Open The Arbatov File

The following was written by Criton Zoakos, NCLC Director of Intelligence, and is reprinted from New Solidarity.

It is no secret among professional circles that this organization's assessment of Mr. Georgi Arbatov's politics is unflattering, to say the least. However, this is only *the least* that intelligence professionals in the socialist sector may choose to infer from the charges we have leveled against the director of the USA-Canada Institute of Moscow.

In reality, Georgi Arbatov, a recent addition to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a foreign service functionary of that body since 1960-62, is a conscious agent of the Rockefeller-Morgan private political intelligence networks. Despite our organization's understandably extremely limited access to primary evidentiary documents pertaining to the Aratov case, we have been able to conclude firmly that the subject was contacted and recruited at some point during 1960 and 1968. Hence, this writer's professional recommendation to the appropriate Soviet agencies and authorities would be to open the Arbatov file for the appropriate period of time, examine the relevant evidentiary record, and determine the precise circumstances in which the subject was recruited by the Rockefeller networks.

We have no doubt that others are going to be involved in the case; Mr. Arbatov's political promoters, his administrative superiors at various times, political colleagues, collaborators and so forth. If pursued to its conclusion, the unraveling of the Arbatov case will once and for all cleanse the Soviet intelligence and security agencies of all major sources of contamination, and thus for the first time in history will allow for a Soviet political intelligence establishment to be founded on a sound scientific basis rather than the prevailing incompetence and cloak-and-dagger chamber of horrors.

The litmus test used for determining conclusions in the Arbatov case was the historical role that Arbatov and his Institute have played in disseminating the myth of the "military-industrial" complex. This piece of modern psychological warfare went a long way in shaping world events from the Summit at Camp David in 1959 to the Soviet leadership's blunders up until Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's recent trip to Moscow.

The Tale of the Military-Industrial Complex

Of all the celebrated operations of strategic deception recorded in the annals of transactions among states during the 20th century, one of the most stunningly successful will remain the myth that the legendary military-industrial complex of the United States is a group of warmongers and nuclear provocateurs bent on perpetuating aggression against the socialist camp.

The so-called military-industrial complex emerged in the folklore of the 1960s as the image of a sinister, allpowerful conspiracy of "conservative," "right-wing," "militarists," "fascists," industrialists and generals, a conspiracy that provides the impetus for aggression and imperialist adventurism in American foreign policy.

Georgi Arbatov's entire political career and the raison d'être of his USA-Canada Institute is dedicated to the proposition that the American conservative "rightwing" is the source of danger for world war while the Eastern Establishment of the Rockefeller family and its liberal adjuncts are the "realistic forces" seeking a peaceful accomodation with the Soviet Union.

The entirety of this analysis was manufactured in the United States during the Kennedy administration by think tanks of the Rockefeller family, and it was disseminated massively by President Kennedy's National Security Council as a priority project of national security. Arbatov and his associates in the Soviet establishment at no point had any hand in producing this piece of analytical atrocity. However, they adopted this thesis fully and, since 1967-68 they have been the principal conduits for spreading and cultivating it in the Soviet Union. One may thus assert that Georgi Arbatov, as an exceptionally successful "agent of influence," has played an instrumental role, in fact an absolutely indispensable role, in making effective the most ambitious strategic deception project of post-war finance capitalism.

Even though the phrase military-industrial complex presumably was coined at President Eisenhower's farewell address Jan. 17, 1961, the story of the deception operation has earlier roots in the 1957, 1958 and 1959 fits of hysteria that Nelson Rockefeller threw in reaction to the first initiatives toward detente and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union undertaken by Republican conservative-traditionalists around President Eisenhower.

These Republican-conservative efforts were sufficiently strong at the time to have made the 1959 Camp David Summit between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower a resounding success. That meeting, opening the way for the 1960 Paris Summit, represented the maximum threat to the Wall Street-Rockefeller interests of the entire post-war era, with the sole exception of post-March 1977. The 1960 Paris summit would have brought together the heads of every major anti-Rockefeller grouping in the political world: General de Gaulle, in charge of a reconsolidated France: Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the old industrialist-allied Rhinelander who was shaping an anti-monetarist Europe with de Gaulle; Nikita Khrushchev, who was preoccupied with the tasks of Soviet industrialization; and President Eisenhower, a spokesman of the antimonetarist, traditional industrialist interests of the United States.

Had that summit succeeded in shaping the basis for broad-ranging cooperation among these leaders, the Rockefellers and the whole Lower Manhattan crowd would have been destroyed right then and there at the tail-end of the 1957-58 recession. De Gaulle's and Adenauer's "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" would have taken the place of the European Economic Community, American troops eventually would have withdrawn from European soil, and the multi-billion dollar swindle of the Eurodollar market never would have emerged to rescue New York's financiers.

All this was destroyed by the famous U-2 incident, a political destabilization operation of the Rockefellers simultaneously aimed at President Eisenhower and the Soviet leadership.

Of what is known of the U-2 incident, the following assertions can be made with certainty: (1) the U-2 had been sabotaged on the ground before takeoff so that it could not receive incoming communications and would have to make a forced landing in the Soviet Union; (2) the sabotage was carried out neither by the normal CIA channels nor by Pentagon channels (the most likely hypothesis is that Allen Dulles utilized his authority as director of Central Intelligence to order the sabotage outside of agency channels); (3) Soviet intelligence blundered colossally in attempting to analyse the incident to the point where Khrushchev, repeatedly embarrassed by his defense officials, stated "we are justified to wonder publicly, who are we dealing with really?"

In short, Rockefeller succeeded in blowing the Paris Summit sky high without Khrushchev and Eisenhower knowing what really hit them!

From that time on, Walter Lippmann led the whole pack of Atlanticist psywarriors spinning tall tales about how Pentagon militarists and "defense industry interests" had pulled off the U-2 caper and about how badly they had miscalculated because that provocation would now give Soviet "hawks" and other such Soviet equivalents of the "military industrial complex" the opportunity to go after the unfortunate Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet party paper, *Pravda* even published one Lippmann column to this effect, completely unedited. Mr. Lippmann's reputation as a "realistic force" started rising in certain Soviet circles, while he himself was preparing to become Nelson Rockefeller's speech writer for the upcoming Republican primaries.

At any rate, the Rockefellers and their Lower Manhattan faction began stabilizing their position only after they installed John F. Kennedy in the White House via considerable vote fraud. The U-2 affair had only delayed the potential threat of the combination of forces represented at the Paris meeting. It was decisively contained only after the watergating of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a wave of assassinations (including that of anti-Rockefeller Italian industrialist Enrico Mattei), and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Whatever the detailed arrangements were between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the deal that defused the thermonuclear confrontation over Cuba involved the following strategic exchange:

The Soviet Union undertook to oppose any scheme for a Gaullist Europe and the United States would give guarantees for the continued existence of the Cuban state (and would also withdraw certain missiles from Turkey and Italy).

After that affair, the Rockefellers' consolidation for the remainder of the decade depended on (1) destroying the threat posed to monetarist interests by American traditionalist-industrial capitalists; (2) keeping Western Europe under monetarist hegemony or, failing that, keeping it destabilized; and (3) keeping, to the extent possible, the Soviet Rapallo-oriented, heavy-industry, high-technology factions away from policy making in the Kremlin.

For these objectives, the Rockefellers and their monetarist allies launched and promoted a far-reaching array of projects that comprise most of the history of the 1960s. In 1963 Kennedy's National Security Council under McGeorge Bundy launched the Institute for Policy Studies to coordinate a broad range of operations known as "The New Left" with vast funding from such philanthropic organizations as the Ford Foundation, the J.M. Kaplan Fund, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Rabinowitz Foundation, and so on. This "New Left" operation created a synthetic lumpen and petit bourgeois "movement" directed against the Rockefellers' traditionalist-conservative opponents, both Republican and Democratic.

The Vietnam War itself, initiated by President Kennedy, was rapidly transformed into a project primarily aimed at destroying the Rockefellers' domestic political opposition. The myth of the military industrial complex was relaunched by the Institute for Policy Studies and by such Rockefeller agents in the Communist Party USA as Victor Perlo and Herbert Aptheker, among others!

A cursory review of events during the first five years of the 1960s indicates that the propaganda channeling sequence that manufactured and spread the military industrial complex myth was National Security Council — Institute for Policy Studies — CPUSA — World Marxist Review — International Affairs, with many other parallel and overlapping conduits and institutions suckered into the operation.

Victor Perlo — an agent of Morgan Guaranty since at least 1938, who "joined" the CPUSA after that party's complete takeover by the FBI in 1957-58 — played a key role in disorienting Soviet political leaders during the time when de Gaulle and Adenauer were attempting to organize an effective opposition to Rockefeller. In an article published in Moscow's International Affairs entitled "The Alliance of German and American Militarists," Perlo presented the notorious thesis that Adenauer and the German industrialists he represented are incorrigible Nazi revanchists bent on war against the Soviet Union.

This was merely one of a barrage of analyses with which the CPUSA flooded Soviet publications, on orders from the National Security Council. Since "Rockefeller" and "finance capital" had disappeared from party jargon, writers such as Art Shields, in *International Affairs* (No. 1, 1962) wrote gems like: "The shadow of the Pentagon hangs over the United States as 1962 begins. Its power has mushroomed to enormous size behind the fog of cold war...."

Doctor Herbert Aptheker himself, the party's most egregious case of constipation, contributed an auspicious analysis late in 1963 where he definitively identified two currents in United States foreign policy — one the horrible militarist right wing and the other the group forced to recognize reality (à la Lippman) and seeking compromise by negotiation....

Arbatov: Some Substance To Charges

Georgii Arbatov closed out a three-week U.S. tour April 27 with a speech before the American Association of Scientists in Washington, D.C. While during his trip he had retailed a version of the Carter Administration's fraudulent "sleeping giant" threat of a U.S. military-technological take-off should Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) completely fail (see EIR No. 16), Arbatov was apparently overcome with the realization that if Carter's provocative policy and the definitive Soviet response continue, he and his services on behalf of "détente" will be rendered superfluous. "Détente" is now "in danger," Arbatov announced, and U.S.-Soviet relations are moving into a "cold war pattern."

Concurrent reports that the Soviet Union is making it known through numerous channels that the USSR is unimpressed with the "sleeping giant" claim in particular suggest that Arbatov has come under strong pressure from Moscow as well. In his Washington speech, he stuck closely to the formulations of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in describing Carter's SALT packages as unacceptable. The arms proposals of Carter and Vance would have given the U.S. a unilateral advantage, he said. Arbatov also followed the Soviet party line on the

"dissidents" question, where he stressed three points. First, that the Soviet "dissidents" are financed by powerful foreign institutions. Second that these institutions are working in collaboration with the U.S. government. And finally, that these activities are endorsed by the President of the United States.

Turning to potential "areas for agreement," Arbatov returned to his usual amiability vis-à-vis particular Carter proposals. Three areas for speedy agreement are a total test ban treaty, an Indian Ocean demilitarization plan, and a ban on development of new weapons systems, he said. Carter's Indian Ocean scheme has been denounced roundly in the Soviet military daily *Red Star* and the "no new weapons" proposal, although one version has been put forward by Soviet leader Brezhnev, has been the framework for the U.S. demanding curtailment of Soviet Research and Development.

Following his presentation, Arbatov was presented with a copy of "Open the Arbatov File," the exposé printed here. Professing his own innocence of its charges, Arbatov admitted that "there may be some substance" to what it has to say about Victor Perlo and Gus Hall of the Communist Party USA.

The Gullibility of the Soviet Union

Georgi Arbatov, who served on the board of the World Marxist Review from 1960 to 1962 played an instrumental role in helping disseminate the Kennedy-National Security Council line on the military industrial complex. So did many others whose careers were launched by Nikita Khrushchev's efforts to get the Soviet Union out of its isolation into the world arena. According to all available indications, up to the very end of his life Khrushchev retained that particular blind spot that never allowed him to see "whom he was dealing with." We have no reason to believe that Khrushchev solved the U-2 riddle, nor that he ever understood that Kennedy was nothing more than an instrument of Rockefeller interests; to the end Khrushchev believed that Kennedy meant well, that he wanted peace but he was pressured by certain "dark forces," perhaps the "military industrial complex," perhaps others.

The intelligence that Khrushchev was getting on the United States was downright lousy. However, much of this incompetence in Soviet intelligence was of his own making. His single biggest mistake was probably his purge of Marshal Georgi Zhukov in 1957. There is little doubt that Marshal Zhukov's personal friendship with General Eisenhower was the fruit of a keen Clausewitzian tradition in the Soviet General Staff, from Tukhachevsky, to Zhukov himself, to Admiral Gorshkov today. This tradition, embedded in a profound, humanist-scientific conception of national interest as it applies to the USSR and national interst in general, has identified the Rockefellers and the monetarist faction as their "probable adversary."

There should be no doubt at this time that the Soviet General Staff perceives as its enemy not the United States as a nation, but the Rockefellers as an international faction. This is crucial.

In the days of Khrushchev, however, the factional clout of this tendency in the Soviet leadership was under intense pressure. From the 20th Congress onward, Khrushchev was pushing intensely for a drastic de-emphasis of heavy industry in favor of the agricultural and chemical sector. His immediate opponents turned out to be those sophisticated political layers associated with the high-technology, capital-intensive industries related to defense production.

Contrary to naive opinion, the opposition of these layers to Khrushchev's perspectives was not the result of bureaucratic intradepartmental rivalries but rather of more sophisticated outlook of economic organization and international political realities imparted to them as a result of their special responsibilities. Their weakness was that their more viable public spokesmen tended to be from the military — a result of historical circumstances and also an indication of their weak political cohesion.

Khrushchev's most convenient expedient for curbing this opposition was to go after its most organized and numerically more limited core, the military. Marshal Zhukov's removal was followed by the Yuri Popov affair in the GRU, the Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. The exposure of Lieutenant Colonel Popov as a presumed CIA agent opened the GRU to a massive purge under Ivan Serov, a high KGB official whom Khrushchev had placed at the head of the GRU. The notorious Penkovsky Affair that preceded and followed

the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 helped remove the exceptionally incompetent General I. Serov. Serov was replaced by Khrushchev's special "de-Stalinizer," General Ivashutin, who is presumed to have totally crippled the GRU's ability for impartial professional evaluation untainted by the political expediencies of the moment.

The Penkovsky affair still remains a highly dubious proposition. Whether Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was really a CIA-MI6 agent or merely a politically manipulated pawn is unknown to us, as is his ultimate fate. What is very well known, however, is much more significant in terms of political impact. The Penskovsky Affair put an enormous amount of pressure on the Soviet General Staff at precisely the time when Khrushchev was consummating his agreement with Kennedy to betray the West European Rapalloist factions.

Viewed from this light, one is justified in asking certain questions about Dzherman Gvishiani, the chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, who at the time was Penkovsky's superior.

Khrushchev's dilemma of "guns-versus-butter" was only relatively a real one. In a sense the dilemma had existed since the formation of the Soviet Republic and it exists even today. Khruschev's mistake during his tenure was identical with that committed today by the "agricultural faction" that is opposed to the transferruble strategy proposed by the Labor Committees. Khrushchev confined his range of choices exclusively within the realm of available Soviet resources. Hence, he was compelled to opt for constraint in the rate of growth of heavy industry in order to speed up growth in agriculture and the consumer sector generally. This was self-defeating then, as it is today.

To justify laxity in defense production, Khrushchev had to seek international detente. This is a laudible objective only if it is pursued by seasoned professionals who know whom they are dealing with. Khrushchev, when it came to knowing whom he is dealing with among the world's capitalist factions, was a helpless babe-inthe-woods. The havoc he wrought in the Soviet intelligence establishment further aggravated his special shortcoming.

The end result was the continuing myth, to this day, of the military-industrial complex bogeyman.

It should be noted, however, that toward the end of 1964 when Khrushchev was removed, he was removed by the currently ruling coalition, a group representing a balanced emphasis on heavy capital construction, vigorous pursuit of a war-winning strategic capability, a moderate emphasis on chemical industry and agriculture, and a reemphasis of special detente relations with Western Europe to remedy the damage done by Khrushchev's "harebrained scheming."

The key difference between Khrushchev and his successors on defense and industrial strategy was that he ultimately had no idea of the unique function of sustained technological renewal in a modern economy. His defense policy was once and for all to achieve a credible deterrent and leave it there, he staunchly opposed the pursuit of marginal, war-winning capabilities. His economic policy was to inhibit the further growth of high-technology, capital-intensive sectors in favor of the

consumer sector.

Khrushchev's successors, in their commitment to continuing, deliberate emphasis on technological innovation, properly identified the solution to both the butter-versus-guns dilemma and to their pursuit of the marginal strategic advantages that ultimately account for nuclear war-winning. Contrary to popular prejudices, nuclear war-winning capabilities are attainable only as by-products of a serious commitment to broad-based, general theoretical scientific research — a point very well understood both by the late Marshal Grechko and by U.S. General Keegan.

The Soviet leadership after Khrushchev, however, had to apply their relatively sophisticated solution to the combined resources-and-defense problem to a political situation severely constrained by one exceptionally limiting factor: their own primitive understanding of capitalist factional politics!

A case in point is the Brandt-Brezhnev deal. In the years following Khrushchev's fall, the Soviets opened a series of very positive initiatives toward Western Europe. They launched their proposals for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and for special economic cooperation between the European Economic Community and the CMEA, the socialist sector economic trade group, as blocs. The proposals included such sophisticated initiatives as the offer of the transfer ruble for interbloc transactions!

Things ultimately fell apart when the Rockefellers ordered then West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to launch his Ostpolitik as a way of containing the Soviet initiatives. Brandt's Ostpolitik was nothing but a filibustering set of counterproposals intended to be taken by the Soviets as a starting-point for a bargaining process that led nowhere. The Soviets took the bait and things remained static until the Rockefellers' October 1973 Oil Hoax; from there they deteriorated to the present point.

The Inconspicuous Mr. Arbatov

Through all the post-Khrushchev years the Soviet leadership operated under the handicap of being victims of the grand strategic deception of the "military industrial complex." Granted that certain leadership groupings probably knew better. The fact that the issue was not contested in party ranks, however, created new priorities and new loyalties in the various ministries and agencies, to the point where any real knowledge of the actual state of factional affairs in the United States had no bearing on reality. The Soviets have been hopelessly naive about American politics in the last 17 years — and before that they were worse than naive!

This naivete and ignorance was never a natural state of affairs. It was systematically induced and cultivated, from the very birth of the Soviet Republic. This is something well known not only among intelligence specialists but among many oldtimers and leaders of the CPSU. The party was contaminated by monetarist agents from its October days. The cases of monetarist agents Bukharin, Ryazanov, and Radek are merely exemplary of the special circumstances in which Lenin's voluntarist revolutionary impulse subverted the infamous Parvus plan and made the Russian Revolution a success.

The Kirov assassination, the Tukhachevsky Purge instigated by the German British-American agent Admiral Canaris, and the post-World War II Operation Splinter Factor are merely case studies of how imperialist agencies have manipulated the isolated Soviet Republic into fits of self-induced destabilizations. More generally, every communist and workers' party outside of the socialist sector historically has been penetrated by imperialist intelligence agencies, often more than one per party.

In point of fact, as part of imperialism's historical policy of containment, any Soviet agency and institution that had dealings with the outside world, either by way of party relations or for business of state, was sure to have to deal with agent-contaminated institutions. Ironically, the only institution of the Soviet Republic which by profession had to concern itself with the world situation but which did not have to come in direct contact with contaminated foreign institutions has been the armed forces and their general staff.

This is one of the reasons why the general tendency of this layer is to vacillate between the military hard line of crude (but otherwise effective) confrontation and commitment to war-winning, and the more sophisticated commitment to utilize all resources — political, economic, military — to destroy the international Rockefeller-monetarist faction, what East German Defense Minister Hoffmann has identified as the faction of international finance.

Georgi Arbatov exemplifies the general ambiance of mushheads in the international affairs department of the Central Committee and in the lower rungs of the Foreign Ministry-bureaucrats and careerists highly susceptible to imperialist psywar.

His years at the World Marxist Review indicate that he was a participant of the strategic deception operation aimed at the Soviet leadership. After that he was transferred to the Central Committee's Secretariat for International Relations under Boris Ponomarev where, in his contacts with Western communist parties, he could not help but be incessantly in contact with enemy agents. With respect to the CPUSA, his particular area of specialty, he could have contact only with Rockefeller agents. It is a matter of record that they brought him into contact with personnel from the Institute for Policy Studies, founded and functioning under U.S. National Security Council supervision. In point of fact, most of Arbatov's most authoritative reports to the Soviet press do not fail to include quotes from Institute founder Richard Barnet and other agents of the National Security Council — especially when it comes to "exposing" the military industrial complex.

When Arbatov's USA-Canada Institute was founded in 1967-68, it made its primary task to rely heavily and exclusively on Rockefeller-controlled sources of information about the United States. Later on, this practice was supplemented by regular meetings between Arbatov, Richard Barnet and David Rockefeller. Arbatov also considers himself a proud participant in the so-called Pugwash Movement organized by McGeorge Bundy, the

National Security Council director who founded the Institute for Policy Studies.

It was somewhere in the context of these meetings that Arbatov was directly recruited. This is something that the appropriate Soviet agencies must conclusively determine.

Justifiably, the question arises, isn't it possible that Mr. Arbatov is simply a foolish dupe who has naively fallen for the military industrial complex line? Can it be that a man with such a personal stake in the Soviet order is an outright agent? After all, he is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Our conclusion is yes, Arbatov is a conscious agent. The criteria we have used are his personal intellectual qualifications, his moral quality as it is known to us from his public record, the special functions to which he owes his post-academic career and, most important, the litmus test of certain well-timed political interventions during the current period.

With respect to his current behavior, Arbatov personally, and his institute generally, have presented to the Soviet public a highly and especially distorted picture of what the Carter Administration is. Of all the information available in the American press about Jimmy Carter and David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission, Arbatov's institute has edited out everything and presented only the Trilateral Commission's line on Carter.

Any knowledgeable observer of the United States since Nov. 2, 1976 knows that this country is in the clutches of a fascist beast that is struggling to impose fascist economics. Yet, Arbatov, in his recent appearance in Boston, actually sided with Jimmy Carter to call for an end of technological progress. During his present stay in the United States, he is actively aiding and abetting this nation's fascist enemy. The struggle of the American working class and U.S. industrialists for industrial progress, against Carter's fascist energy program is systematically edited out of the analyses of Arbatov's Institute or is distorted to appear as "right-wing reaction."

The consequences of his activities are not inconsiderable. If the Soviet government, for example, is fooled into not aiding the West Europeans to build their nuclear energy industry despite Carter's sabotage, this by itself could guarantee ultimate Rockefeller control of that continent this year and imposition of fascist economies before the end of the year. The strategic implications of such an eventuality for the Soviet Union need not be spelled out here.

Arbatov's present meddling in the international situation is no tomfoolery. He is actively contributing to the enemy's ongoing deployments. This alone is sufficient evidence of his agentry.

This does not necessarily make him an extremely dangerous man. It is more than possible at this time that the Soviet leadership is deliberately allowing him to run around in this fashion in order to achieve a deception effect at the Rockefellers' expense. Just as in the case of classic espionage agentry, among the modern craft of "agents of influence," there is such a thing as a "playback agent."

We do not think that Arbatov is useful as a "play-back

agent. More useful would be an official investigation of his role and his treasonous activities.

One of the more useful features of such an investigation would be the establishment of rigorous rules and political criteria for the practice of reliable political intelligence.

If such criteria had been in force, no person responsible for authoring such a book as Mr. Arbatov's amoral The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations would even be allowed to get near the doorsteps of the CPSU's Central Committee.

-Criton Zoakos