

An American mission to China

Daniel Sneider uncovers the kind of military goods and expertise the Defense Department is sending to Peking.

For two weeks in the middle of September two of the nation's top defense technology specialists in strategic nuclear weapons systems will be the guests of the People's Republic of China. Where they will go, who they will see, even what they will discuss has not been revealed yet by either the authorities in Peking or Washington.

The two men are Dr. William Perry and his assistant Dr. Gerald Dinneen. The former is in fact the Undersecretary of Defense for Development, Research and Engineering; the latter is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.

Both joined the Defense Department with the Carter administration in 1977, but both are also longtime members of the upper echelons of what is referred to as the military-industrial complex—they are specialists in the most advanced areas of defense technology, in the electronics systems that relate to missile guidance, to electronic detection of missiles, and to electronic intelligence gathering.

'Ongoing consultations'

While the Defense officialdom will say no more at this point than to acknowledge the fact of this visit and the time of its occurrence, the State Department adds that this is part of ongoing consultations between the U.S. and the PRC on defense matters and on transfer of defense-related technology to China. Dr. Dinneen in fact is the key Pentagon official in charge of the transfer of technology to China, and his boss, Dr. Perry, controls the Defense Department's entire research and development program.

According to official sources, the visit is a product of the growing defense contacts between China and the United States.

The exchange took off with the visit of Defense Secretary Harold Brown to China last January. Next, Chinese Vice Premier and defense chief Geng Biao

visited the U.S. in the spring. Following Geng Biao's visit, when the sale of U.S. defense technology to China was unveiled as a new policy, the Chinese invited Perry and Dinneen for a visit.

Since then little has been said about what is actually involved in these discussions or even what U.S. policy is toward sale and transfer of defense technology to China. In late June, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Richard Holbrooke visited China, just preceding the Hua-Carter talks in Tokyo. Although little was said about what happened during that visit, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported from Peking that an agreement had been reached to hold regular quarterly defense consultation meetings with the Chinese, the first in Peking in October.

It appears that the Perry-Dinneen visit, which also surfaced as news at the same time as the Holbrooke visit, will be the first meeting in the series of consultations.

The quiet before the storm

What is amazing about this visit is not simply that the men most responsible for defense technology related to the most advanced elements of strategic nuclear weapons systems are going to China to discuss "transfer of defense technology." The Carter administration has undertaken a major shift in U.S. policy toward China, a shift toward a military alliance whose scale and character remain largely unknown and in fact are likely to have proceeded far beyond the bounds many Americans imagine still exist on such cooperation.

All this has taken place without a single significant statement of what U.S. policy is from any senior official of the U.S. government. A policy shift is accelerating that could mean war or peace for the U.S., and the vast majority of government officials and Congressional representatives, not to mention the public at large, have been kept completely in the dark. Will we wake up one morning and read on the front page of the *New York*

Times, courtesy of a leak from Dr. Brzezinski, that there exists a Presidential Directive No. 60 which commits the U.S. to a strategic nuclear alliance with the People's Republic of China?

Nowhere does there exist in the public record any discussion by administration officials of the effect of their new defense policy with China on the Soviet Union. Even if one were to accept the standard premise that the PRC relationship can be utilized to grasp concessions from the Soviet Union, there is no evidence that this works.

On the contrary, the evidence is that each step by the U.S. toward providing China with enhanced military capacity, particularly if that involves strategic nuclear systems, only increases Soviet aggressiveness and potentiality for direct U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear conflict.

Holbrooke states the policy

The closest thing to a policy statement during this past year was a controversial speech by Holbrooke June 4 on U.S.-China policy, a speech pointedly delivered right after the Geng Biao visit. As was noted at the time, Holbrooke declared that "triangular diplomacy" was "no longer an adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with China" and that relations with China would be developed "on their own merits."

Holbrooke enunciated some vague "principles" on which China policy would be based. One of those was a clear commitment to buildup of China's defense capability, on the dubious premise that a strong, "secure" China "enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and therefore contributes to our own security and that of our allies." Holbrooke at no point mentioned the Soviet Union directly, but he used several phrases that, as one defense expert remarked, "amount to perhaps the most threatening statements this administration has dared to make to Moscow."

The sum total of those references is the threat to elevate the verbal notion of "friends" and "parallel interests" (the usual descriptions of U.S.-China ties) to a strategic alliance. As Holbrooke put it at one point: "In short, relations with China are not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union, although the pace of their advance has been and will continue to be influenced by changes in the international environment. . . . In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests, we will remain—as at present—friends rather than allies."

These points were made in testimony delivered by experts before a hearing conducted on U.S.-China policy by Lester Wolf's House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. The hearing, first of a series on this subject, in part reflects growing

unease on Capitol Hill and among foreign policy makers about just how far U.S. relations with China have gone and are going. While for the first time many people are at least asking some timid questions, few have really taken stock of the impact of merely continuing a strategic policy shaped under Henry Kissinger.

The nuclear technology issue

The White House, the Defense Department and the State Department have attempted to portray the decisions on transfer of defense technology as moderate and limited in character. While it is readily admitted—in fact eagerly admitted—that items now licensed or potentially licensed for sale to China are well beyond anything considered, even in the past, for sale to the Soviet Union, the attempt is made to allege that a certain line has been drawn.

The definition of that line, however, is such as to make it meaningless in terms of its strategic impact. Supposedly the key limitation is that the U.S. will not sell actual arms and arms systems to China. What is permitted is what is called "dual-use technology and defensive military support equipment." Computers, radar systems, trucks, helicopters, jet transport are given as examples of such equipment.

Such a definition ignores the rudiments of modern warfare, the kind of technology which is in fact vital to conduct of warfare, particularly strategic nuclear warfare, and which rarely appears in the form of direct arms systems. That gray area known as "dual-use technology" is not a keyhole through which small items can be slipped but an open door big enough to drive a Mack truck through.

Nuclear weapons systems

The crucial issue for the Chinese, for the Soviets, and for the U.S. is the enhancement of Chinese strategic and tactical nuclear capability.

This not only involves the construction of the bomb device and the rocket delivery systems which the Chinese have demonstrated. It involves highly sophisticated electronic technology which performs functions like guidance of missiles, use of satellites for precise targeting, electronic counter systems, telemetry communication and encoding, communications systems of various kinds, not to mention the complex radar systems, early warning systems, satellite detection and surveillance systems, and variety of other hardware and expertise which are all part of modern nuclear warfare.

All these aspects of a strategic nuclear force Peking necessarily lacks, due to the poor quality of its scientific and technological base, with the exception of the aging corps of U.S.-trained scientists who made their way so easily to China in the 1950s. All this can easily be

transferred to Peking under the vague guidelines already set out by the administration. And all this, delivered and installed by China, would be considered in Moscow a direct and vastly different threat to the national security of the Soviet Union.

Has anyone in Washington, inside or outside the administration, considered what the Soviet response must be to such a perceived threat, particularly one supplied by Washington?

One answer was given in somewhat confused fashion by Michael Pillsbury, a Reagan defense adviser who testified before the Wolff committee and has in the past been an advocate of U.S. arms and defense technology transfers to China. Said Pillsbury in an interview with *Newsweek* April 21: "The Soviets, who are obsessive missile counters, exaggerate the importance of Western arms transfers to China. This is a dangerous situation, which could lead to a pre-emptive Soviet strike on China." Pillsbury does not go on to consider what the U.S. would do in such circumstances.

Back to Perry and Dinneen

With this in mind it is useful to return to Messrs. Perry and Dinneen. If they are going to China to discuss something relatively innocuous like sale of trucks or helicopters, they are a bit overqualified for the job.

Take Dr. Perry, for example. Before joining the Defense Department he was director of the Electronic Defense Labs of the Sylvania Corporation in California, where he directed work on analysis of missile systems and electronic reconnaissance systems.

He was on the scientific advisory committees of the Defense Department and the National Security Council; joined a special panel evaluating the famous "Missile Gap" in 1960; worked on SALT verification problems; and finally, advised the Defense Intelligence Agency on electronic intelligence regarding satellite data and so forth.

Dr. Dinneen has a parallel record of expertise. He was director of the Lincoln Labs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a highly classified defense contract or which specializes in radar, electronic guidance for missiles, and missile system technologies. He has been with the Lincoln Labs since 1953, and was the vice-chairman of the scientific advisory committee of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Air Force. His present job is concerned with electronic detection, surveillance, and communications systems, especially as they relate to strategic nuclear warfare.

Not even the itinerary of the Perry-Dinneen visit to China is yet public. But at the least, grave questions must be raised about what is going on here, before the answers are found out the hard way.

The Muslim Brotherhood story

EIR spurs investigation

by Robert Dreyfuss

Nearly two years after the *Executive Intelligence Review* began the series of exposés which gained it international recognition as the leading authority on the Muslim Brotherhood, the American press and law enforcement authorities have themselves begun a serious campaign to investigate the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States and abroad.

The July 22 assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, which was recognized generally as a conspiracy that began in Teheran, was the catalyst for those investigations. The trail led directly to the Brotherhood and its various arms.

Since that assassination, *EIR* has been contacted by the press, police departments, and other agencies requesting briefings and detailed background reports concerning the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Students Association, and the activities in the United States of Savama, the secret police of Ayatollah Khomeini.

That process was accelerated by reports of an interview with Farah Diba of Iran, the wife of the late Shah, who declared to the West German magazine *Bunte*, "To understand what has gone on in Iran, one must read what Robert Dreyfuss wrote Nov. 13, 1979, in the *Executive Intelligence Review*."

Thus, on Aug. 8, the *Washington Post* reported that the presumed assassin of Tabatabai, David Belfield, employee of Bahram Nahidian, was also a protégé and devotee of Said Ramadhan, an Egyptian who is a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and who now lives in Geneva, Switzerland. The *Post* reported that Belfield spoke with Ramadhan by telephone two days before the murder of Tabatabai and then again two hours afterward! That same day, the *Post* said, Belfield escaped by jet to Switzerland. The *Post* reported that Ramadhan was a leader of the Brotherhood in Egypt—echoing reports first published in the *EIR* more than a year ago.

Other newspapers, including the *New York Times*, have also begun to cover the Tabatabai assassination and the activities of pro-Khomeini organizations here from the standpoint of a conspiracy, although so far only small pieces of the puzzle have been published outside