

An Understandable Soviet Blunder

The following statement was issued Aug. 12 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., National Chairman of the U.S. Labor Party and Presidential Candidate:

During the most recent weeks Soviet officials have allowed Manhattan financiers' agents of influence in and around the Soviet leadership to run amok in playing back through the Soviet press the political line being fed into Eastern European Arbatovian networks from the Dartmouth Conference and other Manhattan-centered conduits. Strategic analysts must understand that, apart from certain complicating secondary aspects of this development, at the proverbial "bottom line" of the matter this current rash of "play-back agency" is a strategic deception operation.

Soviet resort to such a deception operation at this juncture is a grave strategic error, a blunder which increases the danger of early total war. However, we must understand that given the Soviet leadership's crucial incompetence concerning certain ABCs of the internal political processes of the industrialized capitalist countries, the current blunder is understandable.

First, I shall outline the situation as it appears to the best-qualified Moscow analysts. In this way I shall show why certain top Soviet circles would think they had good reason for adopting a deception posture at this juncture. Secondly, I shall indicate how the Soviet deception posture operates. Thirdly, I shall demonstrate why it is a grave blunder. Finally, I shall indicate the most probable solution to the problem represented.

Countdown For War

Top strategist thinkers centered around the Soviet military have consistently viewed the Manhattan financial interests as the primary source of the total-war danger since no later than the U-2 incident. Although in the wake of the 1962 Cuban missiles crisis N.S. Khrushchev and his successors in the Politburo have pursued a variety of "detente" based on the false doctrine that Manhattan financial circles are "realists" who wish to avoid war, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military and immediately related development has been a consistent development of a war-winning capability for conditions of intercontinental total war.

In consequence of the massive destruction of USA-NATO strategic advantages during the period of the Vietnam War, and partially as a by-product of that war, and because of the stagnation and emerging austerity in U.S. industrial and technological progress, the Warsaw Pact has now achieved a *marginal* war-winning advantage of the type which would act as an actual war-winning advantage only under conditions of total war. That is, the Warsaw Pact capability for winning a war against NATO forces exists only under the condition that total war begins with a total-kill strike against North American

population and logistical centers — thus eliminating the NATO forces' in-depth war-fighting capabilities behind first-line NATO combat deployments. Such a war would involve an estimated 20 to 30 million casualties among Soviet citizens (i.e., in the order of magnitude of World War II losses) as against upwards of 160 million casualties in the USA. It is this ratio of losses among civilian populations which is the most critical feature of the Warsaw Pact war-winning potential at this juncture.

Overall, the balance between the "Manhattan realists" and the war-fighting postures of the Soviet leadership involves what may be termed a threshold. Whenever the direction of NATO and related postures and actions shows NATO to be committed to a threat against vital Warsaw Pact strategic interests over the near to intermediate term, and when those threatened interests are deemed to warrant risking 30 million Soviet lives, the Soviet strategic posture shifts to a war-fighting posture in a way we shall summarize below. Whenever that threshold is reached or probably reached, an interim condition tends to emerge, in which a Soviet deception operation tends to emerge automatically, again for reasons we shall explain below.

Soviet estimations are lawfully focused on two most critical developments within the NATO countries, with primary emphasis on the internal political situation in the USA and secondary emphasis on the related internal political situation in the key West European NATO country, West Germany (the BRD). The Soviet command knows that the Carter-Mondale "energy" and monetary policies commit the USA to early thermonuclear confrontation (an updated version of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) of the sort to which the Warsaw Pact will respond with total war. The crucial issue for the Soviet strategist is whether a significant, effective opposition to the Carter-Mondale energy and monetary-austerity policies exists within the United States, and secondly whether the BRD is capable of abruptly pulling out of NATO as a last resort for preventing Carter-Mondale from going to war.

If the U.S. Congress capitulates to Carter-Mondale-Schlesinger on the energy and monetary-austerity issues, and if the AFL-CIO leadership lines up with Carter-Mondale, then the Soviet command must tend to conclude that there exists no force within the USA capable of preventing the escalation toward the showdown triggering war. If it also appears to the Soviet command that the BRD government will not sabotage such a showdown, then the Soviet command must tend to conclude that an irreversible commitment in effect to total war prevails in NATO's political command.

The second point then considered by the Soviet command is the probable timing of the actual showdown. The convergence of crisis developments in Africa and the Middle East on the period of upcoming NATO maneuvers

represents the visible, most probable point for an immediate, actual outbreak of total war.

The capitulation of the House of Representatives and the AFL-CIO leadership to the Carter-Mondale "energy" package and AFL-CIO capitulation to the Humphrey slave-labor package (the announced Sept. 4-10 rallies for Nazi-modeled slave-labor "full employment" programs) forcefully inform Soviet strategic analysts that no visible efficiently placed force has the brains and guts to stop the Carter-Mondale march toward the confrontation triggering total war. Strong indications that the Schmidt government of the BRD is not openly counterattacking Carter-Mondale efforts to overthrow that government strongly suggest to Soviet commanders that no effective opposition to the Carter-Mondale game exists within the BRD. If the BRD capitulates to the demands of Carter-Mondale's Young Socialist (Juso) and Young Democrat (Judo) supporters for a moratorium on nuclear energy programs, and if the BRD and Japan bend to the Carter-Mondale-Manhattan reflationary demands, then the Soviet command is largely correct in assuming that nothing perceptible and efficient stands in the way of total war.

However, the Soviets, not being reckless, are not going to react with "flight forward" launchings of preemptive total war while the slightest reasonable possibility exists that something might develop at the last minute, so to speak, to prevent the actual confrontation from occurring. Under such conditions the Soviet leadership will — in sports-page language — stall for time by dribbling, or punt. They will tend naturally to keep all alternative postures in place. They will keep a line open to Nelson Rockefeller et al., they will keep up alternative lines toward detente with Western Europe and so forth, will pursue their Third World "new world economic order" posture, and will also go on a discreet form of alert for anticipated outbreak of total war.

From the standpoint of the probable best estimate now available to Moscow, the immediate, next critical period for possible total-war outbreak is the period of the upcoming NATO maneuvers. If a confrontation is to erupt in some combination of southern Africa, the Horn, the Middle East, or an Egyptian invasion of Libya, it is crucial to NATO that it be in mobile deployment preparatory to war at that juncture. A combination of NATO maneuvers is the best cover for such mobile deployments.

If nothing evil develops during the August-October period, then the Soviet command might judge that the immediate total-war danger has subsided, at least temporarily, and resume a line of approach toward new strategic war-avoidance possibilities.

Overall, given the Soviet command's stupidities concerning the internal political processes of the industrialized capitalist countries, their estimation to the foregoing effect would be entirely rational in terms of the best criteria acknowledged by the Soviet political command.

The fallacy in their estimate is reflected by their failure to recognize and act upon certain vital measures of strategic war-avoidance. In short, Soviet stupidity is located essentially in their long-standing political differences with this writer and his associates.

Thus, while the Soviets are keeping their strategic war-avoidance options open, during the month of July they dropped their efforts to develop new, creative war-avoidance approaches, and withdrew to more primitive, previously-established options of the character of dribbling and punting.

How The Deception Operation Works

Given electronic and other intelligence measures, it is virtually impossible for any major power to launch a surprise attack upon the other. Respecting the deployments which must probably occur during the twelve or more hours immediately preceding a total-war outbreak, the attacking power cannot avoid displaying such preparations in significant part to its intended adversary. Pearl Harbors do not occur in modern warfare except by gross incompetence or through political guile by the ostensibly surprised adversary.

The possibility for political strategic surprise exists chiefly for the period immediately preceding the pre-assault deployment. This is particularly significant, if only marginally significant, for the mode of total war. That is, a period of intercontinental and other atomic, bacteriological and chemical bombardment precedes the assault by ground forces, such that the time between the mobilization of ground forces and the bombardment is less than the time required to complete the pre-assault deployment of ground forces. Although complete surprise is impossible, the degree of surprise can be maximized.

In the NATO countries, the political deception incident of maximizing surprise is obtained by acting while parliamentary forces are on vacation or by generating a charade in parliaments which distracts attention from the war preparations being made behind that charade. In the Warsaw Pact countries, which have a centralized political command unlike that in the NATO countries, the approach to political deception assumes a slightly different form.

In the Soviet case, the means for political deception are provided by lower Manhattan itself. Typified by Georgii Arbatov and the Dartmouth Conference case, Manhattan and its allies have large networks of agents of influence in place within and proximate to the top Soviet leadership as well as the leaderships of other CMEA-Warsaw Pact nations. These agents of influence are, in the main, well known to Soviet and other Warsaw Pact security forces as "submarines." Since Manhattan's strategy for a thermonuclear confrontation is based on influencing the Soviet command through these agents, any Carter-Mondale thermonuclear confrontation must be preceded by an intensive activation of the "submarines" within the Warsaw Pact political command. Soviet deception is based on permitting those "submarines" to run amok in the Eastbloc press, so that Manhattan agents of influence within the Warsaw Pact political command not only more readily expose themselves for Soviet security forces actions, but act in effect as Warsaw Pact play-back agents for the edification and deception of the lower Manhattan financier-political forces.

The current deception is thin. Every reading from the Eastbloc reflects the "hardest" mood seen in many

years, yet, on the surface the Arbatovians are having a field day in the Eastbloc press. Nonetheless, despite such strong evidence of a deception "playback" operation, the situation is sufficiently ambiguous to Western analysts so that hysterical elements in and around the Carter-Mondale Administration will believe what they obsessively wish to believe — that the Warsaw Pact command is politically off-guard.

The critic of the analysis would tend to argue: "But such a posture by the Soviets markedly increases the probability of total war!" What the critic obviously overlooks is that at the point the Soviet command believes that the Carter-Mondale forces are in tight control of the USA political command and about to bring down the Schmidt government's resistance to Carter-Mondale policies, the Soviet command must consider that total war is already an irreversible near-term probability. Under those conditions the Soviet command gives up those elements of war-avoidance which conflict with any slight augmentation of a war-winning capability. The critic must understand that the Soviet command's deception operation is wrong, but nonetheless rational.

The Soviets' Blunder

According to well-informed U.S. sources, and somewhat corroborated by other relevant sources, elements of the Soviet command have had the U.S. Labor Party's strategic analysis under increasing consideration during recent months, especially since Nov. 1, 1976. This is circumstantially confirmed by qualified military and related circles in Western Europe, who report Soviet military-strategic thinking as more or less precisely conforming to the U.S. Labor Party's analysis of Soviet policy and perceptions.

This study of the U.S. Labor Party's work has taken the form of a factional issue in Soviet "central" circles, in which the Labor Party's analysis of the world situation has been pitted directly against the contrary position of the 280-odd person USA-Canada section associated with Rockefeller agent-of-influence Georgii Arbatov. The Labor Party's views, shared on crucial points by leading forces in NATO and other "Western" countries, have been explicitly or otherwise endorsed to East bloc circles by certain capitalist and other forces with direct communication access to those East bloc circles. At the same time, the Soviet leadership has been the most significant containment opponent of the Labor Party after Henry Kissinger and other Manhattan-controlled forces.

The Labor Party's thesis is well known, of course, but it should be restated here in the form it has been communicated to Soviet and other Warsaw Pact political forces, as in, notably, *The Case of Walter Lippmann*. We have said to the Soviets:

- (1) The Communist organizations of the capitalist sector are at best viable social-democracies of the type of the CGIL (trade-union) strata of the Communist Party of Italy. Other Communist Parties, such as the Communist Party USA, are totally garbage, mere tools in the hands of Manhattan and other intelligence networks.
- (2) Otherwise, excepting viable currents of the trade-union-linked forces within social-democracies, the

"left" in the capitalist sector — Maoists, Trotskyists, and so forth — is absolutely political garbage of the worst sort.

- (3) The only viable forces in the capitalist sector for purposes of Soviet war-avoidance policies are represented by industrialist-labor alliances of the sort developing around Giulio Andreotti in Italy and similar formations existent or tending to develop in France, the BRD, and other nations.
- (4) Therefore, a socialist transformation in the capitalist industrialized sector is excluded for the foreseeable future except (a) as a Red Army project in the aftermath of war, or (b) an uncertain form of development produced by the "new Middle Ages" that the Carter-Mondale energy-austerity programs portend.
- (5) Therefore, the CMEA countries must in effect offer a common interest strategic alliance to humanist industrialist-labor alliances, based on industrialized global prosperity in a high-technology mode of economic cooperation among the OECD, CMEA, and developing nations.
- (6) To avoid war, the Soviet command must turn to open diplomacy in (a) declassifying its war-fighting order of battle, and (b) making a firm offer of the kind of economic cooperation which aids the OECD and developing nations in establishing a new, gold-based international banking system through which to quickly pull the world out of its present depression.

Unfortunately, although war-avoidance policies in that direction have been pursued by the Soviets and other CMEA nations, the Soviets have stubbornly refused to employ the kind of consistent and persistent open diplomacy we have proposed. That identifies their essential practical blunder.

The principal known reason for this blunder by the Soviets is their fear that such open diplomacy would give too much credence to the U.S. Labor Party. Apart from some deep resentments against the Labor Party, and especially this writer, in certain top Soviet circles, the principal reason given through indirect but nonetheless authoritative channels is that any Soviet public recognition of the U.S. Labor Party in any form but slanders would jeopardize vital Soviet channels of negotiation with Manhattan financial-political circles. The Soviet Central Committee's communicated policy on this point has been confirmed from high-level sources in NATO and other countries. The most strenuous communications have been made through Arbatovian and similar channels from the U.S. State Department and Dartmouth Conference-connected sources communicating such threats into Soviet circles.

This problem coincides with a sentimental piece of stupidity within leading Soviet circles. The forces within the capitalist sector with which the Soviets must establish understanding include, prominently, traditionally hard-core anticommunist political and social strata. The stupidity on the Soviet side in this connection is that the Soviet command has so far refused to acknowledge the propriety of giving those anticommunist conservatives the kind of open-handed, credible policy offer the situation requires. The Soviets refuse to understand, so far, that the best people in the industrialized capitalist

nations are the typical, devoutly anticommunist conservatives among trade unionists, industrialists, and so forth, the people organically committed to the humanist principles of industrial and agricultural prosperity in terms of technological progress. The Soviets cling — at least in large part — to the delusion that the so-called liberals and radicals are the relatively more viable force, that the financier circles that control these liberals and radicals are in some way a rational, realistic bulwark against the danger of war.

Collateral Features Of The Mess

There are two principal internal aspects of the Soviet Union's leadership circles which contribute to this blunder. Up front, despite the contrary impressions attributed to the Moscow Trials period, the hard-core Anglo-American-Dutch networks associated with the old Alexander Helphand-Parvus networks have never been cleaned out of the Soviet command. The spiritual descendants of Radek, Bukharin, and Riazanov are notable in this respect; the layers around the Communist Party's "Marxist-Leninist" doctrinal circles, the layers heavily influenced by Frankfurt School and other Korschite garbage, are the notable "sociological phenomenon" for consideration. It is these strata, interlinked with the nests of agents of influence of foreign private intelligence services, which are the core of the Soviet command's political problems at this date.

Let us be plainspoken. Most of what is issued from Moscow as standard textbooks in "Marxism-Leninism" is pure garbage, as is the related nonsense published under the same general auspices as "dialectical materialism (diamat)" and "historical materialism (histomat)." It is sheer gibberish, the worst sort of mixed nominalist double-talk and falsified history.

The organic outlook of the majority of Soviet citizens is properly termed socialist despite this — just as the organic outlook of the typical skilled worker, farmer, and industrialist in the USA is within the tradition of the American Revolution and the Constitution despite the garbage purveyed in most U.S. textbooks, major media, and public school and university classrooms. The organic outlook of the Soviet and American citizen is ultimately identical: it is a commitment to industrial and agricultural growth with the maximum emphasis on high technology and scientific advancement. The difference is that the American thinks in terms of privately owned industries and farms, where the Soviet citizen thinks in terms of state-owned industries and farms. The majority of American citizens are organically procapitalist humanists, whereas the majority of Soviet citizens are organically prosocialist humanists.

Otherwise, there are two other important distinctions between the Soviet and American humanist. First, sociologically, the Soviet citizen thinks in terms of the allocation of nationally accumulated capital to those industries which represent the lever for the greatest rate of overall national growth, and situates this in terms of the state budget for investment and production (the plan), whereas the American thinks in terms of national fiscal and credit policies as fostering (principally) the

development of those sections of private industry which result in the same sort of general benefit to the nation as a whole. Second, the Soviet citizen has been conditioned to 60 years of garrison economy, and with a much keener preoccupation with a hostile "outside world" than is reflected in the post-war anticommunism among U.S. conservatives.

On the top party and state levels, including the military command, the Soviet Union in particular has on balance a much better situation than we presently enjoy in the USA respecting national and foreign policies. Whereas much of the U.S. political command is made up of corrupt elements who place the interest of Manhattan banks and international finance above the interests of the nation, the preponderance of the Soviet command is sincerely dedicated to its perception of national interests in terms of industrial and agricultural high-technology progress. Whether the Soviet command makes errors in perception and policy judgment is important but secondary. The advantage, for both the Soviet citizen and for those of us who care about the real interests of the United States, is that the Soviet command is, preponderantly, rationally committed to the real interests of its nation. Hence, we can negotiate with that leadership on the basis of proposals which represent in fact the intersection of interests of our respective nations — on condition that we ourselves have a government committed firmly to our actual national interests as a high-technology industrial and agricultural nation.

The rational qualities of the Soviet command have proven themselves to extend beyond the East bloc as such to the acceptance of economic cooperation among CMEA, OECD, and developing nations as the only sound basis for durable mutual political security premised on joint efforts to effect global prosperity. Furthermore, not only Soviet scientists but numerous other key strata of the East bloc nations have excellent intelligence qualities and valuable knowledge.

So, if one can brush aside the driveling garbage on "diamat," "histomat," and so forth — which has no connection to Karl Marx — and concentrate on the world-outlook developed on the basis of Soviet organic outlooks, the Soviet leadership is in that sense socialist in outlook and method.

Unfortunately, the garbage to which we have referred is not merely verbiage. A large section of the East bloc political leadership has a soft spot for Robespierre-Danton-Marat et al., for what is called "leftism." Although the Soviets denounce anarchism and terrorism rightly enough, they have a tolerant attitude toward anarchist and terrorist layers as "erring" currents which must be influenced into a more positive outlook and practice. This is properly notorious. Wherever we see a Communist Party, we generally find a gang of misguided Communist fools tailing after this or that professed "anti-capitalist" rag-tag on the presumption that "anti-capitalist proletarian" forces must be potentially "progressive" despite their immediate lunacies. Hence, the pathetic typical Communist is found buried up over his head in some sort of liberal or "radical" lunacy, attempting to recruit from these political cesspools and influence them from within.

That is the most fundamental reason the Communist movement in the industrialized capitalist countries has

both been such a wretched failure by its own standards and has in most cases been taken over and degenerated into a condition approximately that of the FBI's miserable Communist Party USA. (Freedom of Information Act releases show a marked similarity between the refuse quality of FBI political evaluations and the same mentality exhibited in the political evaluations published in the CPUSA's New York *Daily World*. The unresolved question is whether the FBI caused the mental damage to the *Daily World* writers, or whether excessive association with the CPUSA caused brain damage to much of the FBI.)

Although Moscow knows that the CPUSA's "KGB" unit is nothing but an FBI-State Department tool, Moscow clings to the CPUSA with the same qualities a foolish monkey shows by holding to the nut within a monkey-trap.

Although the Arbatovian-Frankfurt garbage played back from Moscow does not correspond to organic Soviet outlooks and thinking, that intellectual refuse does exert a pernicious influence on Soviet foreign policy, and could be the margin of Soviet error which leads into an otherwise avoidable total war.

Illustration: Terrorism

Antiterrorist analysts, including some of the best experts, have independently emphasized to us: Yes, the Institute for Policy Studies and allied networks are the main source of terrorism — but there is also an East bloc angle. Unfortunately, there is an important element of truth in that report; as a result of Soviet stupidity, various terrorist networks have successfully dipped neo-Fabian terrorist activities in East bloc and Cuban colors. It is also true that some contaminated elements of the Soviet KGB are implicated in this.

This writer, an honest and influential figure working to prevent war, is persona non grata in effect within the East bloc and Cuba — largely through Manhattan influences on the Moscow leadership — but almost any scoundrel visiting the East bloc or Havana to implicate those nations in terrorism walks in and out of those locations, and is usually feted by some official or semi-official agency in the process! On this point, the stupidity of the Soviet leadership shows most clearly.

Worse, at the point that U.S. circles at no lower level than Zbigniew Brzezinski issued an assassination order against this writer, an "icebox" article was pulled out, this writer's name inserted arbitrarily and obviously in

"I.D. format" in the middle of it, and thus Soviet cooperation with the terrorists was planted in Issue 27 of Soviet *New Times*.

That incident illustrates the point that it is not only conceivable but probable that certain aspects of Manhattan-instigated international terrorism are partially laundered through Manhattan agents of influence in Moscow and other CMEA and allied nations, and that it can not be excluded that the dumb KGB has in some instances allowed itself to be implicated in this monstrous folly.

On some issues the Soviet leadership can be monstrously and stubbornly imbecilic!

The Solution

There are important forces within the CMEA and Warsaw Pact countries who are by no means foolish. However, for them to counter the foolish ones we must produce a credible alternative. As long as there is no signal to the effect that significant forces are moving in the United States and Western Europe to prevent an early confrontation, the Soviet command will tend to follow a war-waiting policy.

The resistance of the BRD and Japan to the Carter-Mondale energy and monetary policies, provided the Saudis do not capitulate to Cyrus Vance or Henry Kissinger, tends to create a credible block in the way of war.

A U.S. Senate rejection of the Carter energy policy would also markedly reduce the danger of war, provided that the AFL-CIO goes back into opposition to Carter.

An escalated "Cartergate," if it is accompanied by broad overthrow of the unconstitutional horrors of the Carter-Mondale Administration, would also contribute in a major way to eliminating the war danger and Soviet perception of the war danger.

To the extent that this writer and the Labor Party receive open support from circles in the USA and Western Europe that will cause a major setback to those Soviet factions which condone international terrorism and which are attempting to sabotage economic cooperation between the CMEA and industrialist forces of the OECD countries.

If these developments do not occur, then the element of stupidity in the Soviet command plus the lunacy in the Carter-Mondale Administration mean that we are on track for an early outbreak of total war. Anyone who does not take my warning seriously, considering the massive corroboration of our analysis to date, is some sort of imbecile.