

Detente On The Line In Administration Battle

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his collaborators, including arms negotiator Paul Warnke, have taken the offensive to swing the President firmly behind a detente policy. They are particularly worried that National Security Council Chairman Zbigniew Brzezinski's provocative statements last week, linking SALT to Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa, will bring U.S.-Soviet relations to a crisis point.

Secretary Vance and Warnke met with Carter on March 3, the day after Brzezinski's most provocative statements to date on SALT and the Horn, and warned the President that Brzezinski's attempts to unilaterally change the Administration's policy and hinge further SALT talks on Soviet and Cuban withdrawal of support for Ethiopia, seriously endanger U.S.-USSR relations.

Carter, apparently affected by the warning, has reportedly sent Warnke back to the SALT negotiating table in Geneva with a renewed effort to achieve an accord this year. Later the same day, the President publicly distanced himself from his National Security advisor in an address to a meeting of college newspaper editors. The President said both he and negotiator Warnke agree that the SALT talks are progressing steadily, and that he is looking forward to a likely summit with Soviet President Brezhnev to clear up the three or four final technical details still in question.

This commitment to a SALT agreement coincides with Carter's decision to diffuse the Horn of Africa crisis. The White House is talking about a formula to cool out the situation. Yugoslav President Tito, visiting Washington this week, announced that the U.S. has agreed with his formula for solving the Horn problem: a Somali withdrawal from Ethiopia, a Soviet-Cuban withdrawal from the Horn, and a federation of the Ogaden with Ethiopia. In his press conference March 9, President Carter revealed that the Somalis had telephoned him to announce their withdrawal from Ethiopia.

At the same time as the Horn crisis heads toward resolution, Secretary Vance has made clear his intentions that the U.S. will not get embroiled in supporting the "internal settlement" for Rhodesia, a proposal that the Brzezinski faction threatens to turn into another Horn crisis.

State and ACDA Officials Attack Brzezinski

Officials at the State Department and Warnke's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are known to be increasingly enraged at what Brzezinski has already done to bring the U.S. to the brink of general thermonuclear war with the Soviets. State Department officials this week called Brzezinski's statements on "linkage" about as "effective as shooting yourself in the foot" (a reference to the disastrous step-by-step diplomacy of

Brzezinski's mentor, Henry Kissinger, no doubt). "As the centerpiece of Soviet-American relations, the SALT talks are simply too vital to make them hostage to events in the Horn of Africa," one State Department official noted, while another derided the NSC's plot to escalate U.S. criticism of the Soviets: "Instead of turning it up one notch, as intended, Brzezinski turned it up five or six notches."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also known to support a quickly-concluded SALT accord.

These officials are, rather, beginning to conceive of a "reverse linkage" concept: a new SALT agreement, once achieved, can be "linked" to other, mutually beneficial agreements on expanded U.S.-USSR trade and scientific collaboration. As one ACDA official put it: "If you have a SALT agreement, then you can have increased trade; that's the way we see it."

Soviets Watching

The Soviets are watching this factional rift carefully. Because Carter and much of the leadership in Congress has so far fallen in behind every hideous provocation proffered by the City of London and its allied faction in the U.S., the Soviets have dropped their longstanding war-avoidance policy. Now, they are building their war-winning capability and are prepared to use it — all the way — if further provoked. However, the USSR has made it quite clear that if the U.S. begins to act in a sane way — for instance, by negotiating a SALT agreement in good faith — it will make a positive response immediately.

The Soviets are also differentiating the various factions that are battling for control of U.S. foreign policy. In the Sunday Weekly Review column of *Pravda* March 5, the Soviets declared that SALT would have been concluded by now were it not for sabotage by a faction within the U.S. Then, the Soviets went on to clarify the problem: "Several days ago a useful report was published by the U.S. State Department, rejecting the falsification about violations by the Soviet side of the 1972 agreement...however, simultaneously, the alarming word linkage can be heard from official Washington. Most often it issues from the lips of Presidential assistant for National Security Brzezinski. Apparently sensing the untenability of the linkage tactic, Brzezinski is dancing the steps of a Polonaise, today he is for linkage, tomorrow he is against it, but adds that it could become inevitable."

The *Pravda* piece also gives Carter the opportunity to come down firmly for detente; it does not link him to Brzezinski's madness, but instead quotes the President's previous statements warning that without a SALT agreement the world might well be heading toward catastrophe.

The State Department added pressure on Carter to go this route by issuing a report last week on adherence to the original 1974 SALT. The report confirmed that the Soviets have never cheated on the SALT agreement, and that the several times their activities were challenged by the U.S. they were rapidly corrected or shown to be no violation. *The New York Times* — whose board until recently included Cyrus Vance—joined in with a recent editorial: "Zbigniew Brzezinski has gone a dangerous step further...This is a degree of linkage that Mr. Vance strongly opposes...To make SALT talks hostage to Soviet adventurism is a visceral reaction, understandable but mistaken."

Kissinger Steps in to Brainwash Congress

Because Brzezinski's semantic efforts to wreck SALT are being effectively held in check through Vance and Warnke's efforts, Brzezinski's tutor — the man who first invented the linkage game — Henry Kissinger, is running a much more direct operation to wreck a SALT accord. In the same way that Kissinger used knee-jerk anti-communism to brainwash former President Nixon, Kissinger is now telling conservative Republicans that this Administration's SALT accord would be "giving in to the commies." Howard Baker, Senate Majority leader and Presidential hopeful who regards Kissinger as one of the Republicans' foreign policy lights, mouthed Kissinger's cold war policy on television's Issues and Answers inter-

view show March 6. Clearly hysterical about SALT, Baker could not even pause when asked if Soviet withdrawal from the Horn would be an act of good faith.

Two days later, on March 8, Kissinger met with the Republican Policy Committee behind closed doors, beguiling members to believe that there is a policy vacuum in the Administration which the Soviets are taking advantage of, urging the Republicans to speak out. Specifically, he said he hates the Administration's SALT proposals and is against the Administration's Africa policy. Senator Laxalt (R) of Ronald Reagan, declared after the meeting, "Kissinger is completely with us." Also following Kissinger's cue, Senator Dole (R-Kan.) issued a statement of support for the internal settlement for Rhodesia.

The actions of Vance and others, however, have set the stage for Carter to act in the national interest and in the words of an ACDA official, "go for a SALT agreement and worry about Congress later." Competent Administration officials are gearing up to convince Carter to ignore claims by Brzezinski and Kissinger that the Senate will refuse a SALT agreement now. In fact, the Senate "is much more favorable to a SALT agreement than to the Panama Treaty," according to one Senate aide intimately connected with the SALT debate — a sentiment known to be widespread on Capitol Hill.

—Barbara Dreyfuss

'The SALT Dilemma and the Horn'

New York Times, editorial, March 8:

...There is no disagreement over the fact, as Secretary of State Vance has put it, that Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa will complicate the already difficult task of winning Senate ratification of the projected SALT treaty. But President Carter's security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has gone a dangerous step further to warn Moscow that its activities in Africa would "inevitably complicate" the negotiations themselves. This is a degree of "linkage" that Mr. Vance strongly opposes.... To make the SALT talks hostage to Soviet adventurism is a visceral reaction, understandable but mistaken....

... The danger of yielding to the temptation is that there is no logical stopping point. In the end, a SALT agreement would be made contingent on first resolving every other Soviet-American dispute. The tactic cannot work as intended, but it can destroy the fragile arms control framework. The Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, showed his understanding of this danger when he signed the first SALT treaty with President Nixon in 1972 despite the intensified American bombing and blockade of North Vietnam....

Recent American efforts to obtain terms that would satisfy the Senate appear to have been sympathetically understood in Moscow... But a slowdown in the negotiations now, ostensibly over Ethiopia, would be quite another matter. It could arouse deep suspicions in the Kremlin that the United States is seeking unilateral advantages in the nuclear arms race. It could endanger the SALT I agreement on offensive arms, which has been extended informally since its expiration last October....

The central military issues in SALT II were settled more than three years ago at Vladivostok by Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford. But in 1976, an election year, after Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Angola, completion of the treaty was delayed by Mr. Ford, to his subsequent regret.

Warnke versus Nitze

U.S. News and World Report recently published a debate between U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency head Paul Warnke and Committee on the Present Danger spokesman Paul Nitze on whether or not a SALT II treaty is in the strategic interest of the United States. The debate demonstrates, to a certain degree, the differences in thinking between sane elements of the Carter Administration and CPD types in the Administration and in Congress like former CPD founding member James Schlesinger and Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash), the chairman of the Senate subcommittee which handles SALT.

The clearest criteria by which to judge these outlooks, in our opinion, is represented in Mr. Warnke's appreciation of what the strategic realities of a non-SALT world would be, despite the general shortcomings of his views on military matters. In contrast, Mr. Nitze demonstrates a dangerously incompetent understanding of such a world, defined by his obsession with the numbers of missiles either side would have with and without SALT.

Q: Mr. Warnke, why would the strategic arms limitation