

chances for the comprehensive peace settlements sought by the Carter Administration in the Mideast and Africa, and likely finishing off chances for a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union. Kissinger's effective policy control over large sections of the Republican Party, established earlier this year when a party national committee statement signed by 38 Republican Senators practically threatened a Republican "veto" of a SALT II

agreement in the Senate. This gave Kissinger the leverage to demand White House consultations with Republican Senate leadership in the interests of a "bipartisan" foreign policy — in other words, "clear it with Henry."

Meanwhile, Kissinger has moved back into the foreign policy limelight (see box).

—Don Baier

"Elder Statesman" Kissinger Out Front In Coup Drive

Because Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has "so much on his plate that he cannot long afford to shuttle between Egypt and Israel," President Carter should "appoint a special negotiator of the highest prestige and caliber . . . Henry Kissinger himself . . ." to run Mideast peace negotiations. So said Joseph Kraft in his Washington Post column July 25.

In the interests of promoting an Israel-Egypt separate peace—a sure recipe for new Mideast wars like the 1973 affair organized by Kissinger and something only Israel and London desire—Kraft praised Kissinger's well-worn "step-by-step" shuttle diplomacy routines, backed up by bluster, threats, and assassinations. Kissinger, said Kraft, "would seem to be twisting Sadat's arm" while appearing to "keep the pressure on Begin." For this reason, said Kraft, Kissinger would be preferable to the Israel Lobby's other candidate for Mideast arbiter, Vice President Walter Mondale, whom Kraft also touts.

Kraft admits that the Kissinger appointment would mean that "the Carter Administration might seem to be confessing another failure to a world already prone to believe the President cannot cope," wiping out the foreign policy credibility of the White House. But, he continues, Carter "must rise above personal and political considerations."

Henry Speaks for Himself

Kissinger himself appeared in his role as NBC-TV's "elder statesman" immediately after Carter returned from the Bonn Summit, to "advise" the President that he could have avoided what Kissinger called a Soviet-imposed "semi-humiliation" as a result of the Shcharanski trials if only he had "postponed" Vance's SALT negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Identifying himself as a supreme defender of Soviet dissidents, Kissinger went on to criticize Carter to a nationwide television audience as ineffective on human rights. Kissinger broadly hinted that Carter was incapable of handling relations with the Soviets generally unless he utilized Kissinger's "linkage" song-and-dance.

On the day of the Kraft column Kissinger held a conspicuous Washington, D.C. meeting with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the most prominent of the blacks fronting for Ian Smith's "internal solution" government in Rhodesia. Kissinger emerged from the meeting to suggest his backing for the "internal," implying that the Carter Administration policy in southern Africa was not giving Smith a "fair opportunity" to shut out the Patriotic Front liberation group backed by all five of southern Africa's front-line states.

Fronting for Kissinger, Senators Case (R-NJ) and Javits (R-NY) and Moynihan (D-NY) have introduced a resolution in Congress "authorizing" Carter to lift United Nations economic sanctions currently in effect against the Smith regime as soon as "free elections" are held. Smith is still publicly proclaiming his intention to hold parody "elections"—without the Patriotic Front—in December. They have consistently refused to negotiate with the Patriotic Front at an "all parties conference," proposed by the U.S. and agreed to by the Patriotic Front. Meanwhile, even the British press and Tories are admitting that Smith and Co. are losing the guerrilla war with the Patriotic Front, the Rhodesian economy is collapsing, and the internal settlement has no prospect for success without a "bailout" endorsement from the U.S.

The White House was forced to accept the Kissinger Case-Javits bill as the best way to derail such a flat bailout—a bill sponsored by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) to require immediate lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia. With prospects wide open for African participation in the Grand Design in the wake of the Angola-Zaire agreement and Namibia settlement, outright support for the internal solution would destroy U.S. credibility in Africa overnight.

But as a result, the hand of Kissinger and his London masters has again been strengthened, and Administration officials are openly worried that the Namibia settlement may come apart if black African states get the message that the U.S. is turning against them.