

EIR Special Report

The U.S.S.R. sends Carter a message

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As a result of the Afghan events, President Carter, under the influence of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, has now placed the United States in an untenable no-win position worldwide.

The Soviet response in Afghanistan has prompted the governments of all major nations in the world to not only draw this general conclusion, but also to embark on their own appropriate foreign policy courses which will further aggravate the Carter administration's already desperate situation.

In a matter of days after Defense Secretary Harold Brown returns from China, recognition of this strategic reality will dawn upon the average American citizen and precipitate an avalanche of reactions that will quickly seal the fate of the Carter candidacy will be precipitated.

One of the gravest dangers this nation is about to face is the possibility that a rudderless government may be presided over by an inept and discredited President for the remainder of 1980, amid a perilous international situation and a stormy electoral campaign.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan has made it evident that there are two equally odious outcomes of the foreign policy of the Carter administration: World War III, which the Soviets are likely to win, or a string of American defeats and debacles that is uninterrupted until Carter and his team are kicked out of office.

What Afghanistan showed

What the Afghanistan events demonstrated to every government in the world are the following facts:

Fact One: The Soviet leadership has taken Brzezinski and Kissinger's boasts of destabilizing the U.S.S.R. by means of "Islamic fundamentalism" and the "Arc of Crisis" literally and has called that bluff militarily.

Fact Two: The Soviet leadership, convinced by the Dec. 12 NATO decision to place an additional 600 nuclear missiles in Western Europe that



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Washington has abandoned any serious concern for detente, has decisively shifted to a direct military mode of defending what it regards as its vital strategic interests.

Fact Three: As indicated by the quality of the Soviet deployment in Afghanistan, when the Soviet command decides to move militarily, it does so in a most thorough and comprehensive way, paying no attention to any considerations but military. Afghanistan is also a warning against the doctrine of "theater nuclear war."

This latter fact is perhaps the most seriously studied, especially in Peking and Western European capitals. Washington, so far, has failed to pay proper attention. As Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche has repeatedly warned, the Soviet military move into Afghanistan was designed and meant to be a warning signal to the London-Washington-Peking axis against any further encroachment against what the Soviet leadership regards as its vital strategic interests; the move into Afghanistan was also viewed by the Soviets as a last-minute dramatic action for reversing the course toward general thermonuclear war. The thoroughness of the Soviet military actions inside Afghanistan, the quality of deployed equipment, the establishment of total control over communications, transportation, and key areas of administration, the neutralization of every element that might represent a potential, even distant internal rival, all indicate that the signal meant to be delivered to every party concerned, is a very serious signal indeed.

Soviets shift policy

The Soviet action in Afghanistan was accompanied by a general transformation of the Soviet Union's overall foreign policy posture. The Soviet government announced that it rejects the latest U.S. proposal for limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and that it will continue to reject all such proposals until the Dec. 12 NATO decision for "weapons modernization" is reversed. The Soviet government also signaled that from now on it will

In this section

Our Special Report this week analyzes the facts behind the Soviet coup in Afghanistan. First, Contributing Editor Criton Zoakos takes a look at President Carter's foreign policy debacle which contributed much to the Soviet decision to move. Our Soviet desk chief Rachel Douglas then answers the question why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, with heavy documentation of the many instances of Soviet "advance warning" to the U.S. Next are our background pieces on military strategy and how Afghanistan is no "Prague Spring." We next look closer at U.S. foreign policy, in particular the much vaunted "China card" and the push for an Islamic alliance. Finally we scrutinize Europe's reaction, their effort to save detente in face of Carter's "Cold War" hard line and continue the implementation of the EMS.

refrain to respond officially to President Carter's announcements, leaving this task to Soviet journalists, and that it will consider Carter as virtually "finished" as President of the United States, with a "bare minimum of credibility" left to him domestically and internationally.

The entirety of the Soviet posture is meant to convey that the Soviet leadership regards Brzezinski's policy of encircling the U.S.S.R. with a rearmed Europe, a rearmed China, and a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated "Islamic fundamentalism" as a war provocation—and is prepared to fight any war that Brzezinski provokes.

The Afghanistan move called Brzezinski's bluff and it is very likely to shortly call Peking's bluff as well. In the military geography of the Near and Middle East, the United States had no conventional, limited military counter-response available.

The British government, led by Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, has announced that it will act as the "pacemaker" for Brzezinski's policy internationally, accelerate the shipment of weapons to China, move up the nuclear weapons modernization in Western Europe, and build up a new Islamic Pact centered around a rearmed Iran and Pakistan.

The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and also certain relatively less insane circles in London are presently realizing that the Thatcher-Brzezinski response is simply to intensify the very policy which triggered the Soviet signal-move—without supplying any credible hint that they are able to take on the Soviets on the military terms that they define. As every European and Japanese official who can read maps must have already deduced, the Red Army's High Command will hardly consider a possible boycott of the Moscow Olympics as a staggering defeat to their motorized divisions.

As every European and Japanese official knows, if the Soviets are compelled by the Brzezinski-Thatcher strategy, to repeat their Afghan move in Pakistan or Iran, the only possible Anglo-American response will be either acquiescence or a nuclear strike. Those able to read Moscow's Afghan signal have no doubt that the Soviets have completely and unequivocally once again rejected the doctrine of "theater nuclear war." Any American nuclear response to an induced Soviet move into Pakistan (or Iran) will instantaneously lead to general thermonuclear war. Any failure to respond to such an induced Soviet move will rapidly lead to a realignment of continental Europe in the direction of the Soviet side, and similar shifts in Asia and the Middle East.

The alternative to these nightmare scenarios is a course of action principally focused on putting aside the Thatcher-Brzezinski policy of inducing the Soviets to such further moves, the so-called "controlled disintegration" policy of the IMF, and replacing it with a broad program of industrial expansion and prosperity.

I. Why the Soviets

Overall policy

After many warnings.... a display of force

With the dispatch of many thousand soldiers into Afghanistan, the leadership of the Soviet Union shifted from a "war-avoidance" to a "war-winning" mode of conducting foreign policy. How the decision was reached, and what it would take for Moscow to return to war-avoidance, can be understood from an examination of Soviet strategic thinking.

The invasion of Afghanistan was not a tactical move. By taking Afghanistan, Moscow answered an array of British and American steps which added up, on the walls of the Kremlin's maprooms, to a picture of probable thermonuclear attack. The Soviets see three processes afoot on the globe leading towards that result: 1. an American attempt to encircle the U.S.S.R., involving destabilization of the Middle East, playing the China card, and building a mobile strike force to fight wars on the Soviet periphery; 2. an increased United States and NATO commitment to the strategy of "limited nuclear war," applied not only to Third world theaters of crisis, but to Europe, where the countries Moscow views as more reliable detente partners are being harnessed to American plans; and 3. an economic crisis so severe in the West that the Soviets are easily convinced that the "final collapse of capitalism" has arrived and is motivating overseas adventures by the United States.

The Soviets expect nothing but lunacy from Washington at this moment. The Soviet news agency Tass, in a Jan. 6 release authorized at the highest levels in Moscow, responded to President Carter's imposition of sanctions against the U.S.S.R. with an assessment of the president's judgment as follows:

The President's statement creates the impression that it lacks both political balance and a realistic assessment of the international situation, that it overestimates the potentialities of the United