

Chinese, and the "superhawk" Committee on the Present Danger — the Soviets have, as Brzezinski charged on national television, "broken the code of detente" and are determined to achieve "global hegemony."

Carter explicitly rejected a definition of detente as "easing of tensions," calling it "simplistic" and substituting Brzezinski's phrases about "broadly defined reciprocity." The Soviets, charged Carter, have used detente "to struggle for political advantage" using military power and assistance as a means to political influence; Carter's denial that the U.S. has quite obviously done the same will ring as hollow in Washington's corridors as in the Kremlin's, given the U.S.'s abrupt shift to "keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East" following the U.S.-Soviet joint communique on reconvening the Geneva conference.

Carter concluded, "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice. We would prefer cooperation through a detente with increasingly similar restraint for both sides — a similar readiness to resolve disputes by negotiation and not violence, a similar willingness to compete peacefully and not militarily. Anything less than that is likely to undermine detente...."

In other words, "Take detente on Brzezinski's terms — or else."

—Don Baier

U.S. Press Trumpets Washington Split On Carter Speech

New York Times, "Carter Calls on Soviet to End Confrontation or Risk 'Graver' Strain...Toughest Stand Yet," June 8:

In his toughest speech to date on Soviet-American relations, Mr. Carter attacked the Soviet interpretation of detente, which, he said, "seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence."

New York Times, editorial, "From Linkage to Sausage," June 8:

For all its ambiguity on the linkage of SALT to Africa or tension elsewhere, his speech was essentially conciliatory....This was the speech of a President ready to take an arms treaty to the country and to the Senate

and to defend it on its merits if the Russians will not further inflame conditions in Africa....

Washington Post, "Carter Challenges Soviet Leaders...Two Different Speeches," June 8:

...The Soviet Politburo may have heard almost the opposite speech that most Americans did...Carter made numerous explicit accusations against the Soviet Union that no American president has made before....He charged the Kremlin's leaders with using "proxy forces" in Korea as well as in Angola and Ethiopia....One of the most extraordinary paragraphs in the Carter speech combined the U.S. desire to increase "collaboration with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China" with American dedication to achieving "genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world"....If Carter meant what he said, he surpassed the rhetorical goal of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "to liberate" the people of Eastern Europe from the Communist yoke.

In Africa, Carter joined his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in drawing the line in the dust against "the persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba...."

It may appear superficially that Carter split the difference between Brzezinski and Vance, but he did not. Carter yesterday said that "tensions, sharp disputes or threats to peace will complicate the quest for a SALT agreement...." Quest literally embraces both negotiations and ratification....The speech came against a background of the struggle between opposing forces inside the administration....

Washington Post, editorial, "Mr. Carter on the Russians," June 8:

The president has enunciated a *government* approach toward the Soviet Union....There is one fundamental condition on which the value of the president's speech rests. It is that he impose and continue to impose on his government the discipline that the mere preparation of such a speech implies....

Baltimore Sun, "Carter Warns Soviet," June 8:

...Still, there was confusion both inside and outside the Administration about Mr. Carter's priorities. To the extent that others among Mr. Carter's aides won or lost in shaping the policy declaration, Mr. Brzezinski may be most nearly satisfied. But the balance Mr. Carter struck is not expected to cause great difficulty for Mr. Vance.

There can be no certainty, of course, that what Mr. Carter said yesterday will develop as a clear, predictable policy...