

Black Caucus, McGovern Denounce Brzezinski's Confrontation Games

The Congressional Black Caucus yesterday issued a stinging denunciation June 5 of what they termed efforts "to reintroduce an East-West confrontation over the invasion of the Shaba Province of Zaire." The black congressmen warned President Carter that he had better make good on his initial promise to "end a Cold War-oriented policy on the African continent," and demanded that the White House concentrate on achieving majority rule in all of Africa and persevere in "the quest for economic development and national integration."

The group also announced the formation of a lobbying group called Transafrica, including blacks in the Administration, Congress and civil rights groups to pursue the question.

At the same time, Congressman Charles Diggs (D-Michigan), chairman of the Caucus, called into question the Administration's assertions that the Cubans had been responsible for the Katangese invasion of Zaire in mid-May. Diggs declared that "the Cuban presence in Zaire was manufactured by the Administration."

The Black Caucus is working in parallel and in consultation with Senator George McGovern (D-SD), who last week challenged the Administration to prove to Congress that they had evidence supporting their charges that the Cubans were directly responsible for training and equipping the Katangese invasion forces. On the Issues and Answers television show June 4, McGovern warned that there was a strong effort on the part of Carter's advisors to begin "ordering some kind of decisive military action to firm up his public image." McGovern then directly blamed the foreign policy crisis on Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Council, referencing how former NSC Director Kissinger destroyed the peace and development initiatives of President Nixon's Secretary of State, William Rogers.

The Senator is planning hearings later this summer to determine the future role of the NSC.

Distinctions Necessary

While McGovern has carefully attacked only Carter's advisors — British agents Brzezinski and CIA Director Stansfield Turner — for their war provocations, other congressmen such as the Black Caucus and numerous press around the country have not been so careful. The distinction is crucial. Britain's agents in both the Republican and Democratic Parties are working to finesse the growing "no new Vietnam in Angola" sentiment into a Watergate-style attack on Carter's "foreign policy bumbling — and away from the London-authored treason of Brzezinski and Turner.

Vote-hungry Republicans are particularly susceptible to this kind of ploy, and it is important that the GOP does

not become blinded to the fact that an ad hominem attack on the Administration will only force Carter to do London's bidding or else allow London to replace Carter with a hideous Mondale and Ted Kennedy Administration.

However, there is ample opportunity to push Carter in the right direction at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 9 when Admiral Turner is to present his evidence of Cuban responsibility for the Zaire invasion. Turner is running scared, with no real evidence to support his charges. He has refused to give the Foreign Relations Committee, on which McGovern sits, more than one initial piece of information, saying he will only trust the Senate and House Intelligence Committees with the real proof.

Some Capitol Hill sources are speculating that he hopes to thus prevent McGovern from exposing his "evidence." However, McGovern will be fully briefed by the Intelligence Committee anyway, according to his aides, and is expected to make some strong statements after the hearing.

Turner has been frantically meeting with Congressional leaders and Monday testified before the House Intelligence Committee hoping to persuade them about Cuban responsibility with ordinary maps of Africa and "eyewitness reports" from the bush. Defense Secretary Harold Brown admitted on "Face the Nation" Sunday, that "this of course is not the kind of evidence that a scientist is accustomed to seeing."

There is clearly no constituency in Congress for Brzezinski or Turner. Only a few sheepish Congressional leaders such as House Speaker Tip O'Neill, under pressure from the Administration to stand united with the President, have declared themselves satisfied with Administration assertions. There is widespread suspicion of the facts in the Zaire case and Brzezinski's motives in pressing the issue, particularly from the liberal layers. Conservatives hate Brzezinski for his insane China policy, i.e., forming an alliance with the unstable Chinese against the Soviets and at the expense of some of our Asian allies.

Under pressure from their constituents, an otherwise unlikely coalition of liberals and conservatives could be forged to drive Brzezinski from office.

Development Solution

UN Ambassador Andrew Young, in a major interview this week in *U.S. News and World Report*, again reaffirmed that a key section of the Administration is determined to pursue an economic development not a confrontation policy in Africa. Young said that, regardless of what might finally be the case for Cuban activity in Zaire, U.S. should not respond "emotionally" to the

situation. "Our relationship with Africa is much more economic than it is strategic. . . . We need maximum freedom in providing economic assistance, because I think that our most successful approaches around the world have been when we have given food aid and development assistance."

But Young, like McGovern, the Black Caucus, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance have not concretized these vague economic development sentiments by openly supporting the programs being worked out between France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, and the socialist countries for the multi-billion dollar industrial development of Africa. It is precisely by collaborating with this well-defined international effort that Brzezinski's war-mongering can be completely undercut and the basis laid for a lasting peace.

—Barbara Dreyfuss

Young: "The U.S. Needs a Rational Approach to Africa"

Echoing his statement of recent weeks, Andrew Young continued to assert that economic development of Africa is the concern of a faction in the Carter Administration in devising policy in an interview with U.S. News and World Report.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, how should the United States deal with the escalating Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa that seems to concern President Carter so much?

A: I know it sounds strange, but if you look at where the Russians were when Jimmy Carter was elected and where they are now, there probably has not been a significant expansion. The Russians were in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Cubans were already in Angola. They are still in Angola, but their position there is no more stable than it was. In three years they have not been able to pacify Angola. It's still a land very much in turmoil, and with very many problems....

I've said that we ought to have a rational, analytical response to the Russians and the Cubans in Africa, and not respond emotionally. I'm afraid that we have been responding emotionally, and I would hope that we would stop and think very carefully about it.

...I don't think people here in the U.S. know Africa. Even the best of our experts tend to think of Africa through a European mind-set.

Take, for example, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. Most of the U.S. press had not even heard of it six months ago. Then, all of a sudden, it becomes of great strategic significance. The Ogaden is really nothing more than a thousand miles of sand.

Q: What about Eritrea? Doesn't Cuban and Russian involvement there pose a strategic threat?

A: Remember, three or four years ago we were the ones advising the Ethiopian Army against these very Eritrean rebels. We thought it was in our interests to have a united Ethiopia. There's no question that our

concern in Ethiopia is for human rights, for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and basically for a peaceful settlement of disputes. I'm not sure that what happens in Eritrea makes a great deal of difference to the interests of the United States of America.

If one tends to see all this as a great Soviet design, and lapses back into the domino theory, then there may be some cause for concern. But we should have learned the weakness of the domino theory in Southeast Asia.

Q: Is there danger that the United States will be perceived as a helpless giant that is unable to cope with a Russia on the move if this country fails to act?

A: That's an image we've created for ourselves. It's not an image that I accept. I would say that, from my perspective here at the UN, that's not the case. We have more influence in Africa right now than in the recent past — including in Angola.

The Angolans are presently cooperating with us. They see that it's in their interest to have a peaceful settlement in Namibia. They are protecting our economic interest in Angola with Cuban troops, and they are supplying the United States with almost 1 billion dollars' worth of oil a year. Now, they're not doing us any favor; they need the billion dollars to keep their country going.

Even the Cuban presence in Angola has not threatened any material United States interest at this point, nor has it minimized U.S. influence in Angola....

Q: Do the charges of Cuban involvement in the invasion of Zaire from Angola change the picture? Doesn't this threaten U.S. interests?

A: Let me make this point: Angola is almost twice the size of Texas. It takes you two days to get from Houston to El Paso on superhighways. There are no superhighways in Angola, and there's not good telephone communications. What we're saying is that a group of people — the Cubans — who are predominantly in the capital of Luanda and who are doing most of their military operations in the south against UNITA, have got to be responsible for another 5,000 armed men from Shaba — which was known as Katanga in Zaire. Those men were originally armed by the Belgians, and later fought for the Portuguese. They later came in to fight with the MPLA — the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. They have fought on every side. But they have always maintained their own interest in returning to Shaba in Zaire. They had Cuban weapons and Russian weapons. They also had Chinese weapons. Remember, the Chinese also were involved in Angola.

You can make a case for almost anything you want to make in Angola. But, in fact, I don't think anyone can be sure of everything that's going on there — not even the Cubans or the Angolans. I think that even the President's information has been greatly limited by the restrictions on intelligence gathering inside Angola, and the fact that it's difficult to gather adequate intelligence.

...Almost anywhere we have worked militarily we have produced limited results. And almost everywhere we have moved covertly we have failed miserably — and have produced results that are often counterproductive

to our interests. I think we ought to be finished with covert activities. I can't point to one place where we have succeeded with these.

...Covert operations reflect the kind of cynical attitude that has threatened to destroy our relationships with an entire continent. Fortunately, I think we have learned that lesson. I don't know anyone who is advocating that course of action.

Q: Is there anything the administration can do to induce the Cubans to pull back from their African adventures?

A: I think that there is. We made clear to them that we would take it as a serious breach of principle and a violation of territorial integrity had they gone on into Somalia — and they stopped at the border. We have talked with them constantly about their role in Eritrea. And they insist that they will not be dragged into Eritrea militarily — that they advocate a political solution there.

I think that we can get them to work toward a peaceful solution with us in Namibia, because I think it's in their interests and in ours and in South Africa's interest. If we can achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia, then I think we will have paved the way for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

Now, where we are diplomatically aggressive and active, there is almost no Cuban presence. Had we not been aggressively active in Rhodesia through the Anglo-American plan, Cubans would be all around Rhodesia in every frontline country in large numbers. Had we been able to move diplomatically in the Horn, we could have prevented the Cuban presence there....

Q: ...Do you agree with people who argue that the U.S. should signal its displeasure over Soviet actions in Africa by slowing down strategic-arms-limitations negotiations, or curtailing economic relations?

A: We should signal our displeasure in any way that does not hurt us. It hurts us to slow down SALT....

McGovern Questions Brzezinski Role, Warns Carter: Don't Be Boxed In On Africa

Sen. George McGovern (D-SD) strongly questioned the validity of the post of National Security Council and particularly the role of NSC Director Brzezinski in confusing and obscuring the current Africa situation on the ABC television program Issues and Answers June 4.

Q: You have mentioned Secretary of Defense Brown. He also said today that if the Russians are not checked in Africa and extend their adventurous activities there to other countries, there would be a real risk of a return to the Cold War. Couldn't that be devastating to prospects for a new SALT agreement along with relations with the Soviets generally?

A: It could indeed. If I could give a little unsolicited advice to the President and to his colleagues in the

Administration, I'd like to suggest about three things.

First of all, don't panic regardless of what goes on in Africa today.

Secondly, play it cool. Don't over-react.

Thirdly, keep your eye on the ball; the main ball right now is the SALT discussions. The survival of the human race could very well be tied up with the progress we make with the Soviets in arriving at some kind of control on the arms race....I would hope that while we may be distressed and concerned about what the Soviets and the Cubans are up to in Africa, that we wouldn't let that divert us from the main theater of action where our survival rests and that is working out some sensible agreement with the Soviets....

Q: Senator, the pendulum, as you know, frequently swings from one extreme to another, and it seems to be swinging in the direction of casting all kinds of doubts upon the Soviet Union. Do you feel that the administration may get trapped in its own rhetoric to the extent they won't be able to sign a SALT agreement?

A: Well, I think the President is the victim, a kind of a victim, of an unfortunate and irrational political climate. There are several causes that have contributed to that irrational political climate. One is the legacy of Vietnam. Ordinarily we say that that means we can't any longer react when our interests are threatened. I think the more likely danger is that we will react even when our interests aren't fundamentally threatened, just to show that we are still strong and that our fortitude is there. And that, of course, is the thing that has involved us in unfortunate ventures in the past.

The second problem that I think the President is faced with is the rise of a new anti-Communist hysteria in the country....

The third factor is what my colleague, Senator Church, has referred to as the "situation room syndrome." I personally think the greatest accomplishment of President Carter to date is, he is the first President in modern times who completed his first year in office without any crisis, without any hostilities. But paradoxically that has left the impression in the minds of some people that he has a kind of fuzzy image and so there is a temptation to show the President as a powerful figure reacting at midnight to a crisis and ordering out the troops or ordering some kind of decisive military action to firm up his public image. There is a great temptation, I am sure, on the part of his advisers who are drawn to that kind of prospect like bees being drawn to honey, but I hope the President will resist that.

Q: Senator, let me ask you, you put out a very strong paper last week, criticizing, in particular, the President's national security adviser, Brzezinski, for precisely this kind of mentality. Isn't it a fact, though, that if the President didn't want to hear that kind of advice or didn't want to respond to that kind of advice, all he would have to do is pick up the phone and say, "Zbig, cut it out"?

A: Yes. In the last analysis, the President is responsible for his own Administration. He is responsible for Mr. Brzezinski; he is responsible for the Secretary of State. I must say, however, that, as I have watched what has happened the last few weeks, and thinking back to what happened in the early months of the Nixon Administration, I think there is something wrong with the way our national security and foreign policy apparatus is organized in the government. You have the so-called National Security Council, the National Security Adviser under Mr. Brzezinski. Now, without getting personal about him, but just talking about the institution, the person who holds that job, is not-accountable to the American people. There is no way that Congress can get at him. We don't even confirm him. We can't cross-examine him. He is a kind of free agent operating over there in the confines of the White House, sometimes going out to make statements in public, sometimes making them in China and elsewhere, where I think it is ill-advised at a delicate time in foreign policy. But it has the effect of eroding the power of the Secretary of State, who is the chief foreign policy officer in the government. So, as the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on International Operations, I have decided to hold some hearings later this summer on this whole question of how foreign policy is determined. The relationship to the National Security Council.

It may very well be that we have come to the time when we ought to abolish the National Security Adviser, the National Security Council, and concentrate the organization of foreign policy under the Secretary of State....

Q: ... (the Administration) is encouraging a multi-African force; it is encouraging the Europeans to take an active role in Africa. It is not becoming involved in a military fashion, but just as Africa may not be of primary concern to us militarily, surely it has to be argued that it is not of primary concern to the Soviet Union either. What are they doing that far out of their traditional sphere of influence?

A: I think they are making the same mistake that others have who have tried to establish a base in Africa, and I don't think they are going to be any more successful.

The main concern of Africa today is over the problems of poverty, the problems of race. Those are areas where we have been reasonably successful in making some contribution. We have got a good working relationship with a number of the African states based on the fact that we have assisted them economically and with technical back-up. We have been on the right side of the race question, at least in recent months, with Ambassador Young taking the lead and calling for majority rule.

I think measures of that kind will serve our interests in Africa better than anything we do militarily.

Q: But forgive me, Senator. We have been boxed out of Ethiopia; we have been boxed out of Angola; we have been boxed out of taking any effective action in Rhodesia; we are damned if we do and damned if we don't in the current Rhodesian situation.

A: Who boxed us out of those areas?

Let me tell you, we are not entirely boxed out of Ethiopia. We are still carrying on an economic

assistance program in Ethiopia, partly because we think even though it has a government whose ideology is different from ours, it is still important for us to maintain some relationship there.

We could very well be providing economic assistance to Angola. They have wanted investment from the United States and from the West. We could increase our influence even in these areas where they have governments that follow an ideology different from ours if we were a little more imaginative. I don't think we have to respond militarily in all of those areas in order to maintain a presence.

One View of Brzezinski's M.O.

From Joseph Kraft's column in the Washington Post, June 8:

Recent cooling in Soviet-American relations has directed attention to the role of the president's special assistant for national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski. He plays an advocate's role — something far different from any of his predecessors in the office.

He does not discipline the president or check his weaknesses, as the special assistant usually did. In the Carter administration, as a result, the role of safety man in national security has had to devolve haphazardly on somebody else....

The central theme of Brzezinski's advocacy derives from suspicion of, even aversion to, the Soviet Union. He was born a Pole, took consistently anti-Soviet positions during his graduate school days at Harvard, as a professor at Columbia and during a brief stint in the State Department during the 1960s.

Under Carter he has been tough on Russia in arms control, human rights and attitudes toward Western Europe, China and the Third World. Though he favored the "comprehensive settlement" approach to the Middle East — in part, I suspect, because it went against the grain of Kissinger's step-by-step approach — he did not lean to the joint U.S.-Soviet declaration, which that policy at one point entailed.

Brzezinski tends to play down his intimacy with Carter, but beyond doubt he serves the president in important ways. He is well known to Carter and trusted more than anybody else in the foreign-policy community....

But his personality can be abrasive. He has alienated several foreign governments, including those of Israel and Russia. Several comments, including one made recently at the Great Wall of China — "last one to the top gets to fight the Russians in Ethiopia" — suggest a lack of nice judgment, and even good taste.

As an advocate, moreover, he shares Carter's chief weakness: the inability to see how good intentions on one matter can lead to bad results across the board. Thus a great many of the early blunders made by the Carter administration — notably the first arms-control proposal to Moscow — were mistakes made by Carter with the active help of the man who should have been saving him.

Presumably the president knows all this, and there is

no convincing evidence that he is Brzezinski's man. But neither has Carter developed a system for saving himself from the mistakes to which he and Brzezinski are both prone. The safety man on foreign policy in the Carter administration is whoever happens to come along.

Usually the task devolves on Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. He, for instance, saw the confusion building in Sino-Soviet relations and prompted the president's speech on the subject at the Annapolis commencement. But though Vance usually wins on the showdowns, he is loath to challenge Brzezinski, an old friend. Even when he does win, he does not control the final outcome — witness the Annapolis speech, which ended up as a muddle requiring further explanation to determine where the president really stands.

Black Caucus: "No Diversion From The Development Issue"

The Congressional Black Caucus issued this statement on the Administration's foreign policy on June 6:

National Energy Forum: Carter Energy Policy Is No Policy

With remarkably little mention in the media, scores of the world's leading energy experts, engineers, industry leaders, and political spokesmen from Democratic and Republican ranks met in Washington, D.C. on May 18 for the National Energy Forum of the World Energy Conference. The theme that was consistently struck throughout the proceedings was that the Carter Administration's current energy policy and related international nuclear nonproliferation policy were wrongheaded and disastrous.

ENERGY

The World Energy Conference, founded half a century ago as the World Power Conference, ought to be one of the most credible and authoritative bodies in the world on all aspects of energy. Among the participants at this meeting were:

Robert Georgine — President of the Building Trades union;

J.C. Turner — President of the Union of Operating Engineers;

Gerard C. Smith — U.S. Ambassador for Non-Proliferation Affairs;

John D. Dingell — Democratic Congressman from Michigan;

James McClure — Republican Senator from Idaho.

In addition, leading members of the nation's major oil and coal companies, including Texaco, Gulf, and Island Creek Coal Co.; the major nuclear construction firms, including Bechtel Power Corp., Combustion Engineering,

(Our concern is over the Carter Administration's attempt) to reintroduce an East-West confrontation over the invasion of the Shaba Province of Zaire despite an initial commitment to end a Cold War-oriented policy on the African continent. We hope that the Administration will not overreact in this particular instance, since knowledgeable observers of the region have long recognized the multitude of causes to which the Katangan rebels have lent their support as well as the diverse sources of assistance for their grievances.

It is our firm conviction that as long as local political solutions are not found conditions in that region will lend themselves to the intervention of outside forces. The crisis in Zaire should not permit the Administration to divert its attention from two issues of paramount importance to Africa — first, the search for a rapid and just solution to the problem of white minority rule in Zimbabwe, and Namibia and South Africa, and second, the quest for economic development and national integration.

and General Electric; leading European and Japanese energy policy spokesmen, scientists, energy consultants, and electric utility representatives, were represented.

The one surprising thing about the conference — besides the press blackout of it — was that the participants confined themselves to criticism of the Administration without outlining measures to get at the source of White House misperception: the handful of well-financed and well-placed no-growth advocates. For instance, every major labor group, corporation, or utility that opposes the present anti-growth policy is under some form of attack by this environmentalist clique, ranging from allegations of anti-trust violations, Securities and Exchange violations to environmentalist legal challenge. Despite these attacks, not one speaker at the conference openly addressed this problem.

NEF Man: Nuclear Energy is Real Issue

The following is an interview with William O. Doub, a former commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and current chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference.

Q: The Carter Administration's national energy policy has been assailed from various quarters as a no-growth tax policy, not an energy policy. What is your evaluation?

A: These are the non-issues — when we run out of oil and gas — these are not the real issues. We are not about to run out of energy. The real issue is how to maximize utilization of all energy sources, and nuclear energy must play a major part in that. Developing nations, with no indigenous energy resources, do not have the luxury to