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## NDPC STATEMENT

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# Emergency U.S. policy toward the endangered nation of Lebanon

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*The following statement was issued by the National Democratic Policy Committee on April 14.*

During the 1980 campaign for the U.S. presidency, President Ronald Reagan received extensive support for his election from among both Christian and Islamic Arab-Americans of Lebanese extraction, as I received significant help from among leaders of the same community on behalf of my own candidacy for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination.

The time has come for both the President and I to discharge our obligation to those supporters. We are not obliged to adopt precisely the proposals offered by various sections of the Lebanese-American community. We are obliged to take a course of action which represents efficient justice for the endangered nation and people of Lebanon.

It is my direct knowledge of matters, that since before the destabilization of Lebanon began openly, during April 1975, Henry Kissinger and elements of the U.S. State Department have pursued a policy toward Lebanon which is most charitably described as inept in conception and bloodily immoral in consequences. This role of the State Department in the fate of Lebanon has not been corrected to date by the incumbency of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

It is not necessary to adopt final judgment on the reasons for the ineptness of Secretary Haig's performance to date. We need not conclude that this ineptness is chiefly the influence of Kissinger and Carter holdovers within the State Department. We need not conclude that it is either Secretary Haig's close past association with Henry A. Kissinger, or the Secretary's excessively passionate affection for British foreign policy influences. It is sufficient to recognize that the continuing policy to date is inept in respect of U.S.A. vital strategic interests, and immoral in consequences for the endangered nation and people of Lebanon.

It is sufficient to emphasize that this policy must be changed promptly, and that, clearly enough, only the authority of President Ronald Reagan can change it. Therefore, I appeal not only to President Reagan, but

also to others whose support the President will require to make such urgent changes.

I appeal to members of the Congress to consider and support the policy I outline here.

I appeal to the Lebanese-American community to rally with us to mobilize the conscience of their fellow citizens on behalf of justice for Lebanon at last.

I appeal to the admirable President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to weigh the wisdom and justice of what is proposed.

First, I outline the proposed emergency policy, and then I elaborate the principal strategic and other considerations to be taken into account respecting the timing and consequences of such a policy.

### **I. U.S. Lebanon policy**

1) There is only one practical policy for Lebanon. This is a policy consistent with the sovereignty of that nation and its people, and a policy which will contribute substantially to strengthening the preconditions for stability and peace in the Middle East.

2) The only workable policy toward Lebanon is the immediate and full restoration of its status as a sovereign, multireligious state, under the constitution and within the borders, as existing prior to the April 1975 outbreak of overt, bloody destabilization within the nation.

3) This requires that the asserted spheres of influence of both Syria and Israel within Lebanon's borders be terminated, and that the only military forces tolerated within Lebanon's borders are: a) the military forces commanded by its own government, b) advisers and auxiliary units attached to the Lebanese military under treaty arrangements negotiated by the sovereign government of Lebanon under conditions of negotiation consistent with the principle of sovereignty.

4) The stability of the reconstituted sovereign nation of Lebanon requires economic reconstruction measures either repairing the damage done since April 1975, or providing new elements of industry, agricultural development, and infrastructural development offsetting the damage done over the course of the intervening period.

5) This serves the vital interests of the United States, continental Europe and the nations and peoples of the Middle East region.

Although the term "buffer state" has unhappy connotations, the stability of a sovereign nation of Lebanon on the indicated basis significantly lessens the elements of instability in the region as a whole, to the advantage of all concerned. Therefore, Lebanon should not be defined as a "buffer state," but rather the valuable "buffering" effects of a sovereign nation of Lebanon should be a principal strategic consideration.

## II. The urgency of action

1) The perceived political expediencies of the incumbent governments of Syria and Israel have visibly prompted both governments to seek a fresh confrontation between Israel and Syria through bloody provocations conducted on the territory of Lebanon.

During the period of the fraud-permeated Jerusalem conference on terrorism, cosponsored by British intelligence service interests, a bloody insurgency by Muslim Brotherhood terrorists was in progress within Syria. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Begin stated, in the context of that Jerusalem conference, that unless President Hafez Assad joined the "Camp David" agreements, the Muslim Brotherhood's rampages inside Syria would continue. It is well established that factional elements within the Israeli command are in collaboration with Muslim Brotherhood forces, including elements of the Muslim Brotherhood within or proximate to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Under these circumstances, the Syrian government of President Hafez Assad negotiated a mutual-defense treaty with the Soviet Union. This treaty is assessed as of deep strategic implications, in contrast to previous relatively lower-commitment relationships between the Soviet Union and Arab governments of the Middle East region.

2) This treaty arrangement intersects the principal factional conflicts within the Soviet Union's command. A summary of the nature of those factions is indispensable for proper evaluation of the implications of President Assad's current adventurist actions in Lebanon.

a) The leading Soviet factions are most efficiently identified as divided between two currents. One current is best described in thumbnail as "Soviet nationalist," with pedigrees traced back to the Stalin faction's version of "socialism in one country," and based chiefly in the Soviet state apparatus. The opposing current is associated with Mikhail M. Suslov and Boris Ponomarev of the Soviet Central Committee, and is otherwise centered in the largest of the Soviet foreign intelligence organizations, IMEMO, overlapping the principal foreign intelligence elements of the Soviet State Security Apparatus, the KGB.

IMEMO is a post-1956 reconstitution of the foreign intelligence apparatus of the former Communist International, the "world revolution" faction formerly associated with such competing factions of world-revolutionists as former Parvus (Alexander Helphand) protégés as L. D. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, and with G. Zinoviev. Essentially, these elements associated with the policies of Boris Ponomarev are most usefully described as "neo-Bukharinites."

b) To understand Soviet relations to President Assad, President Qaddafi of Libya, and to the Muslim Brotherhood, one must focus attention on two former British Secret Intelligence executives presently occupying leading policy-making positions with both IMEMO and the KGB. Donald Maclean has been a leading policy adviser for IMEMO since 1963, and Harold "Kim" Philby is presently a Soviet KGB General with great influence over Soviet policies in the Middle East, Libya, and elsewhere.

Several executives of Arab nations' intelligence services have corroborated, independently of one another, our own findings on the continuing connections between Soviet KGB Gen. Harold "Kim" Philby and British SIS. Not only are the Communist parties of the region directed by IMEMO and the KGB, but these parties are also directed through British foreign intelligence agencies of the same areas, with British SIS usually supporting the same tactical line as IMEMO-KGB.

Although the principal Russian policy of British SIS has been the fragmenting of the "Russian Empire" even before the adoption of the "geopolitical" policy of Milner and MacKinder, British SIS and IMEMO find it expedient to collaborate with one another against certain common adversaries—such as the United States, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany: even though the Soviet state-apparatus faction prefers Giscard, Schmidt, and President Ronald Reagan to the British and leftist opponents of those figures.

Philby's special importance to the Middle East arises from the fact that Philby inherited from his Khrushchev-decorated father, St. John Philby, many of the Islamic assets the older Philby had developed over long service in both the India Office and the Arab Bureau of the British SIS. These include the Muslim Brotherhood networks designed, created, and controlled principally by British SIS to the present date. CAABU, for example, is a branch of British SIS, and CAABU agents are British SIS agents wherever they appear in the Arab world.

Although the Brezhnev faction is on top in the Soviet command, the IMEMO faction is determined to cooperate with British SIS (for its own reasons) in

promoting a "cold war" situation between Moscow and Washington. IMEMO uses its preponderant influence over foreign communist parties and related advantages to attempt to manipulate situations to produce "cold war" confrontations.

The case of El Salvador is illustrative.

During December 1980, Cuba's Fidel Castro openly embraced an alliance proposed to him by Willy Brandt's Socialist International and the left-Jesuit Liberation Theologists. Although neither Moscow nor Cuba has any significant presence in El Salvador, despite a single shipment of arms from the Nicaraguan government to El Salvador rebels, IMEMO-KGB forces seek to exaggerate Soviet complicity in a destabilization of Central America, controlled entirely by Western-based forces including the Socialist International and church-affiliated organizations.

Similarly, while Brezhnev was seeking to avoid Warsaw Pact intervention into the internal political affairs of Poland, elements of the IMEMO faction were working together with assets of British intelligence's London Tavistock Institute (owners of the KOR organization and of the Future and Perspectives organization) in the effort to force an East-West confrontation through aggravation of the Polish situation.

It is that factional situation within the Soviet command which, combined with complicity of elements of British intelligence (e.g., CAABU), makes the antics of Hafez Assad and Libya's Qaddafi so dangerous at this time.

c) Since Hafez Assad first rose to power, each time Assad's control of Syria has been threatened, Syria has been involved in bloody confrontations with its neighbors. Hafez Assad is in deep trouble at home again. Now, he is exploiting his recently developed strategic treaty with the Soviet Union, and complicity of factional elements (IMEMO) within the Soviet command, to attempt to force an East-West confrontation through bloody encounters between Israel and Syria in Lebanon.

d) A complementary situation exists on the Israeli side. With imminent elections ahead, the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin is in deep political trouble. Barring some diversionary new war, or the important factor of the charismatic Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres is expected to be elected this spring, and to shift Israel's approach to solving both rampant domestic inflation and relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Israel is in "danger," in some persons' opinion, of shifting to less emphasis on "Zionism" and more emphasis on an Israeli-nationalist interpretation of Zionism.

Each time some faction within Israel moves "dangerously close" to serious negotiations with Arabs generally, on past performance, some of the British intelligence controlled elements of Palestinian or other terrorists obligingly provide the pretext for Israeli military repris-

als against neighboring countries, and the prospects of serious Arab-Israeli negotiations vanish once again for a time. Since 1975, each time such a game has been played out once again, more bloodshed is imposed upon tortured Lebanon.

e) Under these circumstances, any approach which involves mere adjustments of the respecting Israeli and Syrian positions of influence within Lebanon must lead to increased destabilization, more suffering for the Lebanese people, and possibly to the edge of a superpower confrontation.

f) We must act to take the gambit-pawn of the would-be destabilizers away from all such adventurous parties. The solution is simple, long-overdue justice for Lebanon: Lebanon must be re-established as a totally sovereign multireligious state within its pre-April 1975 borders. *No foreign nation has any rights within those borders.*

### III. Practical implementation

1) The United States must repudiate openly and without toleration of any exception the policy of destabilization of Middle East and adjoining nations known variously as the Aspen Institute's "Bernard Lewis Plan" or Zbigniew Brzezinski's versions of that policy: "Arc of Crisis," "Islamic Fundamentalism Card."

2) The United States requires and must demand a zone of truly nonaligned stability of sovereign nation-states in the area including Turkey, extending into India, and extending throughout sections of Africa populated by Islamic populations. The United States requires of the Soviet Union its subscription to that policy of strategic neutrality of the existing nation-states of that region.

3) There must be agreed withdrawal of all Soviet, British, and U.S.A. military forces and related treaty obligations from this region. Necessary military aspects of peacekeeping guarantees for the region should be provided by those nations of Western continental Europe which, unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, have no constitutional prohibition against deployment of military action outside continental Europe.

4) There should be no military involvement by either superpower in this region on condition that no violation of the treaty is made by the Warsaw Pact, Britain, or the United States.

5) Such an agreement would be consistent with the policies of the anti-IMEMO factional forces of the Soviet Union, as exemplified by President Leonid Brezhnev's repeated proposals for Gulf neutrality agreements. This negotiation with Moscow could be approached as an enlargement of the discussion of the proposed Gulf agreement, and should include agreements by both powers to permit Iran to be reconstituted as a nation freed from the obscene mullahs and Socialist International assets such as Bani-Sadr.

6) To make the implementation of such agreements effective, there must be a frank and practical appreciation of the history, significance and present role of the British intelligence-sponsored Shiite and Sunni branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. This must be recognized for what it is in fact. It is a *criminal association* by the same general standards of international law cited by U.S. Justice Robert Jackson and others in the Nuremberg proceedings, which must be outlawed efficiently by all the signatory powers, including recognition by all powers that members of this association and its branches and principal covers is membership in a criminal association, denying to members visa and residency privileges as well as privileges of conducting business within or across the borders of signatory nations.

7) There are other actually or potentially criminal associations threatening the peace of the indicated region, but as Kemal Ataturk understood and the father of the deceased Shah of Iran failed to acknowledge in efficient practice, the neo-Asharite cults overlapping the Sunni and Shiite branches of the Muslim Brotherhood are the indispensable margin of threatened destabilization of the governments within the region and of peaceful relations among those governments.

8) Although economic growth does not ensure stability of nations in and of itself, wretchedness is the enemy of domestic and foreign peace of all nations. We must co-sponsor institutionalized arrangements for fostering the economic prosperity of Lebanon. The geographic position, literacy, and other features of Lebanon make this nation eminently suited to viable investments in industry, agriculture, and infrastructure. Some form of special *Bank for Reconstruction*, providing medium- to long-term credits for agricultural and industrial goods-producing and infrastructural investments at low borrowing costs, must be created. This bank should be designed to attract private investment in these designated categories of investment, through availability of low-cost, medium- to long-term credit for such undertakings.

9) In return for this, we rightly expect Lebanon to aid humanity generally through efficient measures of suppression of the international drug-traffic and growing of marijuana, hashish, opium, and such materials through and within its borders.

### **The Palestine question**

1) It is rightly argued that there can be no general and curable peace in the Middle East until the plight of the Palestinian Arabs is remedied.

2) Except as we must reckon immediately with the included matter of Palestinian Arab refugees living within Lebanon, we should not tie the question of immediate restoration of the full sovereignty of Lebanon to the Palestinian Arab issue more generally.

Rather, we should view the stabilization of Lebanon's true sovereignty as an indispensable precondition for subsequent negotiations concerning the situation of the Palestinian Arabs more generally.

3) As for the Palestinian refugees within Lebanon, we must take a practical interest in ending the situation under which the condition of these refugees continues to be one of the focal points of actual or potential destabilization of Lebanon itself. The economic and social conditions of these refugees must be remedied as a matter of immediate action on behalf of elementary human rights.

4) If we restabilize Lebanon, as we propose here:

a) If we eliminate the ulcer of madness spawned by great-power complicity in destabilization of Iran;

b) If we act to secure key Arab states, including Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, from the destabilizations now projected by elements and accomplices of British intelligence services;

c) If we promote the right to nuclear energy and other essential economic development by all states of the region, including the overdue economic development of the energy resources, water resources, and agricultural and industrial development of the keystone nation of Egypt;

d) If we negotiate successful strategic disengagement from the Middle Eastern and immediately adjoining nations;

e) We shall have created the indispensable climate of preconditions for settling with justice the issue of the Palestinian Arabs.

f) The only alternative to such a solution is a new war, more devastating than those of the postwar period to date, and possible superpower Armageddon through miscalculation piled upon miscalculations by the superpowers and others involved at present.

5) The first concrete steps to be taken for a solution of the Palestinian Arab human rights issue now are 1) a government in Israel which not only moves to provide regional autonomy for Israeli-occupied regions outside the 1967 borders—with minor possible adjustments as negotiated by Israelis and Arabs, 2) increased consultation, even semi-officially, for purposes of defining options for an agenda of official negotiations, and 3) mutual recognition of political existence of Israel and a rightful Palestinian Arab state by the two principal parties, as representatives of the PLO have tentatively proposed in the past.

6) These steps of rapid approach toward a comprehensive peaceful settlement become possible if the powers act to change the present political geometry of the region in a way which makes such steps practicable. The restoration of full sovereignty in fact to Lebanon is the first, presently indispensable step of such transformation of the political geometry of the region.