

Free naval policy from geopolitics

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Contributing Editor

On July 19, 1981, Katharine Meyer Graham's Washington Post published what the Post purported to be the draft of a directive by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to each of the military arms. Although the public information staff at the Pentagon declined comment on this publication, on grounds of secrecy, there are strong reasons to believe high-level reports that this information was intentionally leaked to the Post through influential channels of the administration, possibly the White House itself.

It is strongly believed, as the Post leak argues for this assessment, that Secretary Weinberger is looking ahead to a series of levels of crisis which will make it politically feasible to double and then treble the U.S. defense budget, up to as high, eventually, as half the GNP. It is the high-level, although unofficial view of the secretary's thinking, that this military spending would boost the economy as a whole in a manner echoing FDR's mobilization for World War II.

There is a germ of competence, although many more fallacies, in such an economic policy, if such a policy is indeed Mr. Weinberger's at this time. Certainly, whatever Mr. Weinberger may in fact be thinking presently, the policy-direction we have indicated is the dominant vector in defense and some related areas of administration policy at this juncture.

The proposal to establish saturation, short-warning "first-strike" nuclear capabilities against the Soviet heartland, with aid of Pershing II and Cruise missiles stationed in Europe, does represent an impulse toward "perpetual brinkmanship." Clearly, the Kremlin is presently committed—and ruthlessly—to take some countermeasure before such missiles are emplaced. One way or the other, the present drift of administration "first-strike" policy is leading toward as many severe crises as any booster of increased defense spending might desire, and within the duration of the coming 12 months, quite apart from the looming "financial blowout" of the dollar, widely and increasingly predicted to occur later this year.

Contributing Editor and Founder LaRouche has most recently written a proposed new defense doctrine for the

United States, which is being circulated as a policy bulletin of the National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC). EIR coopted LaRouche's pen to inaugurate a new series of background intelligence reports on selected key topics of current defense-policy importance. LaRouche chose to take up a critical response to some of the more important policy-outlooks of the Naval War College.

It is unnecessary and counterproductive to encumber debate respecting U.S. naval doctrine with the cultist geopolitical metaphysics of either Britain's Lord Alfred Milner or our own Adm. Thayer Mahan.

The simple secret of the continued importance of naval forces in the age of airborne nuclear weapons, and the emerging age of relativistic-beam weapons, is the elementary fact that water-borne freight continues to be, by approximately an order of magnitude, the cheapest means of transport. By applying the fundamental principles of land warfare to the sea dimension—*logistics, cutting edge, mobility and depth*—the requirement for applying the most-advanced existing technology to the naval arm defines the criteria of proper U.S. naval doctrine.

The "gut" of U.S. naval strength is properly a fleet of U.S. flag, nuclear-powered transports, complemented by and adapted to efficient standardization of universal containerization of freight and "star port" interfaces among all modes of land and air transport. The ability to bring such containerized freight, by ships of the U.S. flag, to any point in the world's shores or navigable waterways, and to move that freight inland to points at which bulk is to be broken, is the kernel of a proper naval capability. This capability must be armed, to secure such movement against adversary forces, and as armed means included among the totality of means for preventing an adversary from maintaining comparable logistical capabilities.

Presently, we have no such naval reserve fleet of nuclear transports operating as civilian transport under the U.S. flag. It is best estimated that half or more of our

military ranks, including naval and marine ranks, are users of "recreational substances," including marijuana, which tend to impair irreversibly the moral and intellectual capacities of users. Our fleets are becoming floating drug ghettos, like much of our ground forces, and no successive lowering of standards of testing can conceal with its rigged official scores the simple fact of a downward spiral of mean functional-literacy levels within all of our military ranks.

What is the point of launching more naval warcraft if we lack adequate personnel with the levels of literacy needed to man the technology modern naval equipment requires?

Decay of infrastructure

This sorry state of affairs is not merely a reflection of the take-down of military capabilities over the period from Robert S. McNamara's lunatic "cost-benefit analysis" through the neo-Malthusian carnage wrought by the Trilateral Carter administration. The present lack of means adequate to repair the damage is a product of what has been done, especially over the recent 15 years, to our national agro-industrial economy, its energy production, its transport system, and growing portions of the rock-drug counterculture-afflicted population. We are being transformed into a nation stripped of the basic agro-industrial base, the skills, and the moral qualities required of an effective defense capability in all aspects, including each of the military arms as such.

The problem is not that we lack sufficient budgets for ships and advanced military technology. The problem is a rotting away of shipyards, a basic metals industry predominantly contracting and rotting in obsolescence, ports going out of existence, a collapsing rail system, a "deregulation"-disrupted trucking and air transport system, and a population of which increasing portions prefer the moral, technological, and intellectual incapacities of a "postindustrial society" to the form of sovereign industrial republic capable of mobilizing an adequate national defense.

That, in summary, is the stunning paradox confronting Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Without demanding the removal of such influences as Paul A. Volcker, David Stockman, David Rockefeller and the Fabian Heritage Foundation—it is impossible for the secretary to propose any competent military policy. Mr. Weinberger is correct if he estimates that a Pentagon budget of more than \$500 billion annually would be needed to develop an adequate defense establishment. However, were he given such funds, from where would he purchase most of his material requirements: Japan, perhaps?

Presently, it is forbidden to criticize Secretary Haig, Paul A. Volcker, David Stockman, and David Rockefeller within the precincts of the administration, or even

among significant portions of the Republican Party. President Reagan has been pressured into continuing President Carter's Volcker policy of usurious interest rates, and is otherwise trapped into an "economic package" broadly identical with that of President Herbert Hoover during the spring and summer of the fateful year 1929. It is not permitted to observe that President Reagan has embraced, for the moment, at least, the imminent destiny of President Hoover of 1929.

Instead, we have two fallacious approaches to military policy afoot. The first, associated with Secretary Haig, is the rearming of a much-decayed version of the Schlesinger MC 14/4 NATO policy proposal of 1974-1975: to shelter the lack of in-depth capabilities of NATO forces behind a ruse of nuclear blackmail deployed under such rubrics as "forward defense" and "first strike." The second is the presumption that the political shock of combined economic and strategic crises will cause the United States to tolerate military expenditures rising toward one-half the Gross National Product.

It is fully justified to describe the present "first-strike" tilt, involving a combination of forward-based Cruise and Pershing II missiles, as a "much-decayed version" of the old Schlesinger doctrine. Then, in 1974-1975, the stability of NATO and the U.S.-France alliance was far greater, and the relative scale of in-depth capabilities, in both conventional and advanced-technology features, was relatively much greater than today. Moscow is relatively much stronger, and much closer to the deployment of relativistic-beam weapons.

The sheer idiocy of such mere nuclear blackmail is summarily this. Those who have seized upon this policy have grabbed it hysterically, with impassioned consoling delusions. "See," they insist, "this tactic will force the Soviets off balance, force them to tolerate this, then that, and so forth and so on." Such impassioned credulity overlooks two facts of decisive strategic importance. First, the Soviets will never tolerate any concession which, in their estimation, represents a point-of-no-return of strategic victory-potentials of an aggressive NATO force. Second, any means which portends the subsequent emergence of such a point-of-no-return will be neutralized by Soviet countermeasures before such means can begin to operate to such effect. The very reasons impassioned fools gloat so manically over the benefits of such means are reasons the Soviets would act preemptively to prevent such means from being put into place. *Those who propose the present version of "first-strike"-oriented "forward defense" are plotting a "reverse 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis."*

The second of the two policies, scaling up military budgets of a contracting U.S. economy, is premised on a nominalist's misinterpretation of something lying between FDR's war mobilization of the depressed U.S.

economy and the Nazi rearmament. To be precise about the matter, what the *Washington Post* indicates Secretary Weinberger as projecting is a replay of the policies of Nazi Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht. It is not irrelevant that the leading figure of the British Fabian Society, Friedrich von Hayek, and his cothinker, Prof. Milton Friedman, consciously model their policies on those of Schacht's Nazi Germany. West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has recently given clear enough warning that Hjalmar Schacht's Brüning-Hitler track is a policy which Schmidt's opponents have very much in mind for the period immediately ahead.

To understand why and how Schacht's and his successors' Nazi policies appeared to work—in the eyes of the ignorant outside observer—one must focus on two crucial aspects of the history of the Nazi economy over the 1933-1945 period. First, the limited scale of rearmament accomplished by the Nazi economy up through 1936-1938 looted the economy and its labor force to the point that even Nazi officials warned of an imminent internal collapse, a warning echoed from a slightly different standpoint by Schacht himself. The Nazi arms buildup depended upon the successive looting of Austria (1938), Czechoslovakia (1938-1939), Poland (1940 onward), Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, French North Africa, the Balkans, large regions of occupied Russia, occupied Italy. As the rate of expansion into areas to loot slowed down after Stalingrad, the genocidal slave-labor system of Albert Speer looted wealth from the starved bodies of slave workers and occupied regions' populations.

The ability of an economy to carry the cost of a significant defense buildup depends upon increasing the per capita output of the population to such levels that the population can be maintained, and the industrial base expanded, through technological advancements in increasingly capital-intensive, and increasingly energy-intensive employment of the labor force in increased percentiles of labor-force employment in goods-production and transportation.

What Weinberger appears to be intending would succeed, without Schachtian Nazi-like consequences, only if the impending crisis were used not only to reverse absolutely Volcker, Stockman, Rockefeller policies presently prevailing in Washington. The administration would be obliged to remonetize gold reserves at \$500 an ounce or higher, and to issue gold-reserve-based currency-notes for lending at low interest rates to agricultural and industrial production, for technologically progressive forms of capital-intensive investments in increased production of goods. A 50 percent increase in the goods-output component of GNP could be realized within a relatively short period. Military expenditures could be increased accordingly, without significant inflationary or other regressive impact upon the basic economy as a

whole.

On the assumption that the administration turns to the outlined, latter option, we have the practical basis for projecting a competent naval policy.

The fallacies of Jomini

The greatest single error introduced to the professional curriculum of West Point and Annapolis was the disorientation associated with emphasis on Jomini's misinterpretation of the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars. That disorientation has fostered susceptibility to the "geopolitical" doctrines associated with our own Adm. Thayer Mahan as well as of Britain's Lord Alfred Milner and Halford Mackinder, and of the influence of Nazi geopolitician, Major-General Prof. Karl Haushofer over the programs of Georgetown University.

A summary correction of the fallacies associated with Jomini's point of view is therefore the most useful and direct means for reaching corrected military-science doctrines applicable to naval planning.

The summary history of the crucial features of the military history of 1793-1814 is this.

Two of the leading scientists of 18th-century France, Gaspard Monge and Lazare Carnot took over leadership of the French Military Committee in 1793, organized the toppling of the British Jacobin Terror of Robespierre in *Thermidor*, and created the greatest military instrument the world had known within a few years. The centerpiece of this accomplishment was the development of a new steel industry, the most modern yet in existence, producing masses of new, mobile field artillery. Carnot et al. redesigned the arms of warfare and their deployment around the new geometry of warfare defined by mobile mass artillery fire.

This transformed industrial state, France, and its associated military capabilities, became the instrument placed at Napoleon's disposal. Napoleon achieved this position of command after Carnot had already shattered the 18th-century doctrine of set-piece warfare in battle, an exercise Napoleon repeated to decisive effect at Jena in 1806 against the Prussians.

The Prussian defeat of 1806 turned to the advantage of Prussia. A group of German republicans, centered around Baron vom Stein, Scharnhorst, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, of the same political persuasion as Carnot, used the humiliation of the Prussian oligarchical factions to use Prussian Minister Hardenberg as the "stooge" for a series of sweeping military, educational and related reforms of the Prussian state. Although vom Stein and his republicans were dumped through influence of Britain and Austria over Prussia at the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, the military, industrial and educational reforms of (approximately) 1809 persisted in never-worse-than-diluted forms into the period of the First World War, and were not entirely eradicated from

Germany until the Willy Brandt chancellorship of 1969-1974.

Later, after 1815, Carnot, exiled from France, spent the remaining years of his life at Berlin, collaborating with Alexander von Humboldt to transfer the French science, exiled from France by Orléans and A. Cauchy, into Prussia, under the protection of the Prussian military *Kriegsschule*. Carnot, earlier an associate of Benjamin Franklin, had been approached to work in Prussia as early as 1780. The Prussian republicans knew they were not "imitating" Napoleon; the Prussian military reforms were consciously known to have been the work of Carnot.

This understanding of the limitation of Napoleon in military science was key to Napoleon's defeat. Using Friedrich Schiller's in-depth study of the Thirty Years War, Scharnhorst's circles designed, baited, and operated the Russian Trap used to destroy Napoleon. This was accomplished with considerable difficulty, as the Germans had to overcome strong Russian opposition to permitting Napoleon to occupy the mined city of Moscow.

There was nothing accidental in either the genius of Monge and Carnot, or the fact that Scharnhorst and his associates understood Carnot's genius far better than Napoleon. Gaspard Monge, Carnot's teacher of the Oratorian Order, had mastered geometries which were classed as a state military secret of France earlier, because of the superiority these principles of geometry afforded the design of France's fortifications and design of the geometry of battle. Carnot's most famous military writings, prior to 1793, included the design of the lighter-than-air dirigible as a weapon whose military functions were defined. It was Carnot who worked with his protégé Fulton in promoting naval technology, including the steamboat and submarine.

The source of figures such as Monge and Carnot was a Neoplatonic tradition in statecraft and science traced in military science from the early 15th-century statesman, Plethon, who first defined the relationship between economy and warfare. Leonardo da Vinci, whose leading role as a statesman and military specialist is seldom adequately grasped, and da Vinci's collaborator, Niccolò Machiavelli, are part of this tradition, as was da Vinci's ally, France's Louis XI, Johannes Kepler, John Milton, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, and the protégés of Colbert, Huyghens and Leibniz. During the 17th and 18th centuries, into the early 19th century, this current was known in France as the *mercantilists*, and in Germany as the *kameralists*. Leibniz was educated as a *kameralist* at Mainz, whence he moved to Paris under Colbert's patronage. It was Leibniz, during his period of close collaboration with Huyghens, who revolutionized *kameralism* by inventing economic science (1670s), and introducing the interrelated notions of work, power,

and technology. Göttingen University was based on the influence of Leibniz. Both the von Humboldt brothers were educated as *kameralists*, just as Monge and Carnot were trained as *mercantilists* by the Oratorians.

Into the middle of the 19th century, German science and military science were fully conscious of these connections, as surviving primary sources from the 17th through mid-19th century document that fact beyond dispute.

Two crucial points of correction of prevailing U.S. naval thinking are to be derived from such correction of usually falsified history. First, the history of warfare is the history of mortal combat between the republican and oligarchical orders of society in the world. The military policy of Carnot's France, Scharnhorst's Prussia and the young United States of Washington, Hamilton, John Quincy Adams, et al., was fully conscious of that and informed its practice accordingly. The technologically progressive republic relies upon the most-advanced technology, applied to matters of logistics, engineering, and mobility, to destroy the war-fighting capabilities of the adversary in depth, and to maintain as the goal of warfare the extension of sovereign nation-state republics, to the disadvantage of zero-technological-growth-oriented one-world systems of oligarchism. The war of Alexander the Great against the forces of the Persian Empire is the paradigm for the modern science of warfare.

Second, we consider the fact that Carnot wished to accomplish on sea what he had accomplished on land, and failed in that purpose only because of the foolish Napoleon's rejection of the proposals of Fulton and others of Carnot's circles.

Britain and geopolitics

Britain today is the same form of society which the leaders of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the subsequent decades understood to be the mortal adversary of the United States. Although the principal direct source of the republican culture of the United States was John Milton's Commonwealth party in Britain, the Stuart, Orange and Welf phases of the post-1660 Restoration re-established the dictatorship over Britain of the common, mortal enemies of both the Commonwealth party and the republicans of the English colonies of North America.

Britain is predominantly a rentier-financier continuation of feudal society, which has more or less successfully adapted to the advancements of technology which Britain could not shrug off from outside without undermining Britain's strategic capacities. This character of the ruling, rentier-financier British oligarchy, from 1660 to the present, is key to British strategy and the peculiarities of British military policy leading through Milner and the bloody set-piece war-fighting atavisms of Field

Marshal Montgomery.

Traditional American policy is expressed by the term "community of principle," employed successfully by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to argue against accepting a treaty with Canning's Britain, but to issue the unilateral Monroe Doctrine against Britain as well as Britain's Hapsburg allies, as an affirmation of the fact that the United States would ally only with sovereign republics committed to the same republican policies for themselves as the United States was for itself. As Adams stressed, the United States had no basis for a "community of principle" with its mortal, oligarchical adversary, Britain.

The destruction of our professional officer corps, our failure to select as leading military figures professionals sharing the traditionalist outlook of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, is a reflection of the accelerated development of a "special relationship" between the United States and Britain over the period since 1938. The credulous embrace of the myth of "British brains directing American muscle," has been the key to the aggravated undoing of our nation's capacity for competent strategic thinking. The spread of the oligarchist cult-doctrine of "physiocratic" geopolitics is the leading symptom of this corruption.

Politically, U.S. strategic thinking has become a parody of the children's game of "cowboys and Indians." "Who's the adversary? Let's whip his butt!" is the underlying banality and sophistry spoiling our political and military strategies.

What are the fundamental strategic interests of the United States, as these bear on matters of alliances, adversaries, and vital self-interests at home and abroad? This is the question for which competent answers have been lacking in the deliberations of the military professional's public journals, the plethora of papers and texts purporting to reflect solemnly on strategic issues, and the deliberations of administrations and Congress.

Our republic's interest is defined by the order of our federal constitutional republic as a nation under natural and constitutional law, as the framers of our Constitution rightly understood this. We are committed to the development of the individual now and among posterity to follow us, a development fostered through technological advancement of the goods-producing productive powers of labor. We demand to be free of overreach of foreign agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the Hong Kong drug-debits financier interests, and free to pursue those constitutional policies which define the self-interests of ourselves and our posterity.

To secure this self-interest for the benefit of ourselves and our posterity, our proper policy today is that of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams's formulation in 1823. We desire the transformation of other nations into sovereign republics committed to the same principles as

our own. The entire objective of our proper foreign policy is to foster the spread of a worldwide community of principle among such republics, to spread the republican order, committed to sovereign, technologically progressing republics, through weakening of the oligarchist powers and their colonial systems. We seek to create and strengthen among nations around us, neighbors of the sort which share the same moral outlook and interests of the framers of our Constitution.

Anything else is merely unpleasant expediency, if we are obliged to tolerate it for a period. Otherwise, any foreign policy proposal is counterproductive rubbish.

It is that foreign policy which properly informs our military policy, including a definition of the ends to which the conduct of warfare is to be shaped.

Let it be our policy that the people of any nation subjugated to oligarchical rule could desire nothing but that their nation could be occupied for a brief period by the military forces of the United States. In the endgame of war, the point at which our infantry can be deployed without significant resistance on what was formerly adversary territory, we must be welcomed because we are nation-builders, who spread modern logistics, improved productivity of farms, and other elements of modern sovereign industrial states wherever our forces put their feet. A force designed to fulfill that endgame task of war and to bring war-fighting to such a conclusion ought to be the fundamental military doctrine of the United States. *Let us become, according to the technology of our age, what Alexander the Great would have wished his forces to have been in his time.*

That healthy point of view clears the mind of the cult nonsense of "geopolitics."

The naval anomalies of the Napoleonic Wars

The work of Monge and Carnot, even up to the time of Benjamin Franklin's coordination of world affairs from Paris, shows that there was nothing of a "fluke" in Fulton's naval designs. Steam-powered naval craft, at least for near-coastal and Mediterranean deployment were already a fully feasible revolution in naval warfare at the beginning of the 19th century. Had France committed itself to this available option, as Carnot wished, and implemented that decision as Carnot had redesigned the land forces of France, Britain's defeat on the sea would have been soon assured.

The policy of developing coal, to replace "renewable resources" such as wood and charcoal, was recognized as necessity in 16th-century England, during the period and among the associates of the great scientist and foe of Francis Bacon, William Gilbert. The first glimmers of the development of the modern steam engine are traced to this source. The actual development of the steam engine was accomplished by Denis Papin at the beginning of the 18th century, under the influence of

Leibniz, and embodying the fruits of the collaboration between Huyghens and Leibniz on this matter. Leibniz generalized this to the notions of work and power, defining the notion of *technology*, which he invented, in terms of the general principle of a heat-powered machine enabling "one man to do the work of a hundred."

It also bears directly on our working point here, that Leibniz specified, in the 17th century, the need to develop the cartridge and breech-loaded weapon, and also emphasized the necessary changes in warfare's arms required by such an increase in firepower.

The point we are stressing is that it is a grave error to fall into the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* school of military science, in which the credulous attempt to explain the necessity for certain developments to have occurred in the time and specific sequence they were deployed in history. Once we realize that the naval steam-powered vessel should have, and could have been developed during the first decade of the 19th century, with decisive effects on the strategic outcome, we have confronted ourselves with what should be for many specialists a stunning, health-giving refreshing of their criteria of judgment.

This reflection forces us to look more deeply into the differences between the geometry of Carnot's statecraft and that of Napoleon Bonaparte. It is the peculiarities of the policy-making geometry of the mind of governments which affect the shaping of military capabilities, as well as actions, often to tilt the balance between defeat and victory. It is the whole policy of government which must be considered in this whole overview of strategic thinking, not merely matters deemed military per se by convention.

It instructs us to eliminate from power to make policy decisions those who either underrate the urgency of orienting naval policy to the age of relativistic-beam weapons, or who imagine that we can enter the age of beam weapons while tolerating savage constraints on our NASA and fusion-energy development efforts.

What can be the effect of long-wave phenomena in targeting naval vessels, including submarines? What is the significance of generating gravitational waves in naval as well as land and missile warfare? What is the environment of naval warfare within a geometry in which space-based x-ray or gamma-ray beam weapons can punch through the atmosphere to strike naval craft?

The basic military doctrine of the United States must be to be absolutely first, and a leap ahead of everyone else in both the research and development tasks of the most-advanced technologies, and in not only their general application, but in situating military technology and ordering of the arms of warfare in terms of such technology.

Let us hang a slogan in every naval planner's office: "Think like Lazare Carnot."

Has the Pentagon been brainwashed?

by Lonnie Wolfe

A group of men and women are sitting around a large table in a windowless room. At the center of the table is a small TRS-80 computer with a video display terminal. In each of the participants' hands is a small device resembling a pocket calculator, joined by wire to the computer terminal.

At the head of the table sits a man with a large stack of papers. To his left and right sit two nervous gentlemen clutching black looseleaf notebooks. The man at the head of the table begins to speak. "Well crew, you know why you are here. Today's question is: 'If the U.S. government gives sophisticated weapons to China, what will the Soviet Union do? Or more precisely, what is our risk of nuclear war in the near term and in the long term?' The parameters of the aid program and intelligence on the Soviet leadership personality profiles are in the papers you have already received. You've done this before, so you know the ground rules. Let's begin with you, Sam. What are your feelings on the subject?"

Sam speaks for approximately five minutes, followed in turn, by each person at the table. If someone rambles too long, or if he gets off the topic, the man at the head of the table cuts him off curtly saying, "Let's stick to the topic. You know the ground rules. You're a pro."

After each person has spoken, the man at the head of the table speaks again. "Well, you've all said your piece. Let's see if we can get a consensus. You know how to use the consensor. Let's rate the risk of a Soviet nuclear strike on the U.S. on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being least likely. Let's do it first for the near term. Please, only press the consensor once."

Each person grabs for his little calculator and pushes the button. A few seconds later, the man at the head of the table, looking at the graph on the video screen, announces proudly, "I do believe we have a consensus."