

missiles) which could not be completed in time to comply with the ceiling on ICBMs. This was resolved by agreeing not to deploy SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) until the ICBMs in question were destroyed.

(8) Concealment at test ranges.

The Soviet complaints were:

(1) Concealment of U.S. Minuteman (ICBM) sites, which were shelters designed for upgrading silos. The U.S. cut down the size of the shelters.

(2) Atlas and Titan (ICBM) launchers throughout the country were protested until the U.S. gave assurance that they were deactivated and couldn't be used on any medium-term basis.

(3) A possible ABM radar installation on Shemya Island, which was determined to be for early warning and tracking.

(4) The privacy of the Standing Consultative Committee was protested, when U.S. newspapers reported Soviet violations as fact and not as requests for clarification. Some items were proved to have been leaked in such a fashion by "government circles."

(5) Dismantling of the ABM site at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

Other matters discussed by the Committee during its deliberations include: The blinding of U.S. monitoring satellites, which the U.S. supposedly resolved by showing the cause of the blinding to be natural gas explosions inside the USSR; the question of the mobile ABM system, a system which was determined not to exist; ABM missile tests; and testing of mobile ICBMs by the USSR, which is not prohibited by the treaty. (It was determined, however, that the missile in question did not have strategic but intermediate range.) The Committee also reviewed the denial of test information, in which the Soviets have encoded missile-test telemetry data.

Here are excerpts from the ACDA's Feb. 23 report on "Verification of the Proposed SALT II Agreement."

1. Overall Assessment

The anticipated SALT II agreement is adequately

verifiable. This judgment is based on assessment of the verifiability of the individual provisions of the agreement and the agreement as a whole. Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs...

5. Overall Verifiability of Agreement

...A consideration in determining whether the agreement as a whole is adequately verifiable has been whether the Soviets could exploit the monitoring uncertainties of several individual provisions, each of which is judged as adequately verifiable, in a way that would affect our national security interests. We have confidence that we can adequately verify compliance in such a context because the probability of detecting the fact of cheating increases markedly if the number of provisions being violated increases. Combined with the likelihood of detecting significant cheating on individual limitations, the ability to detect the fact of small cheating on a number of provisions enhances our monitoring confidence.

The Soviets cannot be sure of our overall capability to monitor a SALT II agreement. Thus, Soviet planners would be expected to make careful conservative assumptions regarding U.S. verification capabilities. For example, a slightly less than 50 percent chance of detection, which is considered "low confidence" in monitoring capability to the U.S. would probably appear as "high risk" to a Soviet planner contemplating cheating. Given U.S. Research and Development hedges and our greater industrial and technological base, the Soviets would not lightly undertake this risk and the attendant danger of U.S. abrogation.

In sum, although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs. However, any cheating on a scale large enough to affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. For these reasons, and others noted in this paper, we believe that the SALT II agreement, taken as a whole, is adequately verifiable.

Young: British Solution Is No Solution

The Carter Administration soundly rejected the internal solution for Rhodesia which British Foreign Secretary David Owen had negotiated with Prime Minister Ian Smith. On March 9 Carter made a surprise announcement that Somali President Siad Barre has personally assured him that Somali troops would be withdrawn from Ethiopia. Carter also took an unexpected initiative by proposing a conference of all the interested national leaders which would include black leaders Josua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to work out a transition to majority rule.

Hours before Carter's press conference, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had mooted the possibility that Somalia may withdraw its troops from the Ogaden area saying this "is the necessary precondition for resolving

that conflict there." Vance further said that the Soviets and Cubans should respond in kind, and withdraw in favor of an Organization of African Unity peacekeeping force.

Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young had indicated in public statements last week that he considered the internal solution which included only domestic leaders Rev. Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa inadequate. In a guest editorial in the *Atlanta Constitution* March 1 Young correctly asserted "No Real Settlement in Rhodesia" in the headline. Young followed his editorial statement with strong public criticism of Britain's role in negotiating the internal solution, March 7 saying, "Are they (the British) going to run out on us in

the way they did in 1948 (in Palestine) and leave us with 30 years of trouble?"

We reprint below Young's editorial statement as it appeared in the Atlanta Constitution. The statement is an important step in undercutting the efforts of National Security Council Chief Zbigniew Brzezinski to use the Rhodesian situation as a theatre for a showdown between superpowers:

The problem with an "internal settlement" in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) is that it is not really a settlement. Any agreement which does not include the forces that are doing the fighting — the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian security forces — simply paves the way for a repeat of the Angola experience, with the result being continued bloodshed and civil strife. This conflict would inevitably spill over the borders of Zambia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Botswana.

It is already clear that the agreement announced Feb. 15 between Ian Smith and three black leaders — Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and Sen. Jeremiah Chirau — will not end the fighting. There is, however, a proposal — formulated by the British and United States governments — which is the only hope for stopping the warfare and guaranteeing free and impartial elections.

There are those who are only too glad to wash their hands of the entire matter, deluding themselves into believing that Mr. Smith has had a miraculous change of heart and is finally ready to transfer power.

But a realistic appraisal would suggest that the increasing military capabilities of the Patriotic Front and a rapidly collapsing economy in Rhodesia are more responsible for his change in attitude. Meanwhile, the increased pressure exerted by the presidents of the nearby "front line states" plus the internal talks, have led to the Patriotic Front's willingness to discuss the substantive Anglo-American proposal.

These discussions began recently in Malta, where Dr. David Owen, the British foreign minister, and I met for several days with leaders of the Patriotic Front, including Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. We held detailed conversations concerning transition arrangement, a United Nations peace-keeping force and the current military actions inside Rhodesia. The talks were positive and generally helpful in advancing the Anglo-American plan for a peaceful transfer of power in an independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe committed themselves to free and impartial elections and expressed a willingness to pursue a negotiated settlement.

The U.S. interest lies in stability and order in Zimbabwe and peace in the entire region of southern Africa. It really doesn't matter which nationalist leader emerges at the top of a new government, so long as that person is the choice of the Zimbabwe people.

The need for Western capital, markets and technology for development assures us of a relationship which can be negotiated to protect U.S. interests. Anything short of free and impartial elections that include all of the nationalist leaders simply plays into the hands of the Soviet Union and instability.

We have received extremely strong and positive support from presidents Julius Nyrere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique, as well as the government of Nigeria, for our proposal.

If the mood of the American people were such that it encouraged abandoning our proposals in the face of an "internal settlement," we would be abandoning the development potential of an entire region.

Clearly, the U.S. government cannot support an "internal settlement" but our national interest is tied to peace and cessation of the warfare in the area, and that can only come about as a result of the agreement by the two parties that control the arms — the Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front.

Carter Begins Confrontation With Jewish Lobby

Forces within the Carter Administration are moving to confront one of the chief political barriers standing in the way of a comprehensive, Middle East settlement: the so-called "Israel Lobby."

THE ADMINISTRATION

The politically powerful Jewish Lobby was set up largely through City of London/Rothschild networks, and has historically been used to thwart any U.S. attempts to help resolve the Middle East crisis — not out of any concern for Israel's national interests, but to further Britain's global aims. The Jewish lobby has raised a continuous and loud cry over the U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué of October, 1978 and the Administration's Mideast sales package.

The assessment that the White House has launched a concerted effort to break the Jewish Lobby's grip over U.S. Mideast policymaking was made by a spokesman for the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC). Commenting on the March 8 resignation of Mark Siegel from his post as President Carter's liaison to the Jewish community in protest against the Administration's allegedly anti-Israel policies, the AIPAC representative told a reporter: "The Administration doesn't give a s--t that Siegel quit. They're after us, they're looking for a confrontation with the Jewish community...They want to break the 'Jewish Lobby'."

Noting that Siegel's resignation had come just one week before Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin is to arrive in the United States for discussions with Carter and his advisors, the AIPAC spokesman reported that "the Administration is very upset with Begin" and is