

Chicago gangs—who benefits?

Part 2 of reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series

This week Executive Intelligence Review continues its publication of excerpts from Chicago Defender reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series on Chicago gangs. Full copies of the series may be obtained directly from the Chicago Defender, 2400 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60616.

June 19: 'Disorganizer' creates gang climate

The University of Chicago had successfully "gobbled up" Hyde Park-Kenwood in the late 50s, but needed more land by 1960.

The tactics of the 50s could not be used again: a new strategy was necessary.

July 18, 1960, the University had presented their expansion plans to the Chicago Land Clearance Commission.

The mood against the University, however, was intense. Leaflets appeared: "Levi wants to make Woodlawn a slum." Community organizer Nicholas Von Hoffmann protested the University's new plans to "gobble up Woodlawn."

The University had quickly realized that their plans for expansion Northward would run into opposition unless there was a community organization that articulated their views. So they set about creating one.

The U. of C.'s objective was more complex than a simple land grab. But first things first.

As Joseph Check noted in an article entitled "Urban-Counterinsurgency & the University of Chicago," the U. of C. saw the future of Woodlawn to be "one in which a relatively high occupational and middle income level will prevail, because the housing and other physical facilities are such as to exclude the lowest income groups. ..." Urban renewal meant the same old thing: black removal.

In preparation for the "impending war of urban

renewal," the University had assessed its strength. Check revealed the self-assessment:

1. The University had "the power and influence on its Board of Trustees and its alumni (which) could lean the city and corporate finances in the University's favor."

2. "The University could bring in investment and seed money, if it had commanding control (of Woodlawn)."

3. "The University could steer education and research to meet its need for exact information on the community, training local and municipal leaders, providing information through mass media, and establishing an Urban Institute."

4. "The University supports the South East Chicago Commission (SECC) to coordinate and strengthen (e.g., 'control,' observes Check) the other neighborhood organizations."

The SECC domain was 39th to 67th Street, Cottage Grove to the Lake. It was Julian Levi who headed up the SECC, an agency which University of Illinois urbanologist Pierre de Vise twelve years ago had dubbed "the University's own version of the CIA."

It was Julian Levi who was head of the U. of C.'s Urban Institute.

Julian was about his brother's business; his brother, Edward Hirsch Levi, was Chancellor of the University.

If the heat on First Presbyterian Church for housing the Blackstone Rangers was deserved, the Church deserves even more heat for setting up the University's "community organization."

In collusion with the University of Chicago, First Presbyterian (with a Lutheran and a Catholic church) created the Woodlawn organization (TWO).

The TWO founders had early decided they would need some "indigenous leadership" to lead them, so the four white ministers selected Rev. Arthur M. Brazier.

Comments writer Charles E. Silberman in the book, "Crisis in Black & White" that put TWO on the map:

TWO floundered for a while, until the Revs. Charles T. Leber, Jr. and Ulysses B. Blakely (First Presbyterian's

co-pastors) called on Saul David Alinsky to join TWO.

The decision produced some of TWO's most heady conflicts: Rev. C. K. Proefrock of the Immanuel Lutheran Church (one of the original founders of TWO) and four other ministers, forbidden to tape record meetings of the Greater Woodlawn Pastors' Association, pulled out of the Association, out of TWO, and left the community. Proefrock remained in Woodlawn and was one of Alinsky's most articulate critics.

Enter Saul David Alinsky, counter-insurgency expert.

"The first function of the community organization is community disorganization," Alinsky is quoted as saying in a book friendly to the disorganizer-organizer, "Black Power, White Control."

Alinsky's was a "Maoist" dictum: destroy before rebuilding; it was the tabula rasa notion of British philosopher John Locke.

Woodlawn was one of Saul Alinsky's success stories.

Until Alinsky joined TWO, the University of Chicago viewed TWO as an "uncontrolled gang."

And with Alinsky's arrival, the University was not about to praise TWO or Alinsky—not yet. They heaped abuse on their man.

Recalled Alinsky: "The University of Chicago could have ruined TWO by simply issuing a statement endorsing me as one of their 'illustrious' alumni. In that case, nobody in Woodlawn would have had anything to do with me...."

Alinsky was in fact an illustrious U. of C. alumnus—he had graduated cum laude in the 30s and like Edward Hirsch Levi, was a protégé of Robert Maynard Hutchins. Alinsky had been awarded a fellowship in criminology—he was to become a gang profiler; his first gang was Capone's—by U. of C. President Robert M. Hutchins.

But Alinsky was not meant to be an academic sociologist; he was a practitioner, a countergang organizer. Saul Alinsky was given the freedom to characterize the U. of C. sociology department as "an institution which spends \$100,000 on research programs to find the location of houses of prostitution which any taxi driver could tell them for nothing."

Alinsky's remark misses—or rather evades—the point. The School of Social Service Administration is not a collection of stupid people. If the sociology department got a \$100,000 grant for a year-long research program to find whorehouses on Chicago's South Side, they would take that amount of time (and apply for a year's extension of the grant) precisely because they did *not* want the whorehouses found.

Saul Alinsky always maintained his distance from

his Alma Mater. "Whenever I feel they are trying to seduce me, then I let them have it—and bang! I'm back in the gutter, where I belong."

Comments a *Defender* source, a Southside observer of Alinsky's role in shaping TWO, "For Alinsky to get in the gutter, he'd have to do some social climbing."

"Black Power, White Control," a book documenting the creation of TWO, suggests the first phase of the University of Chicago's strategy was to herd the community organizations into TWO, while continuing to hold itself out as the villain.

Charles Silberman comments (in "Crisis in Black and White"): And so the University of Chicago obligingly supplied the whipping boy—*itself*—that was needed to unite the tenants, homeowners, and businessmen in a common cause...."

Julian Levi played the tough: "Either accept the plan (U. of C. South Campus annexation into Woodlawn) or sit back and watch it go through," Levi had told a worried Woodlawn businessmen's group. They rushed to join TWO.

In its early days, TWO announced: "We're tired of being pawns in sociological experiments" of the University of Chicago. But TWO was headed for the most outrageous sociological experiment Chicago has seen.

In his organizing, Saul Alinsky focused his attacks only obliquely on the University—his focus was City Hall, and the police, both of which were made to be seen as an alien occupational force within a besieged community.

The notion that not only police but teachers were "hostile authority figures" to the Woodlawn youth was expressed by TWO's organizers.

Alinsky had set up the climate of paranoia that would allow the gangs to be invited in.

With Alinsky in control of TWO came the foundation money: a quarter of a million dollars from the Rockefeller Foundation (had the University of Chicago, Rockefeller University, given the nod?). The Presbyterian Church coffers supplied \$50,000; the Field Foundation (like the Rockefellers, backers and trustees of the U. of C.) kicked in thousands; the Schwarzhaupt Foundation put up \$69,000.

As he observed in his book, "The Professional Radical," Alinsky called organizing on an altruistic basis "a lot of crap." So Alinsky "looked for the wrong reasons to get right things done."

By 1963, Alinsky had created within TWO the illusion of power. The illusion was sufficient for the University of Chicago to "capitulate" to the community organization they had created.

The previously hostile University had "turned into

the staunch friend and ally of the Woodlawn Organization," noted Marion K. Saunders (co-author of "The Professional Radical").

John Fish's book title, "Black Power, White Control," tells the story.

June 20: The university, TWO, and the gangs

By mid-1963 community organizer Saul Alinsky had created within TWO the illusion of power sufficient for the University of Chicago to appear to bend to the demands of the community organization the U. of C. had helped create.

Alinsky's method of organizing had ruthlessly "rubbed raw the sores of discontent." And there were plenty of festering sores in Woodlawn: slum landlords, exorbitant interest rates and carrying charges for inferior merchandise, an overcrowded and segregated school system, inferior city services.

But the focus on such injustices wasn't to last long. In spite of the naivete of the indigenous leadership of TWO, the real creators of the community organization had other objectives. Besides, within months there wasn't going to be any Woodlawn Community.

Rev. Arthur Brazier, in his book "Black Self-Determination: The Story of the Woodlawn Organization," writes: "The University of Chicago began to take seriously its responsibility to the Woodlawn neighborhood lying just to the south of the campus. Previously the university had been active in research and development in projects scattered far and wide over the earth but had ignored the massive problems at its doorstep." Woe to the people at its southern doorstep, they had caught the attention of the U. of C. researchers, the anthropologists, sociologists and urban planners.

U. of C. Provost Edward Levi announced a new "major commitment to improving ghetto schools" in a 1965 winter quarter commencement address: "We must rethink the University's participation in the training of scholars for public service (especially) ... in the area of education for the underprivileged ... greater involvement is required both for training and research."

The upshot of this was, notes Brazier, that "a stream of experimental schools" was established in the Woodlawn school district, funded by Title III grants.

TWO had proclaimed: "We are tired of being pawns in the University of Chicago's sociological experi-

ments!" And the first great victory over the University was to win the U. of C. over to performing a sociological experiment (in education) in Woodlawn.

But this is jumping ahead of our story. In early 1963, TWO was still at odds with the University.

In mid-1963, the University "capitulated." Julian Levi consented to talk to TWO; Mayor Daley set up the meeting. "The previously hostile University had turned into the staunch friend of TWO," Marion Saunders notes in the book he coauthored with Saul Alinsky, "The Professional Radical." Alinsky had done his work well.

But TWO had to be built up even more. Enter Charles Silberman and his book "Crisis in Black & White," published in 1964.

Silberman dished out rave reviews: "Alinsky is that rarity in American life; a superlative organizer, strategist, and tactician who is also a philosopher." Silberman continued to maintain the illusion that TWO was defiantly challenging the University; Julian Levi went along with this in an interview with Silberman: "The University of Chicago is one of the few really first-rate things in the City of Chicago," Levi told Silberman, "and it needs more land if it's going to continue to be first rate..."

But in fact, a truce more lasting than that between the East Side Disciples and the Blackstone Rangers was already intact. Silberman got the national money flowing.

The University of Chicago scheme was acknowledged by none other than McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, who praised Julian Levi's skills in a letter to Levi: "I can see that someone has done a neat job of reconciling both parties concerned."

Now, on to business.

The first order of business was to bring in the gangs.

TWO, with sociologists from the University of Chicago and representatives from the Ford Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and other federal agencies set out to do a study on "alienated youth"—the gangs.

The agencies decided to put together a "job training program" for "alienated youth" which involved the gang leadership "in planning, design, and operation of the program."

Rev. Brazier by this time had also turned into a sociologist. He declared: "The present scientific literature on youth subculture is inadequate to describe a group like the Rangers."

"Before TWO was organized, Rev. Brazier had been an obscure minister of a Pentecostal church concerned almost exclusively with the next life..."

June 21: The gang controller is brought in

With their "community organization" firmly established, the Ford Foundation, the University of Chicago, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and other federal agencies were ready with their gang experiment in mid-1966.

A gang controller was needed—otherwise, the gang might go off on its own. First Presbyterian Church sent for the Rev. John R. Fry, a white veteran gang worker who had had experience working with black gangs in East Harlem, New York.

First Presbyterian's co-pastors, the Rev. Blakely and Leber—who had created the Woodlawn Organization (TWO) and had invited in Saul Alinsky to build TWO up—were kicked upstairs in the Church's hierarchy.

By the time the Ford Foundation-University of Chicago "alienated youth" program was ready, Fry had already brought the gangs into his sanctuary: the Blackstone Rangers were headquartered at First Presbyterian Church (6400 S. Kimbark).

TWO—which was fronting the program—asked Fry to arrange a meeting between their agency and the Ranger leadership (the "Main 21").

TWO had more difficulty in bringing in the East Side Disciples. Without backing (a university and a church), the Disciples, though ruthless, were less organizationally successful. Their gang membership numbered only about 150; in 1966, the Rangers claimed to have 1,000 members.

Eventually, the details were worked out. Jerome Bernstein, deputy director of OEO's Community Action Program explained the program to the leadership of the two gangs.

The OEO was to supply nearly a million dollars over a one year period: gang leadership was to serve as recruiters, basic education instructors, instructor-aides, vocational instructor aides, assistants to the basic education supervisors.

Mayor Richard Daley was opposed to the program, but was convinced of its workability by Julian Levi; the mayor's staff remained consistently opposed to handing over \$1 million to the gangs.

The program was to become a colossal hustle: youths were intimidated into quitting school to join the program; a total of 35 jobs were secured at a cost of \$1 million. Gang related crimes doubled.

What could young gangsters teach but gangsterism? Nothing.

"The whole program was a subtle form of blackmail," Winston Moore charged before the June, 1968 McClellan Hearings. Moore, warden of Cook County Jail, had been a psychologist with the Illinois Youth Commission.

Who would be selected to determine whether the gang program was working and whether it should be funded for another year?

Silly question. The University of Chicago, of course.

Asked to comment on this set-up by Sen. John McClellan, Moore stated: "The University of Chicago practically wrote the program, so for them to evaluate it would be like me evaluating my own jail."

June 25: Seminary operated gang hostels

Gang controller Rev. John Fry, the man who on numerous occasions expressed—and published—doubts about his own sanity, where did he come from? Who were his controllers?

Was it a fluke that Fry was handed First Presbyterian Church during the most explosive period in the Woodlawn community's history?

Not likely.

Fry comes from the same "religious" tradition that created People's Temple founder Rev. Jim Jones. And like Jim Jones, Fry's constituency—his experimental subjects—were predominantly black. But that is a later chapter in our story.

During the height of the gang violence, Charles P. Livermore, executive director of the Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare, had appealed: "We must quit making the black community a laboratory for experiments in bizarre social theories."

The experiments, supposedly launched by the churches to combat delinquency, "would not be tolerated five minutes in the white communities," Livermore stated.

Nov. 19, 1968, Livermore observed: "Some black leaders have learned that the more hatred they can show toward the police, city hall, and the establishment, the more they receive the plaudits, the attention, and the handouts from the various sections of the religious establishment."

We have seen how and why the First Presbyterian Church first set up the Woodlawn Organization (TWO) as a countergang to the University of Chicago.

We've seen how First Presbyterian Church invited in U. of C. alumnus Saul Alinsky to change the focus away from the University, focusing the hatred, "rubbing raw the sores of discontent," against city hall, the police, the board of education, and business.

We have noted also how the U. of C. joined forces with TWO to bring in "experimental education programs," and then the federally financed gang experiment.

Rev. John R. Fry, pastor of First Presbyterian Church, was, however, not the only low-level gang controller.

Who were the others? Silly question. The University of Chicago, of course.

"Rev. Fry and the Chicago Theological Seminary was like one big family, in the surveillance that we made, the information that we had," remembers Lovejoy Foster, a member of the Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) since it was formed in 1967.

With its centrally located University of Chicago headquarters at 5757 S. University Ave., the Chicago Theological Seminary was in a prime spot to oversee the gang experiment.

Founded in 1855, the Seminary was integrated into the University in 1915.

The Seminary, funded directly by the Rockefeller Sealantic Fund (among others), had played a key role in getting TWO going, in 1960.

Next, the Seminary was to emerge as an operator of "safe houses" for the gangs.

The Chicago Theological Seminary ran at least three gang hostels, providing free and unsupervised housing for gang members. Locations of three of the houses: 4500 Greenwood Ave., 4612 Greenwood Ave., and 4454 Woodlawn Ave.

The Chicago Theological Seminary had decided that the gang leaders were "the leadership" of Woodlawn.

The official rationale for the sociological gang experiment being run by the Chicago Theological Seminary was, claimed Paul Bartholomew (vice president of the Seminary): "To provide housing for members of the Blackstone Rangers in an effort to expose seminary students to leadership in the ghetto areas."

The buildings were turned over to the Rangers in early 1967 for use as free living quarters; under the agreement, several seminary students also lived in the building, "but would not exert control over gang activities."

Earlier yet, somebody had toyed with the idea that the Disciples gang could be used in the University's experiment.

The Chicago Theological Seminary had in 1966

turned the building over to the Disciples. But the Disciples, more uncontrollable, kicked the seminary-sociologist students out of the 4500 Greenwood Ave. two-story building.

In this gang fight, foreshadowing the conclusion of our story, the Chicago Theological Seminary came out the winners: they kicked out the Disciples, and invited in the Blackstone Rangers.

This Seminary move, playing one gang off against the other, added to the hostility (and shooting) between the Disciples and the Rangers, Bartholomew admitted in a June 29 newspaper interview.

"Everybody who was a head of one of the (OEO) gang centers was from one of those (Chicago Theological Seminary) houses," police inspector Foster told the *Defender*. "You could always find them when you went there."

A week after Jessie Smith, 42, a Grand Crossing policeman had been shot to death in a gang-related killing, the Rev. Archie Hargraves, head of the Chicago Theological Seminary urban mission, held a press conference in which he denounced the police, and stated: "We will conduct our own discipline when our young people are wrong." Three hours after that press conference, two individuals, Walter Jackson, 16, and Ulysses Green, 69 were gunned down by three Blackstone Rangers. Just two of the some 700 gang shootings per year.

Asked what he thought Rev. Fry's motivation was, Foster stated: "He was doing his job. Whatever his job was, he was doing it!" Foster laughed. "He had a boss. Most likely it was the University. You just don't come out and do things for yourself. That's not the way the world works."

"They (Fry and the other gang controllers at First Presbyterian Church) had to have a boss, some coordination. That's the way the world works—there's not a lot of totally uncoordinated stuff going on..."

June 25: What spawned the gang experiments?

When he was not active in his gang work, Rev. John R. Fry could be found haranguing his parishioners with his existentialism.

Fry was an enthusiast of British Tavistock psychiatrist R.D. Laing, and especially Laing's book "Politics of Experience," which expressed the notion that insanity

might be a more legitimate response to an "absurd" world than "so-called sanity."

To explain Rev. Fry and the theologian-experimenters, one must go back at least to 1908.

That was the year of the founding of the Federal Council of Churches (FCOC).

In 1907, theologian Walter Rauschenbush spent a year with Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Rauschenbush returned to the U.S. as the key organizer of the FCOC.

Notes a former president of the FCOC, Dr. A.W. Beaven, "It is clear that the greatest single personal influence on the life and thought of the American Church in the last 50 years was exerted by Walter Rauschenbusch."

Numerous leading members of the FCOC cite the significant role played by the Webbs' British Fabian Society, in setting up the FCOC.

Predominant leadership in the early federation was provided by its second president, University of Chicago Divinity School head, Shailer Mathews.

In a 1960 book, "Collectivism in the Churches," author Edgar C. Bundy writes: "Men have been elevated to the highest position in the Council not because of their defense of the Gospel, but (rather) for their denials of the historic doctrines of the faith."

Commented a Chicago daily on Mathews' preaching: "We are struck with the hypocrisy and treachery of these attacks on Christianity. Is there no place in which to assail Christianity but a divinity school? Is there no one to write infidel books except the professors of Christian theology? Is the theological seminary an appropriate place for a massacre of Christian doctrine?"

The Fabian church movement ushered in a period of "gate receipts" organizing: the individual principles of the church became subsidiary to the call for unity, which produced a bland moral pap much like the content of television.

Further, the focus of "church work" no longer

comes from the parishioners: the parish could shrink to nothing and the church work could go on.

Who supplied the money for this protestant coalition? In the case of the FCOC, the top funders were: the Julius Rosenwald Fund; the Lewis Horowitz Foundation; the Henry Luce Foundation; the Rockefeller Brothers. Fund, and the Russell Sage Foundation (an organization of which Edward H. Levi of the University of Chicago was made a trustee).

In 1950, the name of the organization was changed to the National Council of Churches (NCC). By 1955, the move was made to squeeze the laity out of the decision making altogether. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, Presbyterian head of the NCC, ruled to abolish the Lay Committee of the NCC.

As Bundy points out, the NCC "wanted the financial support of the laymen but wanted no restraining hand on the excursion into the fields of economics, sociology and politics."

The NCC was a political organization, with a religious and left-wing cover.

The right-wing and fundamentalist church movement makes the mistake of believing the NCC and the related World Council of Churches (WCC) are socialist.

As we will see later in our story about the creation of the Blackstone Rangers, the NCC interlocks with the federal government at crucial points.

U.S. News and World Report noted that interlock as long ago as April 1954.

The Union Theological Seminary in New York City, out of which Rev. Fry was spawned, was "one of the 'darlings' of the Federal, World, and National Council of Churches," notes Bundy.

The NCC was to rely less and less on the dues of the member churches, and more on foundations.

In next week's issue: An offer Daley couldn't refuse.