

Pravda Targets Brzezinski As Wrecker Of SALT

The following are excerpts from Pravda's "International Week" commentary March 5 by Sergei Vishnevskii:

Exactly five decades ago, speaking at Oxford, British General Swinton, the inventor of the tank, declared: "The world is rather more prepared for war than for peace, and therefore I do not think that England ought to agree to any disarmament." The Imperialists of the U.S. and England developed their military program unchecked, and also rearmed Germany. Japan, France and Italy did not lag behind. And everybody knows where the arms race ended up that time....

It would be a great stimulus to winding down the arms race, if the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were successfully concluded. A new agreement (SALT-II) would have been concluded long since, if it were not for those circles abroad who, in the words of Senator G. Hart, want to "suffocate the baby in the cradle," that is wreck the agreement....

Several days ago, a useful report was published by the U.S. Department of State, which refuted falsifications about Soviet "violation" of the 1972 agreement. But at

the same time, the alarming word "linkage" is heard from official Washington. Most often, it comes from the mouth of the President's assistant on national security affairs, Z. Brzezinski. Linkage of what with what? Of the SALT negotiations with questions completely unrelated to the problem of arms limitation, particularly the situation in the Horn of Africa (and in this, the peaceful goals of Soviet aid to the victim of Somali aggression, Ethiopia, are shamelessly distorted.) It is apparent that Brzezinski, sensing the untenability of the "linkage" tactic, is dancing a polonaise: today he is for "linkage", tomorrow against—but adding that it "might become inevitable."...

What is the point of all these dance steps? They might make some sense, if the U.S. had less of a stake in winding down the arms race than we do. It would be of some use to some people in Washington to reread the President's recent statement: "The absence of a new SALT agreement...certainly would lead to a worsening of the atmosphere, and to an ultimate catastrophe. If the arms race continues or intensifies, the chances will grow that those weapons will be used under certain conditions."

ACDA Report Shows SALT II Could Work

Two separate reports released in Washington last week take most of the wind out of arguments by SALT opponents that negotiations so far have been no more than a *carte blanche* for Soviet violations and arms buildup.

The reports reveal that: (1) the compliance system which was set up for SALT I was very effective in checking possible violations of the SALT I treaty; and (2) the provisions of the SALT II treaty which have been worked out would be adequately verifiable under present circumstances.

Both reports were released under the auspices of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala), and were prepared by the State Department.

The SALT II report, developed by the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) with cooperation from the entire executive branch, including the Defense Department, reports a consensus that the treaty as agreed to so far would be "verifiable within adequate limits." In defining this term, ACDA Director Paul Warnke stated that the Soviets would either be caught in any violations early enough to correct them, or that the violation itself would not alter the strategic relationship. In addition, the report reveals for the first time, officially, the details of the provisions which have already been worked out in Geneva.

The SALT I report, which was prepared by the State Department's Standing Consultative Commission, a body created under the SALT provisions, reveals that while many possible treaty violations were filed with the Commission by both sides during the tenure of SALT I, no

claim proved to be in violation of the pact. The Soviets, however, reportedly "pushed the treaty to the limits." The report shows that the mechanism which was created to deal with irregularities worked very effectively and that a frank, give-and-take relationship between the U.S.-Soviet Commission took place on a regular basis. This is presumably the same type of apparatus that would be used to smooth over differences on the proposed SALT II treaty.

According to *Aviation Week*, the United States questioned apparent Soviet anomalies eight times, while the Soviet Union submitted five requests for clarification of unusual or ambiguous actions on the part of the U.S. The U.S. requests dealt with:

(1) Special purpose silos, which were later determined to be in use for launch control, although they were not stocked with missiles;

(2) A pattern of concealment from satellite photography, which apparently ended as soon as the request was submitted.

(3) Heavy missile deployment, which was not resolved because of ambiguities of definition in the SALT I accords. These ambiguities would be resolved in SALT II.

(4) The testing of an air defense system, the SA-5, which was later resolved not to be in an ABM (antiballistic missile) mode.

(5) Soviet dismantling of ABM launchers.

(6) ABM radar installations at the Kamchatka Peninsula, which are believed to be prototypes for full ABM installations. Discussions of this issue are continuing.

(7) Dismantling of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic