fabian-influenced Robert Oppenheimer and others of the Bernard Baruch inclination—in connection with the H-bomb and in stretching the potentialities of Cauchy-Maxwell-disoriented plasma physics practice to their virtual limit, are incontestable points in respect to which Dr. Teller's competence must be admired. We should note that Dr. Teller recently achieved one of the finest hours in his personal public life, in a 1977 international tour in which he clearly and correctly posed the facts showing that antinuclear “neo-Malthusians” are genocidalists in practice. Yet, repeatedly, politically, he has capitulated to the dictates of the same circles which were represented during the 1960s by Hitler's protégé in Hungary, Ferenc Nagy.

Dr. Teller's problem exemplifies an influential community of leading figures of science and related military policy who have failed or refused to break free of control by the international network of “families” centered historically on Venice and Venice's Switzerland and former Austro-Hungarian Empire colonies, a circle for which the fascist P-2 Freemasonic lodge of Italy served (1969-

1981) as the principal coordinator of international terrorism as well as fascist coups, the same P-2 network, including Libya's Qaddafi, funding the projected outbreak of urban riots and terrorism in the United States today.

We single out Dr. Teller for his virtues, not his political flaws. He is the most easily recognized among a number of key scientific figures whose competence should have guided them to the same general assessment of the Peenemünde case we outline here. If such figures would come to their political senses, and apply their scientific competence to the issues of present Pentagon policy, their concerted efforts might bring the White House to its senses—*before it is too late*.

The problem on which attention is to be focused here, is the case of those intellectually cowardly careerists of both leading military-professional and civilian ranks who are disposed to seize upon any evidence, including the Nazi war economy case, to justify their elaboration and support for a military policy which is both immoral and incompetent. They do so under the auspices of a perverted doctrine of "state interest" adduced from the worst features of Clausewitz's *On War*, that strategic planners must brainwash themselves into swallowing any strategic policy adopted by forces which give orders to our Presidents. "This is the policy, buddy. Get with it! Shape up or ship out!"

Peenemünde

This writer has before him at this moment a sampling of reports of Peenemünde's work on jet and rocket aircraft designs bearing on the cases of the wartime Me 163b, the Me 262, the Arado 234, the He.280. This information is viewed from a background of first-hand discussions by himself and his associates with former specialists working at Peenemünde, and considerable research into the development and significance of the scientific and educational institutions which the Nazis mobilized from Göttingen University and other sources to make Peenemünde possible.

The writer also has on his desk at this moment the 1509 *Divina Proportione* of Fra Luca Pacioli, which is not only the most influential single source of the broad sweep of modern scientific progress since, but which has the most specific, although mediated bearing on understanding the specific physics which was decisive for the crucial military applications of Peenemünde.

This material, exemplified by the cited items now spread upon the writer's desk-top, is properly focused on the famous 1859 paper of Bernhard Riemann, which successfully predicted the physics of generation of discrete "shockwave" phenomena in a hypothetical "infinite cylinder," the most crucial single paper for modern aeronautics and the frontiers of present-day relativistic-

beam and related plasma physics research and development. Attention is inclusively focused on the conical or "wedge" variants for the "infinite cylinder," the most important of the subsumed lines of investigation defined by Riemann's 1859 paper.

Attention is also addressed to the archive of geometric designs, representing the work which Felix Klein demanded of graduating students in his program at Göttingen, a feature of training orientation which has been largely neglected since, to the effect of tragic weakening of competence among entrants to our own present-day scientific community.

The fallacy toward which our attention is focused is an argument which can be fairly simplified: "Since the Nazis developed frontier-quality military-technological capabilities under the terms of the Schacht-Hitler-Speer political-economic policy, we can replicate the same relative achievement. Moreover, since we represent a complex of global geopolitical assets far exceeding those of the Nazis, we can succeed where the Nazis failed." The fallacy of the first part of that argument, on which this report is focused, is that *the Nazi economy used up a previously established scientific and industrial potential which no Nazi or kindred political-economic order could produce*. The correlated point is that *we lack technological resources comparable to those the Nazi regime appropriated in subjecting the German nation to its rule*. In terms of the present state of our educational system, the potentialities for producing, assimilating and applying technology, in our industrial establishment, and in the qualifications of and extent of our scientific community, we are *relatively* far below the resources of the nation which fell into Hitler's and Schacht's hands.

In short, the essential rationalization, on which the present drift of Reagan administration military policy depends, is a pathetic and properly obvious fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*.

In other words, the Reagan administration has been duped and pressured (e.g., by the Trilaterals and the Heritage Foundation) into adopting a military policy which might have succeeded in 1938-1940, but which cannot succeed in an economy suffering the combined moral and economic debilitation aggravated by nearly 18 years of the rock-drug counterculture, a comparable period of destruction of our educational system, the past 15 years' growing influence of "cost-benefit analysis" and neo-Malthusianism in government policies and the economic carnage wrought by four years of the Trilateral Carter administration.

The opposite side of the case is that the Nazis found placed at their disposal the fag-end of what had been the world's greatest public and university educational system, an approximately halved remnant of what had

been the world's most powerful combined military and industrial capacity per capita for any population, and the remnants of what had been the world's most advanced scientific capability. The complementary point is the fact that although the Nazis commanded the German state, it was the German nation which deployed *its non-Nazi resources* to fight the war.

Peenemünde efficiently expresses, in the most accessible and concentrated way, the role of *non-Nazi-created* scientific and industrial resources in developing an advanced military capability, *despite* the contrary implications of Nazi economic, social, cultural, and political characteristics.

In terms of military history, the Nazi case is the obverse of the case of Alexander the Great. Philip of Macedon, the "Adolf Hitler" of the fourth century B.C., represented, together with most of the Macedonian generals, a commitment to establishing the Western Division of the Persian Empire based on what the documents from that period describe alternately as the "Persian Model" or "Oligarchical Model." This is the same "model" later deployed as the Roman Empire and as the Byzantine Aristotelian tradition, mediated through the Byzantine sub-capital at Venice into such later projects as the role of Venice, the Bank for International Settlements and Montagu Norman of Britain, in putting the Nazi Adolf Hitler into power. The combined forces of the Platonic Academy at Athens and the Cyrenaic Temple of Amon assassinated Philip of Macedon and placed Alexander the Great in power, destroying the Persian Empire on which Philip's plot was based.

In the case of Nazi Germany, but for intervention in support of Hitler by the British government, during 1936-1938, and again during the war itself, *as Winston Churchill admitted to the British parliament at the close of the war in Europe*, Hitler would have been destroyed by his generals as Aristotle and the proto-Nazis among the Macedonian generals assassinated Alexander by poisoning.

In the earlier case, a morally positive force, Alexander, commanded an instrument whose character was defined previously by the proto-Hitler, Aristotle's patron, Philip. In the latter, Nazi Germany case, the institutions deployed by Hitler were the relatively positive moral forces whose capabilities were determined by a character opposite to that of Hitler and the Nazis.

Societies do not function in terms of the independent judgments of the average individual member of society. Only a tiny minority in any society to date acts according to independent rational judgment. Most people in societies, including the United States up to this point, behave as their wills are controlled by those institutions with which sections of the population associate them-

selves. To make the United States a Nazi state, the present combinations of Buckley types and rock-drug counter-culture neofascists, although aggregating to less than one-quarter of the population, would be a sufficient, already philosophically fascist base. The majority of the people would probably accept American "neo-Nazism" just as most anti-Nazi Germans submitted during 1933-1936 and then fought the war for Nazi Germany. They submitted because the Nazis captured the wills of the top-most layers of the institutions which controlled the judgment and wills of the majority of citizens, Nazis and non-Nazis alike. After the war, the same citizens became fervently anti-Nazi, for the same reason: the change in command of institutions dictated an abrupt shift to a policy of anti-Nazism. As election data of the postwar period prove conclusively, the majority of Americans exercise not one bit more independence of judgment than the German population of 1932-1945 did.

People generally will loyally support the most evil sort of regime, if the institutions with which the people associate themselves do not mobilize resistance of major combinations of institutions against that evil.

It is such moral weakness of judgment of most citizens which has rendered the United States apparently defenseless in face of the growing drug epidemic. The leaders of national parties have supported "drug decriminalization" and gutting of law enforcement action against both drug-users and drug-pushers. Meanwhile, prodrug (NORML) forces of William F. Buckley and the Anti-Defamation League deploy lying defamation and other dirty tricks against any group of citizens which resists this spread of the drug traffic. In moral principle, any New York citizen who supports the reelection of Mayor Ed Koch is guilty of being a witting accomplice of the drug-pushers. In principle, any person who collaborates with William F. Buckley or the Anti-Defamation League is a witting accomplice of drug-pushers, just as anyone who supports Rep. Richard Ottinger is as guilty of supporting genocide as a wartime supporter of Nazi mass-murderer Albert Speer. Morally, there is no difference among Adolf Hitler, Albert Speer, Irwin Suall, James Hoge of the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and Richard Ottinger. The person who will support any one of these will wittingly condone a regime equivalent to that of Adolf Hitler's.

So, from present everyday American experience today, we see the resemblance in morality between the majority of American adults and 1932-1945 supporters of Adolf Hitler.

The majority of citizens behave in that immoral way not because they are personally evil, but because they are intellectually and morally "little people." Each "little person" is controlled by his or her aspirations for



Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, who was to command the Germany army if Churchill had not blocked the plot to kill Adolf Hitler.

what Dante Alighieri termed “earthy paradise”—career, pension, peer-group status, and petty, day to day hedonistic “needs” of his or her self or adopted immediate circles. The passion of “Look, guy, I’ve got to look out for myself,” and “take care of my personal family responsibilities” are typical of the phrases by which most people justify their customary immorality on the “big questions” of national and foreign policies.

The policies and behavior of nations and their peoples are not determined by the rational, independent judgment of a majority among their citizens. The policies and behavior of nations are determined by the institutions of which they are composed, and according to what forces control the top-most command structure of executive functions and opinion-making in those institutions. In the long run, the character of the ruling forces of a state shapes the internal character of its institutions. In the shorter and medium term, the internal characteristics of institutions are determined predominantly by the institutionalizing processes of preceding periods of development.

Although Peenemünde was an institution controlled by the Nazi regime, the character of that regime and its political-economic policies are less than irrelevant to the

characteristic features of the work accomplished there. Peenemünde was a product of pre-World War I Germany, and, most emphatically, of pre-1848 Humboldt University in Berlin and nineteenth-century Göttingen University. The most crucial among the advanced capabilities expressed at Peenemünde were all directly derived from the 1854-1866 work of Bernhard Riemann at Göttingen and Riemann’s employment of what he termed “Dirichlet’s Principle”—of the brother-in-law of the composer Felix Mendelssohn, Lejeune Dirichlet—and of Lazare Carnot’s and Alexander von Humboldt’s project, the University of Berlin (Humboldt University). The most specific among the broader influences of Riemannian physics was the cited 1859 paper.

The Nazi Party and leadership was philosophically a neo-Malthusian, “postindustrial society” cult, from Hitler and cult-doctrinaire Alfred Rosenberg on down. The majority of the Nazi Party’s active membership base of 1932-1933 was a precise analogue of the present-day transatlantic rock-drug counterculture, the Weimar counterculture of the 1920s and early 1930s. This connection of Hitler to the rock-drug counterculture was anticipated by the leading postwar homosexual fascist leader of the period, Stefan George, the first among the Weimar fascist leaders to articulate the “leadership principle” later made the centerpiece of the Hitler cult. There is no essential philosophical difference between Hitler and the genocidal Club of Rome today.

In power, Hitler’s leading political problem was the fundamental opposition in philosophical outlook between the Nazi neo-Malthusian ideology and the commitment to industrial and technological progress of the majority of the German population and national institutions. Hitler required these institutions as forces indispensable for his military aims, but was determined to subvert and then destroy those German national institutions as quickly as they had served his war-fighting purpose. Had Hitler won the war, his world would have been ordered exactly as the Draper Fund, the Club of Rome, and allied genocidal institutions envisage today. Hitler was a fanatically anglophile protégé of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Neville Chamberlain’s cousin, and imbued with the Anglo-Saxon racial theories identical with those of Cecil B. Rhodes and Colonel (later General) William Draper of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City *at that time*. Wipe out all “inferior races” (Jews, Slavs, blacks, etc.) to create living-room for world-empire of a world-federalist system based on the Anglo-Saxon “racial stock.” That is the same policy embraced by such figures as Aurelio Peccei of the Club of Rome, by the World Bank, by the leaders of NATO’s OECD organization, and by such functionaries of the genocidalist Draper Fund as General Maxwell Taylor.

Germany generally was not anglophile, even under Hitler. German citizens volunteered with enthusiasm for a war against the Versailles-enemy Britain, and with shudders of reluctance for fighting on the Russian front. Hitler was obliged to save Britain from the German nation by such means as holding Guderian's tanks back (on Hitler's personal orders) at Dunkirk, by diverting the Luftwaffe from strategic targets in Britain into the prepared antiaircraft shooting-gallery over London. Hitler was quite sincere in sending Rudolf Hess to negotiate an anti-Soviet alliance with Britain, through the Duke of Hamilton—and somewhat justified in his probe through Hess, as Brigadier Rees and others disclosed, "Hess had arrived much too late."

Except for Hitler's crucial interventions to save Britain from conquest by the German military, the war in the West was conducted according to classical German military doctrine, a successful re-enactment of the Schlieffen policy employed in World War I. In the East, Hitler fell into the same kind of trap which Scharnhorst et al. had designed, baited, and closed against Napoleon in 1812—as the professional German military recognized that from the beginning. The Soviet defense of Moscow and Leningrad, during the winter of 1941-1942, had the same principal strategic significance as the Germans' blowing up of pre-mined Moscow around Napoleon's ears. The failure to take Moscow and Leningrad in the successive winters of 1941-1942 and 1942-1943 set up the logistical geometry in which the potential of the Stalingrad flanking counterattack became possible. This was German knowledge since 1809-1812 of the principles of a Russian campaign.¹

It is that and related interaction between German nationalist institutions and the contrary character of the Nazi regime which define every crucial feature of the Nazi period.

Putting aside for the moment the monstrous immorality of those who propose to model a transformed U.S.A. on the Nazi war economy, and considering only whether the war economy feature of such a scheme might succeed, *does the United States today have potential Peenemündes? It does not;* during the recent two decades, culminating in the combined effects of the Carter administration and six months of Volcker's Nazi-modeled monetary policies, the United States has been virtually stripped of nearly all of those institutional capabilities equivalent for today to the German nationalist institutions of industry, science, and military which the Nazis appropriated and exploited over the 1933-1945 period.

What is striking, in this comparison, is a study of both the science and the applied technology embodied in exemplary form in the aircraft identified at the outset. These facts show how damned little progress has been made over the course of 35 postwar years. That poverty

of progress since the days of the Manhattan Project and Germany's Peenemünde attests to the inner character of our institutions: except for the brief and glorious period of fostering of NASA by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, we have destroyed the efficient impulse for progress within the relevant institutions, and have stripped our labor-force of what might have been reserve potentialities in depth, for the kind of high-technology mobilization which might have matched the Nazis' use of the German nationalist institutions represented at Peenemünde.

The exception: Japan

To illustrate most efficiently what is wrong with the policies of the United States, it is most useful to look at Japan. What is it that causes many to accuse Japan of being "unfair"? Simply, Japan "unfairly" refuses to be as stupid as the United States has become. Japan has continued to follow, at least predominantly, the principles of the American System, articulated by President George Washington's treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton. The names of the leading economists of the American System—Hamilton, Carey, and List—are by-words of every literate figure of Japan, almost unknown in the presently decaying economy of the United States. Japan is "unfair" because it has maintained its prosperous growth, by refusing to import ignorant follies, such as the anti-American System political-economic dogmas of Adam Smith, John M. Keynes, and of the British Fabian Society's University of Chicago economics department.

The leading circles in Japan have reached the proper conclusions on economic policy. The most advanced circles among Japan's trading-company complexes have adopted the term "knowledge-export industry" to describe the policy best ensuring that nation's future prosperity.

We stupid American say: "It is not necessary to be first on principal fronts of technological not necessary to revive the precedents of the Manhattan Project and NASA's moon-landing, to give priority to public support for research-and-development undertakings. Besides, the "free-enterprise" freaks and the "environmentalists" are both against it.

"It is sufficient," say the stupid Americans, "that we force labor to work for less and much sweat much more, to drive down U.S. wages toward Third World levels, so that our backward, labor-intensive, obsolescence-ridden, and shrinking industrial base can compete with more productive industries abroad. Otherwise, we shall use our muscle to bludgeon our allies into bankruptcy, so that they will no longer be able to compete with us in foreign trade."

It is the attempt to graft a booming war economy buildup on top of such a lunatic policy of Nazi-modeled

austerity in basic civilian agriculture and industry, which is the cult-like madness dominating the utterances of strategic policy utterers.

That is the short of it all. We must give first priority in national-defense policy to forced-draft expansion of our advanced research and development capabilities, in an environment defined by high rates of technologically advanced, capital-intensive investment in increasing the base and scale of goods-producing output, and building up thus the civilian economic and tax-revenue base for an adequate defense expenditure. We must complement this by measures which foster high-technology economic growth among our industrialized allies, and among our friends of the developing nations, creating an economically powerful community of principle among sovereign nation-state republics, as the institutional base for strategic defense capabilities.

The trouble with the Reagan administration so far is twofold. First, for its own part, the administration is riddled with Fabians (Stockman, Heritage Foundation, Buckleyites), Friedmanites, and Siena Group-controlled "supply-siders," who rally into Walpurgis Nacht intensities of psychedelic antics against any measure which offend their *British* versions of "free enterprise." Second, there is massive blackmail pressure from the Trilateral Commission's forces and the "Harrimanites," such that to the extent the administration wishes to do the right thing, it is terrified of offending these forces, and backs down.

Yet, having thrown away everything needed for a competent defense policy, the administration nonetheless plunges ahead with a determination to deploy a tattered and drug-ridden U.S. military establishment against "the Russkies." It devises its military policy to fit the limiting prescriptions of a lunatic economic and monetary policy. In this way, the administration finds itself verging ever closer to a decayed parody of the Nazi war economy. Obviously, not a single one among the supporters of this imbecilic orientation is exhibiting the slightest knowledge of *the past 500 years of military history since Plethon first set forth the modern doctrine at the beginning of the 15th century.*

Behind Peenemünde science

The achievements of Peenemünde's forces were most immediately the fruit of the tradition of Gottfried Leibniz in science and Leibniz's 1670s founding of economic science as the science of *technology*. The crucial developments of the 19th century on which Peenemünde drew were (a) Alexander von Humboldt's close collaboration with Lazare Carnot (1815-1825) to bring the French science being destroyed by A. Cauchy into Prussia, and (b) the Prussian system of education inaugurated by the student of Friedrich Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt, a system of classical education,

based on the classical Greek of Homer through Plato, which produced the highest quality of scientific potential among *gymnasium* graduates.

Although the vitality of German science was greatly diluted from the 1860s onward, after Britain's choice, Bismarck, secured the Prussian chancellorship, that diluted science remained an adequate basis for Germany's scientific superiority over all other nations through World War I. It was, as we have noted, the impact of Riemannian physics which enabled Peenemünde to achieve aeronautical designs superior to those of any other nation.

The scientific community outside Germany was inferior to German science because of the influence of a method typified by that of A. Cauchy and J. Maxwell, tracing its roots to Newton and Descartes of the 17th century. As a result, Peenemünde's theoretical physics is either not understood or little understood among most professional physicists in the United States even to this day, and the work of Adolf Busemann and his associates continues to be a matter of relevance for advanced-physics problems in leading circles of both the United States and Soviet Union to the present time.

Unless the physics community of the United States is disposed to give up the variety of mathematical method associated with Newton, Cauchy and Maxwell, for the physics traced through Leonardo da Vinci and Pacioli, through Kepler, Leibniz, Euler, Monge, Carnot, Legendre, and Riemann, it is impossible that U.S. science institutions, already numerically far smaller and still shrinking relative to the Soviet physics community, could sustain a match with the Soviet Union in respect of advanced technologies of military relevance.

The current military buildup outline of the Reagan administration reminds any informed military historian of Napoleon III's mobilizations in preparation for the battle at Sedan. Just as Napoleon deprecated the significance of then-modern forms of breech-loaded steel artillery, so the presently visible Pentagon policies de-emphasize the qualitative change in warfare embedded in the rapid, large-scale deployment of x-ray and gamma-ray relativistic-beam weaponry. Such latter technology is a subject of Riemannian physics, associated with principles alien to the tradition of Newton-Cauchy-Maxwell.

To begin developing the institutions on which an effective defense potential in depth depends, it would be wise to begin with closer attention to the 1509 *Divina Proportione* of Pacioli.

¹Note: For the same reasons, the attempt to pinpoint the inner Russian industrial base with precision low-kilotonnage missiles, such as the Pershing II has, in Russian classical military outlook, such significance that the Soviets are assured to react preemptively to prevent such capabilities from being emplaced. There are some genuine idiots involved in shaping our military policy.

The two varieties of strategic folly

On the weekend of July 31-August 2, a select group of individuals who fancy themselves as "strategic thinkers" will convene privately at Leeds Castle in England to discuss "war-winning strategies" for the West. The participants will include U.S. National Security Adviser Richard Allen, Frank Barnett of the National Strategy Information Center, Ed Fuelner of the Heritage Foundation, and several cothinkers from the British Isles and continental Europe.

EIR correspondents found several variations of warped strategic thinking in recent meetings in Washington. For example, a congressional aide with a reputation as a top defense expert told us he fully recognized that U.S. military and NATO forces were at a horrible disadvantage to the Soviets, that U.S. industrial capacity was eroded to a point of collapse. It would take years to catch up. The solution was for the United States to develop a credible first-strike capability and then threaten the Soviets with acting insane and using it. This would keep the Soviets "off balance." The United States and NATO should move toward a confrontation with the Soviets and hope to bluff them down. It may work, this expert reasoned. If not, Europe would go up in nuclear smoke, but it may be necessary to write off Europe to survive.

The same scenario was making the rounds at Henry Kissinger's Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. It will no doubt be discussed at Leeds Castle.

The man responsible for organizing the Leeds event is British Air Vice-Marshal Stewart Menaul, reportedly a close associate of British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Menaul does not subscribe to the above scenario. He recognizes the current vulnerability of the NATO forces, and proposes crash development of space-based laser weapons systems, in particular an antiballistic missile system.

With its emphasis on a high-technology solution, Menaul's proposal is enticing. His thinking, however, is flawed in crucial areas. He claims that it is possible to carry out his program within the context of austerity and deindustrialization in the West. The vice-marshal further claims that the Soviets will never launch a full-scale

thermonuclear war; he therefore upholds James Schlesinger's limited nuclear-war doctrine, and his correlative concept of the "aura of power."

When it comes down to it, Menaul and his cothinkers are also bluffing. His views, as expressed in several locations including a document in circulation by the Carrington-linked Foreign Affairs Research Institute, presume that the laser ABM system is an almost foolproof defense. There is no such thing as foolproof defense. What is required is an in-depth buildup of war-fighting capabilities.

From Stewart Menaul

The following excerpts are from two exclusive interviews, on July 24 and July 29, with British Air Vice-Marshal Stewart Menaul. The interviews were conducted by EIR European correspondent Mark Burdman.

Burdman: On the question of weapons systems, I wanted to convey to you my information from the United States that contradicts your assessment that Weinberger is in favor of the development of space-based ABM laser systems. My reading is that he is obsessed with the type of cost-accounting approach that will never allow for laser systems to come into existence.

Menaul: Well, whatever Weinberger's sentiments are, his *advisers* certainly aren't against this. You should read the latest edition of *Aviation Week*. The senior scientific adviser to the Reagan administration on future defense systems, whose name I don't remember, makes a very good case for the necessity of high-energy beam systems. He says this won't come next week, but by the end of the decade. The problem is that the Russians are now way ahead of us. They'll be sending up their Salyut-7 next month. The Cosmos 1267 involves three to four new Cosmos space stations. They will develop the capability to use lasers from space systems. I hope that when they announce they've done it, some people here will take the whole thing more seriously! The problem is all sorts of so-called scientists, leftist academics, etc., who impede any serious discussion on this.

Burdman: Well, who then specifically is the "lobby" in the U.S. for developing laser systems?

Menaul: Senator Wallop, Senator Tower. Almost anybody who knows something about reality. Bill van Cleave, Harold Agnew, the people at Hughes and Boeing. The problem is that we are governed by politicians, some of whom are lunatics on questions like this. . . .

Burdman: What is your evaluation of the perspective of Carrington in respect to such questions?

Menaul: He's trying to do his job under very difficult circumstances. You see, the problem here is that you have a government of very old-fashioned dyed-in-the-wool conservatives who think the United Kingdom is still a superpower, and they're completely wrong! We're a third-rate power! So look at the problems we create for ourselves. The Trident submarine, for example, is sheer lunacy, and with our total commitment to it, we are savagely cutting back on our navy, air force, army. The U.S., which is manufacturing the Trident, doesn't even take it seriously. The same issue of *Aviation Week* I referred to earlier is saying that the U.S. Air Force would like to be rid of the MX and Navy feels the same way about the Trident.

Burdman: So you feel the MX should be scrapped?

Menaul: It's unnecessary! Why all this talk of bigger and better *offensive* capability? We already have super-overkill capability, it's ridiculous! We must defend, and have available second-strike capability. The key is developing the systems that destroy the incoming missiles, not constantly building new offensive systems! The MX, Trident I, Trident II, it's the same track, all of it. Of course, by building these, we force the Russians to match it, but with the Russians there is one big difference. They know that more and more offensive weaponry is not the necessary new element in the situation, so are proceeding full-steam ahead with the new kinds of *defensive* systems.

Burdman: Where do you locate the doctrine in Western strategy that thinks in these latter terms?

Menaul: There are many people who feel this way, led by me! Why the hell go on doing this? We can already destroy all of Russia, China, Eastern Europe. If we were really worried about security from the Soviets, we would stop the incoming missiles. You have to build up your *defensive* capabilities, and we now have to reverse the years of scrapping such capabilities associated with Carter-Callaghan-Wilson ways of thinking.

Burdman: With everything you've said, how do you explain the John Nott "cost-accountancy perspective" of accommodating to the parameters of scarcity and so on? Also in the U.S., there is a strong similar tendency in economic policy. . . .

Menaul: In Britain, the government has inherited a completely chaotic situation from the previous years, and social problems are increasing, so there are some very real limitations. In the U.S., I don't agree with you; defense expenditures are up 5 percent from last year, and the 1982-83 budget is miles ahead of what Carter would

have put in there.

In the U.S., there are also many people who know very well that we could go into space tomorrow and develop the necessary technology and approaches if we decided to do so. The aircraft industry—Martin-Marietta, Rockwell, Boeing, Hughes—has prepared numerous studies indicating the feasibility of doing this. That's why Wallop recently made his impassioned plea, stating that the technology is *here*, let's develop it. But you get all sorts of blockage of the idea, including within the major industries, where you hear all sorts of fatuous arguments.

Burdman: Who do you have in mind?

Menaul: Figure it out for yourself. It's the companies that make the ballistic missiles, they argue for more and better of the same, it's ridiculous.

We need a *tough* U.S. administration that is ready to say, "To hell with you, this is what needs to be done, and we're going to do it!" Reagan's is that kind of administration, definitely, he's got that kind of toughness. I think that will become apparent in two to three weeks, in the debates in Congress on the question of the Stealth system and the cruise missile bombers. The Reagan administration will say, rightly, that we have the Stealth technology and the Russians don't know how to stop it, so let's go with it! I agree with that, we need the new kind of bomber with the Stealth technology.

Burdman: By late autumn, Weinberger is expected come to some definite decisions on weapons systems. By that time, what assurance do you have that the U.S. will in fact go in the direction of developing the new generations of technologies?

Menaul: Because I know the work being done by the Defense Advanced Technologies Organization in DOD. They have done studies which prove that this *can* be done. This group inside the DOD has access to Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, and they asked Livermore, for example, two years ago, whether it were possible to develop x-ray lasers, and Livermore said yes. The only problem, of course, is that the Russians are way ahead, with their Salyut-7 and one or two other advanced research systems. They spend 12 to 14 percent on defense, the U.S. thankfully is going up to 8 percent; in Europe it's much worse.

Burdman: But, frankly, you must admit the impossibility of doing everything you're talking about in the context of the economic policy typified by the Volcker interest-rate policies. How can you develop necessary new technologies and a competent military strategy without developing the industrial base of the society? From all the information, Volcker's measures are really doing damage to the American industrial infrastructure, so how can

you have a defense program of the type you want without ditching that policy?

Menaul: We understand the situation. The recession has hit *every* country, not just the U.S., that's the current reality. What it means is that we can't now run 26 programs of research in new systems like we would like to, we can only have 12 or 14. So the question now is fundamentally one of priorities. The problem as I see it is not as you are outlining it, but more of the fact that we are giving too much priority to old-fashioned systems, instead of asking, what must we develop for the 1990s? In defense technology, the U.S. is way behind; the Soviets have sent up 1,000 satellites in the past years, the U.S. none, but at the same time, the U.S. has better *available* technology than does the Soviet Union, if it would just use it. The U.S., that is, has nothing like the Salyut and Soyuz systems, but the kind of technology in question is available, if it is just used. the Columbia Space Shuttle was certainly a great thing, but we have wasted an awful lot of time. Look at the MX and Trident: they will both be out of date by the time they are developed, given Soviet technological breakthroughs!

So we need an expansion of the NASA approach. NASA of course has already military foci, as was seen in the plans around the Space Shuttle, but we must do far more of this. He who controls space will control Earth—the Russians are aware of this simple fact. The Russians have literally built a commuter system into space! . . .

Burdman: A further question: isn't it clear that the Soviet doctrine rejects the idea of limited nuclear war? They will fight a total war and have made that quite clear.

Menaul: This is wrong! The Soviets have modified their doctrine in the past years. They're ready to fight war in Europe alone, conventional war, conventional chemical war, and nuclear war. If they decide to fight a war in Europe, they have whatever means available that they consider appropriate, whether it be chemical, conventional, or nuclear. They're ready to fight war in Europe without getting the U.S. involved. This new modified doctrine has evolved from Kulikov, from Ogarkov, from Ustinov, they're the architects of the massive Soviet buildup in conventional forces. Obviously, the Soviets see purely conventional war as possible. They also have an ocean-going navy to starve NATO, deny it oil, raw materials. They're ready for *any* eventuality and the West is not. . . .

The new Soviet doctrines began five, six years ago, with the advent of technologies in computers, microprocessors, electro-optical equipment and so on, infrared equipment, millimeter radar, etc. According to Soviet doctrine, they must be ready to fight *any* war, and their technology for doing so has greatly improved. Their T-80 tanks are as good or better than anything in NATO,

as are their MIG-23s and MIG-25s. Happily, we're developing the F-16 and Tornado, but as we do so, the Russians have another five being developed. So, simply, any war in 1981 is different for Europe than would war have been in 1968-70. I deplore the attitude of some strategists in the U.K., France, and West Germany who talk only in terms of a conventional buildup. They only think that way because Europe is so far behind the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in technology. Yet with its 250 million people, Europe combined could easily be more capable of sustaining the necessary defense expenditures than are the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.; there's just no will to do it.

PD-59 [the Carter presidential directive that acknowledges tactical nuclear war as U.S. policy] makes quite a bit of sense. McNamara and Schlesinger were both on the right track, and finally Carter got in line. We now have the ability to hit military targets with precision and accuracy. As for limited nuclear warfare as a doctrine à la Schlesinger, it is absolutely necessary, given Soviet doctrine. The Soviets no longer are against the idea of fighting limited nuclear wars. Old-fashioned generals talk awful rubbish about this. The Soviets, with their generals' training in electrical engineering know more about precision targeting than do the Europeans, so for the Soviets limited nuclear war is now distinctly a possibility. The SS-20s are there to be used!

The Soviets in fact prefer conventional war in Europe so that they can occupy and take over the industrial infrastructure of the U.K., Germany, and France, rather than a radioactive landscape. If they were winning a conventional war in Europe, the U.S. would do nothing. Could you imagine the U.S. launching missiles at Minsk and Moscow in retaliation for the Soviets' occupying Germany? It would never happen; the U.S. would only launch weapons in response to the Soviets' directly attacking the U.S.

From an intelligence critic

On July 23, EIR Counterintelligence Editor Jeff Steinberg interviewed a recently retired national security analyst whose career in the Pentagon and in the intelligence community dates back to the immediate postwar period. His historical observations regarding the administration's endorsement of the Schlesinger Doctrine of limited nuclear war follow.

It is absolutely correct to describe the present military posture of the United States as a "blitzkrieg" policy. I

was involved in the first postwar studies done by the Pentagon on the deployment of missiles. We went down to Huntsville and interviewed all of the ex-Nazi scientists who we brought over from Peenemünde, von Braun, Berger. They had developed the identical technology that we are talking about today. They had the V-1, which we now call the cruise missile. They had the V-2, which back in 1949 we renamed the Pershing.

The use of these weapons systems was debated out from 1952-56, and it was rejected as a strategic military doctrine. Zumwalt and guys like that were pushing this limited nuclear war doctrine back then, but it was rejected at the time. This was not even considered to be smart tactics. No one ever came up with a competent battle plan based on this tactical nuclear warfare idea. But there it was under McNamara and later under Schlesinger again; the same tactical nuclear warfare nonsense. I like to think that some of the people in the defense establishment are smart enough to know that none of this stuff works. I believe that there is a whole other thing going on.

I think the administration knows that we have a tough recession coming on, and a real possibility of a lot of angry people taking to the streets. Right now we have no room in the Social Security or food-stamp budgets to give any more. We do have an inflated defense budget. We could cut as much as \$60 billion from current programs, and frankly, it wouldn't hurt our strategic defenses in the least. We're not producing anything worthwhile. With the push for a draft and with the inflated defense budget, we have all of the ingredients for a controlled domestic counterinsurgency force to maintain order in the context of a lot of people taking to the streets. Do you remember the old Morgenthau Plan that we had cooked up for Germany right after the war? Well, I think that the real story behind the defense planning is that the Morgenthau Plan is being resurrected, except for use right here in the United States.

From the Pentagon

The U.S. Department of Defense July 24 provided some official answers to questions submitted by Executive Intelligence Review concerning the secret consolidated guidance leaked two weeks ago in the Washington Post.

The five-year, policy-planning "guidance," signed by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, speaks of three possible levels of military buildup which range from doubling the defense budget to spending 50 percent of the GNP

or about \$1.5 trillion in defense. The document also revives the Schlesinger doctrine of tactical nuclear war.

The questions, submitted July 20, were answered by a DOD spokesman who cleared them with superiors.

Q: Who is responsible for the drafting of the guidance?

A: The guidance was drafted by the undersecretary for policy, with participation from other sections of the department. [The Undersecretary for Policy is C. Fred Iklé, who has long-standing connections to Aquarian Rand networks and Swiss banking circles.]

Q: What was the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

A: The Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic-planning document provided the information which went into the formulation of the guidance. [The key component of the JCS strategic-planning document is the work of the J-5 group. Asked whether this was the group that contracts out to such agencies as the Futures Group, and the Rand Corporation and which uses Delphic methods of policy analysis, the spokesman replied, "Yes."]

Q: When was the guidance written and signed by Defense Secretary Weinberger?

A: The final draft was written and signed in mid-June. There were several earlier drafts, parts of which were rejected and modified.

Q: What was the role of the Defense Resources Board? Did it work on the guidance?

A: Yes it did. It played a big part. [The DRB is headed by Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and includes the service secretaries, most assistant secretaries, and the director of national and international security of David Stockman's Office of Management and Budget. Carlucci, whose name has come up in regard to the Italian P-2 scandal, reconstituted the board as an executive committee within the department.]

Q: Was the final draft of the guidance given to other sections of the executive branch?

A: No.

Q: Was it given to the White House?

A: No, I don't think it was.

Q: To the National Security Adviser?

A: No.

Q: Who gave a copy then to the *Washington Post*?

A: No comment.

Q: Is this being investigated?

A: Not at the present time.