

INTERNATIONAL

Europe: a superpower for peace

Detente with or without the United States

West Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government has launched an unprecedented public campaign to secure U.S. Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). Defense Minister Hans Apel arrived in Washington last week for a series of meetings with Senate leaders and other government officials, and testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Apel's message, which went unreported in all the U.S. press, was that if the U.S. does not care enough about the peace and security of the world to ratify the SALT II treaty, then Bonn will not permit the stationing of the American Pershing II or cruise missiles on its territory under the proposed NATO "modernization plan."

Coinciding with Apel's visit, Chancellor Schmidt gave an interview to the London *Economist* (excerpted below), in which he re-emphasized this position. A Senate rejection of SALT, he said, would be a "disastrous blow to the necessary leadership of the United States." How could anyone rely in the future upon the policy of an American President, when three Presidents negotiated this treaty only to have it blocked? Schmidt asked.

President Carter took note of Bonn's growing insistence by quoting in his Oct. 9 press conference the Chancellor's statement that SALT II ratification is a precondition for the NATO modernization program. Following Apel's testimony, protreaty sources in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaked to the *Washington Post* a report asserting that "the allies now regard the ratification of SALT II as a major test of U.S. reliability as a leader of the West." European diplomats and others interviewed by the report's authors said they were disinclined to make "the difficult political decisions" required for the weapons modernization program unless the Senate approves SALT, thereby providing "proof of the U.S. commitment to arms control and the continuation of the search for East-West stability." Apel's organizing efforts in Washington followed close on a summit meeting last week between Schmidt and

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in Bonn. These two leaders have announced themselves dedicated to making Europe a "superpower for peace," and both are intensively engaged in opening up economic cooperation initiatives "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Said Schmidt in his *Economist* interview: economic cooperation has more importance than most strategic thinkers realize. Schmidt and Giscard concluded their summit vowing support for the SALT treaty, and to work jointly in such fields as satellite research and preparations for next year's Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Following the talks, Giscard returned to France and attended French army maneuvers, where, for the first time, Warsaw Pact military representatives were invited as observers. Giscard's Economics Minister René Monory flew to Moscow for meetings of the Franco-Soviet Grand Commission, discussing cooperation in computer technology, nuclear power, space research, and raw materials development.

Brezhnev's arms offer

This series of diplomatic initiatives forms the context for Schmidt's announcement Oct. 7 that he views Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's unilateral troop cut and offer of negotiations on the USSR's medium-range SS-20 missiles "with satisfaction" and hopes these "will serve as a signal for progress in the framework of future negotiations." Schmidt's deepest policy commitment was revealed in his speech, at a Social Democratic Party conference in Nuremberg, Bavaria, where he characterized the Federal Republic's relations with the German Democratic Republic. With all that still divides the two sovereign German states, he said, they share one underlying conviction: "that never again shall war begin from German soil."

Contrary to howls of rage from London, Washington, and much of the international press (see below), Schmidt's position has nothing to do with "self-Finlandization" or "capitulation to Soviet blackmail." Ac-

According to the line popularized by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a conference in Brussels last month on the future of NATO, the conflicts which are now rocking the very foundations of the Atlantic Alliance are due to the fact that Western Europe no longer believes in the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella. "Would the United States use its intercontinental ballistic missiles to retaliate for Soviet nuclear strikes against targets in Western Europe, when such retaliation probably would mean a Soviet attack against targets in America?"—that is how *New York Times* military columnist Drew Middleton characterized the alleged West European view in an article Oct. 10. According to this line, U.S. weakness is driving Bonn to consider "striking a deal with the Russians," thereby threatening the very existence of NATO.

NATO split caused by Kissingerian policies

In fact, it is the policies advocated by Kissinger which are causing the turmoil in NATO, not the Soviet offers for troop reduction or Schmidt's positive response. It is not alleged U.S. "reluctance" to use nuclear weapons which dismays the Europeans, but rather Washington's policy of risking war by continuously seeking confrontations with the Soviet Union (as in the recent abortive "showdown" over an alleged Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba), and American threats to reject the SALT II treaty, jeopardizing world peace.

Whereas the U.S.S.R. and West Germany originally advocated including medium-range weapons in Europe in the SALT negotiations, Kissinger—then Secretary of State—blocked this, arguing that Europe should be left out of the U.S.-Soviet equation. It was Schmidt who, during his 1978 summit meeting with Brezhnev, reintroduced this issue of the "gray zone," since he fully realized that only a global peace solution can work. While Kissinger calls for balancing forces in Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact, leaving the United States arsenal and its mooted alliance with China aside, Schmidt argues that this is insane. If Europe is "decoupled" from the United States in this way, and if the SALT agreement is defeated, the Chancellor is correctly convinced that there will be no possibility of arms reduction in Europe, and the stage will be set for a new Cold War—or worse.

Although the positions of Schmidt and Brezhnev as expressed in their recent speeches are scarcely identical, the way is now open for negotiations. The cornerstone of Bonn's policy on the issue of the new medium-range missiles is that they should only be deployed as a last resort, should negotiations with the Warsaw Pact fail to achieve a Soviet troop and weapon reduction. Since the Pershing II and the Cruise would take at least three years to produce, a decision at the December NATO meeting to initiate "modernization" would leave a long time for discussion before the weapons were actually

deployed, placing the central focus on disarmament negotiations. Brezhnev's proposals, and his endorsement of Franco-German calls for a European disarmament conference, are precisely the preconditions Bonn has insisted upon.

Schmidt and his associates have already begun organizing support for their position, and are seeking clarification from Moscow of what exactly the Soviets have in mind. The Chancellor met Oct. 10 with Italian Prime Minister Cossiga, and elaborated for him the importance of Brezhnev's proposals. The discussions produced a joint communiqué calling for SALT II ratification.

Disarmament spokesman Alfons Pawelczyk from Schmidt's Social Democratic Party, who just returned from a trip to Moscow, announced in Bonn Oct. 9 that in his view the Soviet initiative is not part of a strategy to split the western alliance, but is rather a serious signal of Russian intention. Schmidt's government spokesman, Armin Grunewald, left for Moscow Oct. 10 for further soundings on the military question, and economic consultations to pave the way for Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's upcoming visit to Bonn. The main item on the agenda of Gromyko's visit will be implementation of the 25-year economic cooperation agreements signed by Schmidt and Brezhnev in May 1978.

—Susan Welsh

Schmidt: Salt II must be ratified

The following are excerpts from an interview with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt which appeared in The Economist of London on Oct. 6:

Q: You said earlier this year that "never before have we been so secure." What did you mean by that?

A: When I used that phrase, "we" was not meant to be "we" the West as a whole. It was meant to be "we," the Germans, the Germans in the western Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the Germans in the German Democratic Republic, as well as the Germans in West Berlin, that we are securer nowadays than we were in the 1960s and 1950s and 1940s. My reasoning is rather simple. We saw many Berlin crises in earlier decades, the Khrushchev ultimatum, the building of the wall in the early 1960s. Today, on the basis of a continuous equilibrium of military forces which results from these inside Europe, and those working upon Europe from the outside, we have created a policy of cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe. A

policy of what one calls detente, a policy of calculability on both sides....

Q: *We nevertheless do face a situation where western strategic superiority has gone.*

A: It was never a western strategic superiority. It was an American superiority in intercontinental strategic nuclear weaponry....

Q: *I was talking about strategic superiority.*

A: I do not like that. I think it's wrong to use the word "strategic" only in the context of intercontinental nuclear weaponry. It's a wrong perception of strategy. I use the word "strategy" in the sense of the late Captain Liddel Hart's grand strategy which embraces not only all the military fields but of course also the political, the psychological, the economic fields....

Q: *If one takes the Gulf area, for example. The equilibrium, wouldn't you concede, is less stable now than it was?*

A: Right, right. Not so much due to Soviet activities. Iran hasn't collapsed because of Soviet activities.... I personally do not believe that in the end the complex of Middle East questions can be settled without some participation of the Soviet Union.... I do not maintain that Soviet influence as regards the Palestine question or the complexities between Israel and her neighbors is greater than it was five years ago. It's smaller, indeed.

Q: *What role does or could Europe play in that sort of area in, say the Horn of Africa or in Africa itself?*

A: A rather small role because there isn't much that Europe could provide, what could the Europeans give or guarantee? Could they guarantee military assistance? Could they guarantee the flow of oil into Israel? Obviously they can't. They can, of course, be helpful in a limited way. But it is more or less a fact, whether you like it or not—and I don't like it too much but I have to accept it as a fact—that the Americans are the ones who have influence there, and, to a lesser degree, the Soviets. There is no European Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, nor is there any such thing in the Indian Ocean, nor in the Gulf—nor would there be any such thing....

Q: *Is SALT II vital to maintaining the nuclear strategic balance that you talked about earlier?*

A: Yes, it gives some stability in that balance. Only in that one field,...if SALT II is not ratified as it stands, it could—and this would be my apprehension—create a broad feeling of uncertainty. This treaty has been negotiated by three American Presidents, Nixon, Ford and Carter, by three American Secretaries of State, Rogers, Kissinger and, nowadays, Vance and their aides and security advisers and so on. If after such a long period of negotiation and agreement, in the end parlia-

mentarians refuse to ratify that sort of treaty, the world becomes rather incalculable. How could you in the future depend on a policy carried out by an American president? It would be a disastrous blow to the necessary leadership of the United States as regards the West as a whole. I rule out amendments, which would require negotiation...

Q: *It has been said in West Germany that the increase in Russian military strength was primarily or purely defensive. Is that a notion which you subscribe to?*

A: I will not comment on what others have said. I myself believe that the Brezhnev leadership is fundamentally not aiming at war in Europe, not aiming at offensive moves in Europe, but aiming at maintaining a stable and secure situation. I have to add that, as it was in the past, so also in their perception on stable security in the present, the Russians have always wanted to be on the safe side, having a little more in any field than others, a little better, well, that is their built in instinct. They overdo it in some fields.... But there is, as far as I can see, no tacit hidden offensive attitude behind Russia's policy. This goes for the present leadership in the Soviet Union. I'm not making any prophecies for the rest of the 1980s....

Q: *What about Russian intentions outside Europe, which seems to me much less just a question of containing and preserving the status quo?*

A: ...I do not think that the present leadership in the Soviet Union would risk any showdown anywhere in the world. I think that one could see this rather clearly in the case of the Vietnamese request for Soviet help vis-à-vis the so-called Chinese operation of punishment. The Soviets behaved rather cautiously.... I was critical of the Chinese. They don't have a right to punish somebody, nobody has a right to violate the territory of somebody else, to violate somebody else's sovereignty....

Q: *I must say you're sounding to me somewhat as you were represented after Brezhnev's visit here in May, 1978. There was speculation at that time that there was an understanding between the two of you that the Federal Republic of Germany and its leadership would become the advocates of Soviet attitudes within the alliance.*

A: We are not the advocates of the Russians. We are not even the interpreters of the Russians. They are a great power, one of the two largest in the world, who can and do speak for themselves.... We contribute quite a bit to the defense abilities of that alliance (NATO—ed.). To think of the alliance without Germany is to think of fairly little.

...A return to the Cold War is still thinkable: I hope it doesn't occur, but we have not passed the point of no return as yet. Economic cooperation is more important than strategic thinkers yet understand.