

territory of many countries, who proclaim the inevitability of war and prepare intensively for it."

Two days prior to Pravda's commentary, East German President Erich Honnecker warned, "Recent developments have brought the world to a branching point between war and peace. The Chinese are trying to provoke World War III and may do so by the invasion of Vietnam."

'China modernization a cover for war preparation'

The following are excerpts of an article, distributed by the official Soviet news agency Novosti and authored by Vladimir Potatov, Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Far East Institute. It was published in the Feb. 1 issue of the conservative French daily Le Figaro, which has published numerous Novosti releases over the recent period. It is titled "Weapons supplies to China: the Soviet point of view."

China's leaders have posed for their country the task of making China a strong military power by the end of the 20th century. . . . It was towards this goal that the program of "four modernizations" was launched. Create modern agriculture, industry, army, science and technology. Practice shows that three of these modernizations — that of agriculture, industry, science and technology — serve to reach the main objective: the modernization of the army. . . .

Some of the political figures of the West who lack foresight and who come out in favor of arms supplies to China probably believe that they will succeed in directing the Chinese expansionist spearhead in one direction only: against the USSR. This is a dangerous error! Chinese expansionism is a threat to universal peace and the security of the peoples of numerous countries. No one can ignore, for example, the hegemonist projects hatched by Peking's leaders in South East Asia. . . . The consequences of the policy aimed at encouraging Peking's expansionism are just as evident for Europe.

Peking's leaders continue to propagate the demented idea according to which each generation "must have its own war." Yang Yung, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese army, published an article last December calling for the acceleration of modernization measures for the army, not to lose one moment, and to accomplish all preparations oriented towards an early nuclear war of great scope.

Czechoslovak commentary

In a separate commentary on China, the official Czech daily Rude Pravo compared Chinese Vice Premier Teng with Hitler. Both warned against "Soviet aggression," Rude Pravo wrote.

On Feb. 5, Rude Pravo called on the U.S. to "sharply repudiate" Teng's threat to "punish" Vietnam. If the U.S. does not criticize Teng, the paper stipulated, on this question of war and peace, this means it is encouraging him. The Czech daily concluded with the warning to the U.S. that it is being "naive" to think the U.S. pulls the Chinese string. It is the other way around. "He who thinks he can set his neighbor's house afire without being seen himself, might burn himself in the end," warned the paper.

Henry A. Kissinger: West

Following are portions of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's interview with the London Economist, dated Feb. 3.

Q: Do you think that there is an imbalance even in the present agreement in terms of sheer throw-weight available on both the Soviet and American sides?

A: The real issue is what the strategic forces of the two sides are capable of doing. This in turn decides the impact of military capabilities on the conduct of foreign policy and especially on the conduct of crises. I think it is generally recognized that by some time in the early 1980s the Soviet Union will have the capability to destroy with a reasonable degree of confidence most of our land-based ICBMs. In the same period of time we will not be able to destroy the Soviet ICBM force. This creates a gap in the design of the two forces that is bound to have geopolitical consequences, especially since we are clearly inferior in forces capable of local intervention. . . .

Q: And you'd like to see that remedied.

A: I would like to set it in terms of geopolitical realities. During the entire postwar period, it is obvious that the Soviet Union has always had a substantial superiority in the capability for local intervention, in almost all crisis areas. But that was counterbalanced to a substantial degree by the strategic superiority of the United States. For purposes of this discussion, I define strategic superiority as the ability by the United States to pose a risk, or at least a perceived risk, to the Soviet Union that it might lose most of its strategic retaliatory force if it pushed a crisis beyond a certain point. This knowledge inspired a high degree of caution. . . . The practical result is that in a local, regional crisis the Soviet capacity for intervention must become more politically significant than in the past. And will be perceived as being more significant. The conduct of American policy in crises will inevitably become more cautious. This is an event of geopolitical significance.

Q: Can we distinguish for a moment between counterforce capability and the capability of the United States to retaliate against a Soviet attack?

A: . . . Every calculation with which I am familiar indicates that a general nuclear war in which civilian populations are the primary target will produce casualties exceeding 100 million. Such a degree of devastation is not a strategic doctrine; it is an abdication of moral and political responsibility. No political structure could survive it.

Q: Are you saying that when a SALT treaty comes to be considered, a prerequisite for its ratification by the Senate should be an increase in the United States' counterforce capability?

A: Leaving aside the ratification question, I believe this is a necessity with or without SALT. The dilemmas which I have described will not go away. I am restless when I am told that we

must arm against Soviets

will never permit our military forces to become inferior to the other side's unless it is coupled with an operational definition of what is meant by superior or inferior. Clearly, foreseeable nuclear forces are adequate to destroy tens of millions of people. The question is whether a democratic society can gear its diplomacy to such a strategy, and how we will act in a crisis if we have no other option. I have come to the view, which is different from the view I used to write about in the 1960s, that for one side to have counterforce capability and the other side not to have it (especially if that side is also inferior in forces for local intervention) must tempt a political disaster....

Q: Staying within the strategic force context for the moment, does that mean then that during the period we are talking about you can see little that meets your criterion in terms of counterforce capability?

A: Under current programs, I do not see in the period 1980-87 an according to reliable insider estimates he is optimistic that Iranian exports could resume as soon as the next several weeks. and in any case I am not a technical expert. Of the various weapons we are considering, the two that would have been most useful for a counterforce role were the MX and to a lesser extent the B-1. The B-1 has been scrapped and the timetable for the MX has been stretched out so that it is unfortunately barely relevant to the period we are talking about.

That bothers me because I also do not see an adequate development of forces for local defense by us or by our allies. Therefore the 1980s could turn into a period of great political instability. There is a growing gap between the global political alignment and its military capability. On the one hand most major countries in the world (United States, western Europe, China and Japan) will be grouped on one side and the Soviet Union will be on the other. That may well be perceived in Moscow as a potential for encirclement. But for a period of five to seven years the Soviets may develop an advantage in power useful for political ends. On the one hand the Soviets may fear that if their opponents ever get their act together they will gain a rapid advantage even in military hardware. On the other hand the Soviet Union may perceive a period in which, though its political and economic instabilities are latent but not yet overwhelming, its military power is potentially dominant. If it is not used in that period, the Soviets' long term fate is extremely uncertain. Thus, we could be heading into a period of maximum peril.

The West must face up to that danger. If it merely waits hoping for something to turn up, we will undergo a series of constantly mounting crises.

Q: We want to take you on to some of the political questions and geopolitical questions that you raised earlier. Should SALT in your view be linked to the good behavior of the Soviet Union?

A: Before I get into the question of linkage, which has developed an almost theological character, I would make a general proposition. It seems to me that the argument that

SALT is so important that it is almost totally unrelated to any political conditions is extremely dangerous. ...

... I'm not saying we should link SALT to every Soviet action that we do not approve of. But we must insist that it be accompanied by general restraint.

Look at what has happened since 1975, in the space of a little more than four years: we have had Cuban troops in Angola, Cuban troops in Ethiopia, two invasions of Zaire, a communist coup in Afghanistan, a communist coup in South Yemen, and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, all achieved by Soviet arms, with Soviet encouragement and in several cases protected by the Soviet veto in the United Nations. In addition Soviet advanced aircraft piloted by Soviet personnel are protecting Cuba — presumably against us — so that Cuban pilots and aircraft are operating all round Africa — also presumably against us. That cannot go on and have SALT survive. It is doing no favor to Soviet-American relations to pretend that these areas are unrelated. Sooner or later it will lead to a confrontation.

Q: Say that a senator decides in his own mind that the Soviets are not going to show restraint in the 1980s, which are going to continue, as you said before, to be a very complex time: what does he achieve by voting against ratification?

A: I think at a minimum the ratification process should be used to put the Soviets on notice that the Congress of the United States cannot accept the constant challenges to the international order. ... How that might be achieved I want to reserve for the ratification debate. The administration has an obligation not to sell SALT with the argument that by itself it will usher in an era of peace. If my analysis of the 1980s is even approximately correct, we will enter an era of grave danger. Our leaders must make this clear. I will be open-minded to the argument that we can meet these dangers even with SALT, provided the administration demonstrates that it understands the dangers, that it has a strategy for meeting them and, even more pertinent, that SALT will help in meeting them. I cannot accept the proposition that SALT removes our most probable dangers.

Q: That is going to be easier to achieve during the ratification process than afterwards, is it not? Once ratification happens — let's say for the sake of argument the Senate votes for ratification — the constraint that might exist during the ratification period on the Russians is removed.

A: But the administration has an obligation to show that it can meet the threats to our security, even with SALT, and that it, in fact, intends to meet those dangers. And therefore the administration must make it clear that the SALT process cannot survive, and that it will not let it survive, if these challenges continue.