

zation” of the potential of the economy. In the new approach, there would be a “comparison of a large number of variants of development and the selection of the best of them.”

Those are nearly the same words used by Marchuk’s successor at the helm of the Novosibirsk scientific center, Academician V. Koptuyug, in a winter 1980 description of Novosibirsk’s computerized “Sibir” model for planning Siberian development.

The implication of Lebedev’s remarks is that true economics should assume that doing the *best* thing should be considered the normal, “natural tendency” of an economy. *Not* following the optimal course is abnormal.

As a practical corollary of this theory, Lebedev suggests finding ways to penalize those who fail to move along the optimal course. He also proposes a “beacon” principle—the creation of plants such as a five to six times more efficient steel processing center, which would light the way for an entire industry.

Lebedev concludes with pointed remarks on the issue of economic responsibility for the use of scientific achievements. The bulk of all scientific and technological breakthroughs, he writes, is made available without cost to any enterprise in the Soviet Union that chooses to apply them. Yet these breakthroughs are “the most important part of the intellectual wealth of the entire society and the fruits of great labor.”

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*“It would be advisable in the future to provide plans for the creation of a special type of association, designated for the experimental industrial testing of the most important, fundamental results of the scientific-technological revolution....”*

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Lebedev calls these achievements “intellectual credit” extended to the nation’s enterprises and argues that there should be demands placed on those to whom it is granted. “It would even be appropriate to apply economic sanctions for failure to use the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution within a specified time period,” he concludes.

The U.S.S.R. is forging a national scientific policy that will maintain its economic and military weight as a superpower despite tight spots in the Soviet economy. In case anybody was inclined to miss the point, Lebedev has spelled it out as a matter of international strategy: the reach for progress in science and technology is “one more field of competition” between East and West.

## Soviet doctrine is ‘total war’

by Susan Welsh

The Carter administration’s official endorsement of “limited nuclear war,” in the new Presidential Directive No. 59, blithely ignores what every one of Carter’s defense advisers knows to be the case: that Soviet military doctrine absolutely rejects the policy and insists that war between the United States and the Soviet Union could only be total war.

The documents we excerpt here to prove this were all translated by the U.S. Air Force over the last several years. They are taken from Soviet officers’ training manuals, and were written by top-ranking leaders of the Soviet armed forces—including late Defense Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko—between 1970 and 1975.

More topical statements from the daily Soviet press on “limited nuclear war” and PD 59 are covered regularly by this and other news services.

Yet now both President Carter and Governor Reagan have declared their intention to replace the U.S. doctrine of nuclear “deterrence” with a limited “war-fighting strategy” that would target Soviet military facilities rather than cities (“counterforce” targeting). PD 59 orients U.S. strategic planning to a “limited but prolonged nuclear war,” hitting Soviet missiles in their silos as well as “politically sensitive” targets like the bunkers protecting Soviet leaders. These measures, it is claimed, will shatter the Soviet political power structure, leading to victory for the NATO side short of full-scale nuclear war.

In fact, due to the Soviets’ well-publicized commitment to engage the full depth and breadth of its nuclear arsenal in the opening salvo of a nuclear war, NATO missiles seeking selected military targets would find empty silos when they arrived.

It is sheer bluff, and the policy makers of the Carter and Reagan camps know it, to posit the strategy of limited nuclear war against an enemy whose adopted strategy rejects the very concept of a limited war.

### Clausewitzian tradition

Today’s Soviet military doctrine forms an unbroken continuity with the Clausewitzian tradition of the 19th

century. One of the chief theoreticians of Soviet doctrine during the 1920s and 1930s, M.N. Tukhachevskii, had been an officer in the Tsarist army and was incarcerated in the same German prison as France's General Charles de Gaulle during World War I.

Tukhachevskii developed the famous "theory of the offensive," which included use of armored vehicles and "depth operations" like parachute drops deep behind enemy lines. The core concept remains very much a part of Soviet doctrine today, under the changed conditions of nuclear warfare, as the following quotations show. Tukhachevskii sought agreement from Britain and France for a combined offensive against Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, but the Soviet overture was rejected, and Tukhachevskii himself perished in the bloody purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937, a purge that was set up by Hitler's Gestapo with the help of the British. Master strategist Marshal Zhukov and his associates developed the doctrine further during World War II, in the counteroffensive which crushed the Nazi armies.

The basic concepts developed in these battles remain in force for the Soviet armed forces today, and in some ways are even heightened by the advent of nuclear weapons and the hideous destruction a third world war would mean. Nuclear war is seen as the last resort, when the strategic interests of the superpowers are at stake. Neither superpower would refrain from using its most powerful weapons if threatened with conquest by the other, so war would be *total*, with combined strikes by all branches of the armed forces globally.

Soviet analysts do not use Western terms like "deterrence," "counterforce," or "countervalue" except when discussing NATO doctrine. They make no distinction between "strategic" intercontinental strikes and "tactical" nuclear warfare, since all weapons and targeting options are merely parts of overall war-fighting.

The Soviet officers quoted here stress frankly that their doctrine is *offensive*. This does not, of course, say anything about their *political* intentions; it is a doctrine for war-fighting, when political solutions fail. There is no reason to doubt the assessment of the Soviet political leadership made by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: "General Secretary Brezhnev, Mr. Kosygin and the other gentlemen are not adventurers. . . . Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Soviet leadership fear a war as much as we do here." Schmidt said this in an interview to *Der Spiegel* magazine July 7, following a two-day visit in Moscow.

But if war begins, any sane American who reads the following Soviet statements should realize that "these guys mean business." Anyone who thinks that such statements reflect only "fear for the morale of the Soviet armed forces, should it be admitted by the high command that victory in nuclear war was meaningless," in the words of *New York Times* reporter Anthony Austin Aug. 15, is not qualified to play with toy soldiers.

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## In the words of the military planners

### Marshal A.A. Grechko: "1930s 'Depth Operations'":

The theory of in-depth operations and battles developed by Soviet military science in the middle 1930s reflected qualitative changes which had occurred in the technical equipping of troops. Military thinking in the West was not able to rise to such generalizations. There, they were carried away with the then fashionable one-sided concepts such as "aerial warfare" and "tank warfare," which overestimated the role of individual types of weapons. The Soviet theory of in-depth operations and battles was a fundamentally new theory on the conduct of war by massive, highly mobile and technically well-equipped armies. *Its basic idea was the delivery of a simultaneous blow against the entire depth of the enemy's defenses and destruction of his main grouping through the decisive offensive actions of infantry and the mass employment of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops.* [emphasis added]

The principal tenets of this theory had great influence on the course of the Red Army's combat and operational training, and subsequently became the basis of its offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War. To a certain extent, the provisions of the theory of in-depth operations and battles have retained their significance even for present conditions.

### Marshal M.V. Zakharov: "The theory of the offensive in World War II and today":

The appearance of nuclear weapons and other modern weapons of war have caused a total revolution in military affairs. . . . Today, the question of the strategic target of war has been raised in a new way. *Whereas in past wars the armed forces as a whole were such a target, now one should add the economy of the warring countries, industrial regions and communications centers, and the system of state and military control.* [emphasis added] All this confronts military science with new tasks both in the sphere of determining the nature of a future war and in the plan for seeking the most expedient forms and methods of conducting it. . . .

The progressive nature of Soviet military strategy was clearly manifested during the Great Patriotic War. It was reflected in the assertion of the strategic offensive as the principal and decisive form of action of the Soviet military and in the theoretical development and practical implementation of the strategic operation of the group of fronts as a new phenomenon in military art. The most expedient methods of breaching the enemy's strategic front and effective forms of mounting offensive

operations and counteroffensives were devised; solutions were found to the problem of organizing strategic cooperation between services of the armed forces and groupings of ground forces acting along different strategic axes in the interests of accomplishing the military-political aims of strategic operations. Fundamental tenets connected with the implementation of strategic defense were also developed further.

The experience gained during the Great Patriotic War in the sphere of military strategy has not lost its significance for the present either.

**Maj.-Gen. M.I. Cherednichenko: “‘All-out war’ in the missile age”:**

... [In the second stage of the nuclear period of Soviet military thought, since the development of ballistic missiles in 1960] primary attention was given to the development and perfection of methods of conducting an all-out nuclear war. In an address by the U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] it was emphasized that we were compelled to prepare our armed forces, country, and all the people for a struggle with an aggressor, primarily under conditions of a nuclear war. . . .

As before, it was felt that the primary method in which an all-out nuclear war would be unleashed would be a sudden nuclear strike by imperialist aggressors on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, though the possibility of starting a war by escalation was not excluded. It was felt that any armed conflict would suddenly develop into an all-out nuclear missile war, if the nuclear powers were drawn into it. . . .

In determining the methods for conducting an all-out nuclear war, our military art was governed by the assumption that military-political and strategic aims of such a war could be achieved by undermining the military-economic potential of an aggressor, disrupting the system of control, destroying strategic nuclear facilities, and simultaneously annihilating its military forces within a short time. *The massive nuclear strikes of strategic forces—Strategic Missile Forces, atomic missile submarines, and long-range aviation capable of carrying out the basic war aims—acquired decisive significance.* . . . [emphasis added]

The methods of conducting military operations in ground theaters of war received further development. Mass nuclear raids using medium-range missiles and long-range aircraft were of primary importance in achieving the aims of strategic operations in theaters. The Ground Forces were charged with the task of destroying enemy troop formations and aircraft using operational-tactical nuclear weapons. A special role was assigned to the organization of coordinated nuclear strikes between operational-tactical missile forces and tactical aviation, and also to the mobile operations

involving troops with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. Meanwhile, radioactive contamination of the land, as well as the damage, fire, and flooding which could result from mass nuclear strikes, was being studied.

**Lt.-Gen. I.G. Zav’yalov: ‘Total warfare’:**

Nuclear weapons have established even more firmly the role of attack as the decisive form of military action and have made it necessary to accomplish even defensive tasks by active offensive actions.

One may suppose that future offensive operations will be characterized by a significant increase in the breadth and depth of missions, a more widely dispersed operational structure of fronts and armies, an increase in the pace of advance, and an increasing dynamism in combat actions. . . .

Finally, the emergence of nuclear missiles has revealed the material basis of *the principle of simultaneous destruction of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his combat and operational deployment as well as destruction of the most important military-economic targets deep in the rear of the belligerent states.* [emphasis added] This has aggravated such problems of the military art as the restoration of the combat capacity of units, formations and control organs and also the organization of subsequent combat actions. Fulfillment of all the measures related to this problem will take place under extraordinarily complex conditions, in a confused situation, and with a sharp struggle to gain time. . . . Success on the battlefield is possible when all the decisions of the commanders and the troops are imbued with the aspiration to achieve the assigned objectives whatever the cost.

The art of conducting military actions involving the use of nuclear weapons and the art of conducting combat actions with conventional weapons have many fundamental differences. But they are not in opposition to one another and are not mutually exclusive or isolated one from the other. On the contrary, they are closely interrelated and are developed as an integrated whole.

**The Officer’s Handbook: “Combined-arms strategy is decisive”:**

Soviet military doctrine is offensive in character. However, the offensive nature of our doctrine has nothing in common with the aggressiveness and predatory tendencies of the military doctrine of the U.S.A. and its allies, which reflect the criminal aims of the ruling classes of these countries. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community do not intend to attack anyone at all; but, if they are attacked, they will wage the war imposed upon them by their enemies in the most offensive fashion in order to bring about the rapid defeat of these enemies.

Soviet military doctrine assigns the decisive role in modern warfare to nuclear missiles. At the same time, it assumes that, in addition to nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical nature, the armed forces will use conventional weapons. *Our doctrine is based on the fact that success in modern armed combat is achieved not by any particular weapon or fighting service, but by the united efforts of all the services and branches of the armed forces with the Strategic Rocket Forces in the leading role.* [emphasis added] Only as a result of carefully organized cooperation, taking into consideration the role, place, and importance of each service and branch of the armed forces in a specific situation is it possible to achieve strategic objectives in a war, and success in battles and operations.

**Col. A.A. Sidorenko: "The offensive in a nuclear age":**

The actions of the troops on the battlefield are coordinated first of all with the nuclear strikes and are directed toward the exploitation of their results. Nuclear strikes, the destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack, and swift, highly maneuverable actions with the exploitation of gaps, breaches, and intervals in the enemy combat formation form the basis of the attack of the motorized rifle and tank subdivisions in modern battle. . . .

The presence of nuclear missile weapons will give strikes against enemy objectives in depth a new quality. The launching of such strikes permits inflicting such destruction on enemy troops disposed in the depth in such a short time that it will make them incapable of stubborn resistance for the execution of a rapid maneuver to oppose the attackers. At the same time, the use of nuclear missile weapons will give the attacking troops the opportunity to break through quickly into the operational depth, employ airborne forces widely, and complete the utter defeat of the enemy right after the nuclear strike. . . . [emphasis added]

A new characteristic feature of the offensive in nuclear war is the *conduct of combat actions under conditions of the presence of vast zones of contamination, destruction, fires, and floods.* [emphasis added]

As a result of the mass employment of nuclear weapons by the warring sides, tremendous areas will be subjected to radioactive contamination; populated places, bridges, and other structures will be destroyed; and big centers of conflagration and inundation will be formed. The subdivisions will not only be forced to fight on contaminated terrain, but also to overcome destruction, rubble, and other obstacles which may also be contaminated with radioactive substances. All this will have a great influence on the nature and methods of operation by the attacking troops. . . .

Under contemporary conditions the radioactive contamination of the terrain is an ordinary and constant

phenomenon. It may arise at various stages of the attack as a result of the enemy's delivery of nuclear attacks involving a surface burst. Most often, however, we should expect the employment of such nuclear bursts by the enemy in the situation most crucial for him. As a rule, this is during the withdrawal. By creating zones of contamination with high radiation levels, the enemy will attempt to cut the pursuing troops off from his main body making the withdrawal, hinder their advance, win time, isolate the combat operations from the approach of reserves, and attain a fundamental turning point in the situation in his own favor.

Under these conditions, the pursuing subdivisions inevitably will be forced to cross zones of radioactive contamination. . . .

In going over contaminated terrain, especially in dry weather, the subdivisions move at maximum speed with increased intervals between vehicles so as to preclude or reduce the amount of dust formed on vehicles following behind. Protective gear may be employed by personnel depending on the nature of contamination and weather and terrain conditions. When there is abundant dust formation, the personnel cruising contaminated areas on APCs [armored personnel carriers] and vehicles wear gas masks and protective capes, while tank crews wear only gas masks. In wet weather and after a rain, these same subdivisions may use protective capes, while tank crews may operate without protective gear. . . .

As can be judged from materials in the military press of various countries, the role and importance of combat operations at night will increase sharply in a future nuclear missile war. Night operations will be more frequent. They will develop on a broader scale than during World War II, and they will become an ordinary phenomenon. This is explained, first of all, by the decisive character of the attack, which demands uninterrupted conduct of combat operations day and night; secondly, by the wide development and adoption by the troops of night observation instruments, which has permitted solution of the problems of driving combat vehicles at night and has eased the location of objects on the battle field and the conduct of aimed fire; and thirdly, by the specific advantages and benefits which stem from a night attack.

Nighttime facilitates secrecy in moving troops up to the forward edge and shifting into the attack. . . .

Nuclear weapons employed at night have a stronger moral-psychological influence on the enemy troops. In employing nuclear weapons at night there is a considerable increase in the effects of light radiation, which leads to a temporary loss of sight in personnel located beyond range of other destructive effects of the nuclear blast. Due to the temporary blindness of enemy troops, greater time will be required for the enemy to determine the results of the nuclear attack and to take measures to eliminate its consequences.