

Brzezinski Pushes Kissinger's China Policy

A group of Administration officials led by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski have recently been advising President Carter to follow through with the dangerous policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) authored and pursued by Henry Kissinger since 1970. The *New York Times* confirmed on Dec. 16, 1977 that Brzezinski was strongly urging Carter to implement the Kissinger China policy designed to infuriate the Soviet Union and destroy detente between the U.S. and the USSR. Brzezinski was said to have argued for playing on Soviet fears of two-front encirclement by retargeting a portion of American ICBMs against Soviet troops and military installations on the Chinese border, which would assist a Chinese invasion of the Soviet Far East in the event of general nuclear war.

Coincidentally, according to the same source, so-called PRM-31 (Policy Review Memorandum 31) was circulating throughout the Administration with a recommendation strongly supported by Brzezinski and seconded by Carter's National Security Council advisor on China Michael Oksenberg, and by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Morton Abramowitz, calling for U.S. military assistance to the PRC that would be directed against the Soviets. The PRM-31 recommendation flies in the face of repeated Soviet statements that such action would constitute a grave provocation.

The purpose of the Brzezinski-led thrust to complete Kissinger's China policy has become unmistakable since early January 1978, when Kissinger himself re-emerged as the leading public spokesman for a new Cold War. As Kissinger and Brzezinski know, recognizing the PRC in the context of a Cold War, and setting up a de facto military alliance with the Peking regime, are actions certain to provoke Moscow into the most isolationist, and anti-West attitudes that have been seen for decades. Kissinger and Brzezinski are deliberately seeking this reaction to insure that East-West economic collaboration to pull the world from its current global slump will not occur, that the SALT and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks will become dead letters, allowing a degeneration to total confrontation to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This policy, of which Kissinger's China policy is an integral part, diametrically opposes the United States' interests in Asia and globally. Nonetheless, since Secretary Vance's refusal to accede to Chinese demands during his visit last August, unlikely allies, spanning the political spectrum from the ultra-Cold War Committee

on the Present Danger (CPD) to Fabian liberal Senator Edward Kennedy, have acted to give outside support to the Brzezinski-Oksenberg initiative.

As early as August 1976, Edward Kennedy advocated "normalizing" U.S. relations with the PRC, and implicitly dumping U.S. support for Taiwan; he is known to still support that position. Kennedy recently returned from a two-week visit to Peking, no doubt to bolster his case for this course. California Democrat Alan Cranston also recently journeyed to Peking, at the head of a 10-member Congressional group, and will no doubt join the chorus calling for U.S. recognition.

Outside academic voices, as liberally represented in the testimony released in early January by the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, are also nearly unanimous in their support for recognition and de facto abandonment of Taiwan.

From the other side, a delegation of the Washington-based CPD visited Peking for a week in December 1977, following in the footsteps of top CPD member Elmo Zumwalt who met with high Chinese officials in a visit there last July. The CPD, including its crypto-member James Schlesinger, favors any and every means to oppose the Soviet Union, and thinks nothing of supporting the regime in Peking to this end.

Their opposition comes from both within and outside of the Administration, including those favoring detente with the Soviets, and others loosely termed the "China Lobby" who support the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. The weakness of these opposition forces is their failure to develop a counter-policy based on the real interests of the United States. Under revived Cold War conditions, should they come to the fore, the China lobby stalwarts could rapidly find themselves outmaneuvered and unable to prevent the U.S. and the People's Republic from forming their alliance against the Soviets.

The U.S. Labor Party holds it is past the time for political forces committed to American interests to define an appropriate American policy toward the Far East, and China in particular. The Labor Party is issuing at this time a policy statement on U.S. policy toward China intended to begin to remedy this shortcoming. The following statement is adapted from written testimony submitted to the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations on Nov. 17, in preparation for oral testimony to be given at the second round of subcommittee hearing scheduled for February, 1978.