

## Carter ready to activate 'first strike' over hot spots

by Konstantin George

The formal announcement by Defense Secretary Harold Brown of Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) has formally established a brink-of-war situation between the United States and the Soviet Union, that may arise from any one of three "hotspot" theater military situations: a Sino-Soviet war triggered by Chinese invasion of Indochina and/or the Indian subcontinent; the Persian Gulf focused on Iran; and Israeli threats to Lebanon and Syria.

Brown's Aug. 19 announcement, delivered as a speech at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, constitutes the most crude and provocative diplomatic signal that could possibly have been sent to the Soviet leadership at such a juncture. Brown deliberately phrased every word for Soviet ears and to generate maximum terror in Europe:

"One purpose of my exposition . . . is to make clear to the Soviets the nature of our countervailing strategy. . . .

"Deterrence remains, as it has been historically, our fundamental strategic objective, but deterrence must restrain a far wider range of threats than just attacks on U.S. cities. . . . Our strategic forces also must deter nuclear attacks on smaller sets of targets in the U.S., or on U.S. military forces and be a wall against nuclear coercion or military attack on our friends and allies. And strategic forces, in conjunction with theater nuclear forces, must contribute to deterrence of conventional aggression as well."


These passages require no translation for the Soviet command, nor for policy planners in Western Europe. Brown would be read in Moscow—correctly—as follows.

The term "friends and allies" defines the parties on whose behalf the U.S. would respond against the Soviet Union with "strategic forces in conjunction with theater nuclear forces," the latter referring to the various theater nuclear arsenals maintained by the U.S. with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and U.S. ground and air forces stationed in continental Europe, Japan and Korea, with the two carrier task forces comprising the Indian Ocean fleet, the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, etc. "Friends and allies" specifically designates Israel and China. This is in stark contrast to the term "allies," which instead would clearly connote a reference to overt treaty commitments pertaining to NATO and Japan-Korea.

The "conventional aggression" which Brown defines as a precondition for a U.S. *first use* of nuclear weapons against either Soviet territory or armed Soviet formations may be a Soviet conventional move either against China or into the Middle East theater, in response to any one of a number of provocations.

There are two problems with Carter and Brown's PD 59 "doctrine." The first is the obvious one that its employment in any hypothetical theater situation against the Soviet Union will occasion an all-out Soviet nuclear strike against the United States, and the termination of the nation's existence. Secondly, and directly to the point, the situation entailing early use of Brown's lunatic "limited nuclear war" doctrine, given the regional war-promoting policies of Red China and Israel, is not a hypothetical situation at all.

The military pressures in all three hotspots are building up simultaneously toward an explosion point



Naval photographic center

*Nuclear powered attack aircraft carrier USS Nimitz*

during late September to early October.

In Indochina, a full-scale war against Vietnam is expected by October, with the end of the monsoon season. Reports from Peking and Bangkok (confirmed by the Vietnamese) indicate that Peking is mobilizing on or near the Vietnamese and Laotian frontiers more troops than before the 1979 invasion. In tandem with Peking, the Thais are concentrating all their efforts on placing their country on a war footing. The joint objective of the Peking and Thai regimes is to compel the Carter administration to “honor” its military commitments to Thailand, in case of regional war.

The Persian Gulf situation has also been primed for an early outbreak of fighting, via a U.S. invasion into southern Iran. A three-echelon U.S. military deployment has been underway, to enact such a move.

Echelon 1 is the 1,800 U.S. Marines deployed in Oman, directly across the oil lifeline Straits of Hormuz from Iran. Echelon 2 is the 20,000-odd U.S. combat and support troops stationed in Europe and earmarked for instant deployment into the Indian Ocean theater. Echelon 3 is the tactical nuclear weapons capability maintained by the two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean.

The Israeli command is operating to effect a terminal crisis in the Assad regime of Syria within the next weeks. Should the Israelis “succeed” in their operations against Syria, the Soviets could be forced into a serious countermove, which could bring the world straight to the threshold of a global strategic crisis.

There are other Anglo-American-Israeli operations

that can provide the context for early brinkmanship in the Mideast such as a destabilization of Saudi Arabia.

Any disruption of the Gulf oil is a direct attack on the political stability of Western Europe—above all France and West Germany—and therefore an assault on the Paris-Bonn-Moscow war-avoidance axis.

Destroy that war-avoidance axis, and total strategic isolation of a militarily superior Soviet Union is the result. That means war, either immediately (especially if Brown and Carter-Brzezinski try out their “limited strategic nuclear exchanges,” to quote from the language of PD 59, on the Soviet armed forces) or, in the not-too-distant future.

Let’s assume Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, and the GOP idiots like Fred Iklé, Kissinger, and James Schlesinger, to name a few, who all had their hands in drafting a PD 59 plank verbatim into the Reagan-Bush platform at the July GOP convention, all “succeed” in isolating the Soviet Union. If in the course of the devolving confrontations in Indochina, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East, the Soviet leadership does not make the decision to go to war, it will be turned into a state dedicated to the single proposition of exerting all its resources and capacities to fighting and winning a general thermonuclear war sometime in the early 1980s.

If PD 59 and the policy buffoons behind it are allowed to control U.S. policy at the beginning of this decade, we run the risk of losing the nuclear war that this doctrinal policy will draw us into, and of allowing the Soviets to rule what’s left of the world—before the decade is out.

## Reagan's advisers all hold this view'

*One of the individuals who played a key role in developing the limited nuclear war doctrine embodied in PD 59 is Seymour Weiss. A member of the Nixon administration and former ambassador to the Bahamas, Mr. Weiss heads up Abington Corp., an international consulting firm, and serves as a strategic policy adviser to presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. The following interview with Mr. Weiss was made available to EIR.*

**Q:** I understand you were involved in developing the doctrine embodied in PD 59?

**A:** In the early 1970s, Mel Laird, who was Secretary of Defense, set up a group of people at the Pentagon. One of the senior members approached me about working on it "without being in a position to discuss it with your State Department associates." I said I'd do it if the Secretary of State said okay. The Defense people felt State would kill it before it was even thought through, because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA orientation of State favors MAD, it implies you don't need new weapons system.

Eventually this became an NSC study transmitted to the White House. There the NSC issued NSC 242, which with minor adjustments gave the blessing to our policy. This all took place about 1972-73. The NSC 242 was also called the Schlesinger Doctrine and was carried over into the Carter administration. When Carter came in, he and Brown had reservations on it—they were prevailed upon to sit still and take a look at it. I convinced them that my deputy on the other study, Leon Schloss, should do it. He is now vice-president at Stanford Research Institute. . . . He completed the study in December. . . .

**Q:** What is the difference between PD 59 and NSC 242?

**A:** Targeting the political leadership. . . . If you can say that we will target these leaders so you can't stay in power, this might be a deterrent. . . . Once in a war, the probability that nuclear weapons will be used is greater than if we are at peace, so it is better to have deterrents. Those of us who believe in this strategy believe it's the only way to deter the Soviets. Who knows who's right?

**Q:** What do you think about the Soviet response?

**A:** Their response so far shows that we are on track. . . . The Soviets object to this because they recognize that it is a more effective means to deter them than just the city-busting policy, and they believe our technology is good enough to do it. They want more freedom for their own actions than this gives them.

Suppose we get into a crisis with the Soviet Union, let's say in the Persian Gulf or Europe, and a conventional war starts. Let's say with their preponderance in strength they overwhelm Europe. We have a commitment to use nuclear weapons. The Soviets say we will not do it as then we will hit Moscow.

**Q:** But I thought the Soviets said they reject this concept, limiting such warfare.

**A:** This concept is fostered by Americans who don't understand it.

The Soviets never discussed the strategic concept of hitting cities. All the planning bears it out. This was foisted on the American public while the Soviets really say that if the U.S. was going to do something other than cities they would do it.

**Q:** Would the Reagan administration accept this concept?

**A:** I'm an adviser to Reagan. I don't know the extent he has focused on it. All the military advisers to Reagan, like me, hold to this view so it would be continued and further developed under a Reagan administration. The difference for Carter and for Reagan is the implementation. If we don't buy the weapons to carry it out it will be limited in terms of the degree we do it. Reagan is more effective in doing it. Carter has not been. But there is not a fundamental difference in philosophy. This administration has changed its tune.

The Reagan people, such as Bill Van Cleave and myself in particular, have argued for this. Secretary Brown and others in the Carter administration belatedly accepted it.

Some people speculated that [PD 59] was announced now to cut the ground from Reagan. . . .

**Q:** What about the role of the Secretaries of State, such as Kissinger and Muskie, in the development of PD 59?

**A:** Kissinger was intimately involved. I personally participated in briefings with him on this. Kissinger's office drew up the directive NSC 242.

In this administration I am told that State was aware of my study under Schloss and showed lukewarm interest in it. They did not take an initiative with it. State is generally negative on this and Defense didn't break any backs over this. I believe they were fully informed. My guess is that Vance got briefing papers on it. Muskie had it mentioned to him by Harold Brown.

## 'Doctrine means possible nuclear strike in Mideast'

*One of the many voices raised in opposition to PD 59 is that of U.S. Admiral Gene LaRoque. LaRoque, who heads the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Defense Information, is a well-known advocate of arms control and an opponent of limited nuclear war. He spoke to EIR last week:*

**Q:** What is your assessment of the Carter administration's PD 59?

**A:** It's not new in the sense that our military targeting has changed. Secretary Brown was correct in that sense. . . . We have 10,000 nuclear weapons and there are only 20 Soviet cities with populations over 100,000 so it wouldn't be possible for the U.S. to be targeting just Soviet cities. Clearly, we have been targeting Soviet military installations. The significant change is that the U.S. is announcing that it accepts and is willing to fight a limited nuclear war. This shift has tremendous significance for Europe. It suggests to them that we are willing to see Bonn destroyed in a limited nuclear war. . . . The Japanese are also very much concerned. . . .

The policy doesn't change anything to our advantage with the Kremlin. What it will do, however, is undermine our ability to project a leadership image to our allies.

**Q:** Do you think it will strengthen European objections to the deployment of Pershing IIs?

**A:** Definitely. . . . It is waking up the people of Europe to the U.S. intent to fight a limited nuclear war.

**Q:** As military doctrine, what are your objections?

**A:** For one, there is no way to keep a limited nuclear war limited. We certainly haven't laid down any rules with the Soviets that would do so. . . . Before, our thrust was one of deterrence. But now we are saying we can fight and win a limited nuclear war, which lowers the threshold of war.

**Q:** Do you think PD 59 implies that the U.S. would contemplate using nuclear weapons outside NATO, for example, as part of a rapid deployment force move into the Persian Gulf?

**A:** It would certainly have to be assumed that the doctrine tells subordinate military commanders to be prepared to use the nuclear weapons aboard our aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea. . . . Clearly, Carter is trying to put some teeth into the Carter Doctrine.

Every country has two policies: declared and real. Sometimes the two are the same, but not always. There are many situations in which your real policy is better left

unstated. For example, I think that announcing you are going to make a certain city your capital, when it is de facto, is unnecessarily provocative. It flies in the face of the old Rooseveltian dictum: Speak softly, but carry a big stick.

**Q:** Do you think that the Carter administration is actually intending to fight a limited nuclear war, or are they trying to use PD 59 as a psychological weapon?

**A:** It's very dangerous to play psychological warfare with nuclear weapons. If you play brinkmanship too much, the other people may think you're serious and fire first.

**Q:** Would getting rid of Brzezinski have any effect on the Carter administration's commitment to PD 59?

**A:** Getting Brzezinski out would make not a bit of difference. It's hardly worth the time and effort to mount a campaign to do so. The problem is institutional. . . . In 1947, we instituted the NSC. We invented Brzezinski's post. We now have four different people speaking out on foreign policy. Before 1947, primary in foreign policy was with the Secretary of State. We have to get rid of the national security adviser as a policymaker, the man who always has the President's ear, and get him back to the staff person he was originally intended to be.

**Q:** Well then, what can be done to prevent the implications of PD 59?

**A:** Not that much. The mood of the country doesn't want a change. Its mood is jingoistic, bellicose. The tougher the stand of the leaders, the more the people like it. However, we are planning an educational campaign to deal with this. We had our first planning meeting today. Herb Scoville, Earl Ravenal and others attended, and a visiting English scholar who now works for the U.S. government. We're having a conference in Holland this spring, "Nuclear War in Europe." We want to examine how that war could occur, what it would do, and how it could be prevented. We will invite high government and military officials to participate. The Dutch government has expressed interest. . . . We could get Soviet participation, but we don't want it at this time. The conference is an attempt to say how bad nuclear war is; to examine clinically how it could start, what can be done about it.

**Q:** What do you think of the contention that an E-beam weapon, capable of taking out launched ICBMs before they hit their targets, makes nuclear war winnable for the side that possesses this technology?

**A:** The E-beam technology just isn't here and I doubt it would be successful if it were. We have no way of knowing what happens to an E-beam weapon after it hits an ICBM. The Pentagon has issued several statements refuting Gen. Keegan's contention that the Soviets are near to deploying such a weapon.