

CPD, Led By Schlesinger, Push Washington-Tokyo-Peking Axis

U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, his allies within the Carter Administration, and the confrontationist Committee on the Present Danger, have renewed their campaign for a Washington-Tokyo-Peking military alliance against the Soviet Union.

JAPAN

Schlesinger's Asian strategy was outlined in a syndicated column Feb. 28 by CPD executive board member John Roche titled "The Tokyo-Peking Axis — A Natural." Roche claims there is a "symbiotic" relationship between Japan and China, both economically and culturally, which, combined with the well-known stumbling blocks in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, have once again made China the centerpiece of Japan's policy in Asia. This is all very good, says Roche, as an alliance between the two countries would be on an anti-Soviet basis. "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is back on the drawing board," says Roche, referring to Japan's wartime economic bloc. "This time under the joint Chinese-Japanese auspices. Given the talent and resources involved, this coalition could in a decade radically shift the balance of forces not merely in Asia, but in the world at large."

Schlesinger's top ally within the Carter Administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, announced yesterday that he will travel to China in early May to revive talks on U.S.-China relations that have stagnated since Secretary of State Vance's trip to Peking last August. While little has been released on Brzezinski's plans, it is widely believed that he will discuss with Chinese leaders the policy statements made by Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who told Congress last month that close working relations between China and the United States would be a helpful bulwark against the Soviet Union in Asia. Brzezinski, whose staff is dominated by pro-Peking "experts," is rumored to favor U.S. arms sales to China.

Another CPD ally, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, returned from China last week where he met with top Chinese officials including Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, the architect of China's present anti-Soviet policy and an advocate of Japanese rearmament against the Soviets. Jackson stressed the need for U.S. technology exports to aid the development of China's oil reserves. While Jackson's office dismisses reports that his trip was coordinated with Schlesinger's Energy

Department, Jackson took with him a legislative assistant from the Senate Energy Committee, and a task force has already been established within the DOE to study such a transfer of oil technology to Peking.

Schlesinger has personally headed the drive for U.S. development of the PRC's oil reserves, having used the issue over the past year to keep official channels between the two countries open while the Administration's official policy places China on the "backburner." Last year, the highest ranking Chinese officials ever to visit the United States investigated American oil technology at the invitation of the DOE.

The Japan "CPD"

Simultaneous with these U.S.-based efforts, a small, pro-CPD clique in Japan is using its extensive networks of influence in Japan's military and defense-intellectual community to promote Japanese rearmament and the use of Japan, in cooperation with China, as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union as the United States reduces its military presence in Asia.

Early last month a new defense think-tank, the Japan National Security Research Center, was established to push the CPD line. The main organizer of the center was Hideaki Kase, a "defense intellectual" with close ties to the London International Institute of Strategic Studies. Kase, along with former Japanese Defense Agency chief Michita Sakata and former high-level Foreign Ministry bureaucrat Shinsaku Hogen, form the intellectual core of the avowed pro-Schlesinger wing of Japan's defense establishment.

Within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), a significant grouping has picked up the CPD line and is promoting the idea of "consultative ties between the JDA and China's armed forces. Last month a group from the JDA travelled to China for such "consultations," and the JDA announced last week that a top official from the Agency's Intelligence Division will go to Peking late this month. On the broader rearmament issue, leading JDA officials such as Defense Bureau chief Keiichi Ito, have argued recently that Japan's postwar "peace" constitution allows for "strictly defensive" nuclear weapons.

The success of the Schlesinger line in Japan is by no means assured, however. The vast majority of Japan's business community opposes any attempt to place Japan in a position antagonistic to the USSR. Moreover, Japan's domestic sensitivity concerning defense issues places huge roadblocks before any rearmament efforts.

Japan's business policy was made clear by Toshio Doko, the head of the country's big-business federation, at a Tokyo press conference after Doko had just signed a

\$20 billion eight year trade agreement with China. Doko emphasized that Japan's deals with China should in no way interfere with Japan-Soviet economic relations. Doko's statement should put to rest the widespread interpretations of the China-Japan trade deal as the major step of a "tilt" toward China and away from Japan's traditional policy of "equidistance" between its big neighbors. The trade deal with China — and there are plans to expand its terms in 1981 — is a big boost for Japan's ailing economy. However, any "tilt" toward China would quickly close the door to economic deals with the Soviet Union potentially far bigger than that concluded with China — and business will not tolerate a closing of that door.

The government of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, is also moving to put the lid on the warhawks inside the JDA. The government recently forced Defense Bureau chief Ito to retract his "pronuclear bomb" statement. The government is also opposed to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea precisely to avoid pressure for a Japanese military buildup.

The Soviet Response

The combined effect of the recent moves by the Fukuda government toward signing a long-stalled "friendship" treaty with Peking, the military exchanges between Japan and China, and the Japan-China trade deal have raised grave fears in Moscow, and the Soviets have begun to counterattack.

In a dramatic attempt to publicize its commitment to good relations with Japan, the Soviet Union published on Feb. 23 in *Izvestia* an until-now secret working document for a Japan-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Japan has continuously rejected the Soviet treaty offer, insisting instead that an ongoing territorial dispute between the two countries must be resolved as part of a full peace treaty formally ending World War II.

The Soviets hoped that a preliminary "cooperation" treaty, which shelve the territorial dispute (the Soviets insist the dispute is "groundless," and does not even exist) and puts down on paper the areas in which the countries do agree, would balance the political effect of Japan signing a treaty with China, and help maintain good relations between the two countries.

It is widely thought in informed circles that the Soviet decision to publish the secret draft treaty, a move which angered Japanese government officials, was made only after Soviet officials concluded a roadblock had been reached in efforts to promote the treaty with the Fukuda government. The publication was designed as an appeal to business and political circles in Japan that favor closer relations with the Soviet Union.

Observers have noted, however, that the Soviet attempts to negotiate a preliminary treaty with Japan were bound to fail because of the Soviet "hard-line" negotiating position on the territorial dispute. CPD circles have often gleefully claimed that one of the keys to their strategy in Asia is the "unskillful" way the Soviets handle Japan.

Prior to the publication of the secret draft, the Soviets made a last-minute attempt to end the deadlock in treaty negotiations with Japan. Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo Polyanski last week requested a meeting with Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda to deliver a personal letter from Soviet President Brezhnev. The letter, according to Japanese press reports, urged Japan to sign the preliminary cooperation treaty. Fukuda dispatched Chief Cabinet Secretary S. Abe to meet with Polyanski, and the Japanese press widely reported that a "heated argument" took place between two officials in a downtown Tokyo restaurant, with Abe, restating the Japanese position that a resolution of the territorial dispute is the top priority between the two countries.

The Soviets have also issued a fresh warning to Japan against signing any treaty with China that contains the infamous anti-Soviet "antihegemony" clause. This clause, which Japan has tried to water down into a statement of "international principles," has been the stumbling block preventing Japan from signing the treaty with China. The February issue of the Soviet journal *New Times* stated: "The inclusion in the treaty of an 'antihegemony' clause would draw Japan into the channel of Peking's hostile policy toward the Soviet Union . . . In whatever form, even the most abstract, the 'hegemony clause' is worded, the substance and tenor of the Sino-Japanese treaty will not change."

—Kevin Coogan

Indira Gandhi Winner, Congress Party Loser In India's State Elections

The Congress Party, the party that governed India without interruption for 30 years up to March 1976 lies in total shambles after last week's state elections enabled

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former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to make a full political comeback. As head of a splittoff of the Congress Party (appropriately named Congress-I, I for Indira),

Gandhi's round-the-clock electioneering, particularly in southern India, produced resounding victories for candidates backed by her in the Feb. 25 elections, reestablishing her as India's top political campaigner.

The verdict in Gandhi's favor has thrown all other parties, including the ruling Janata Party, onto the defensive. Political opportunism and expediency have become the name of the game in New Delhi, and the prospect of returning to Mrs. Gandhi's fold has become an enticing one for many fence-sitting legislators. The result now is that all parties have extended their