

above-cited funding umbrella.

NSC Muscle

The Trilateral Commission is finding it difficult, however, to ram totally unsubstantiated charges down the throats of any but its most unscrupulous press organs. Goldwater's threat to sue for libel is accelerating the desertion from the smear campaign. The following are statements from editors who refused to print the IRE-FIJ allegations against Goldwater:

***In a front-page editorial statement, the *Arizona Republic*, Arizona's largest paper and Don Bolles' former newspaper, stated that the stories contained "statements and allegations" that the *Republic* had not been "able to obtain sufficient documentation and proof of to justify publication." The *Republic* and the *Phoenix*

Gazette further disclaimed any connection with the project that issued the fabricated charges.

***Benjamin Bradlee, the executive editor of the *Washington Post* commenting on the lack of evidence for the charges on Goldwater stated, "My favorite paragraph says (in part 3 of the series) 'police also have a report from an informant who overheard a complaint by Joseph (papa Joe) Tocco, operator of a restaurant that serves as a post office for Chicago crime syndicate transplants, that Rosenzweig and other businessmen had prostitution so locked up that the Cosa Nostra could get only a small bit of the action.' Here you have an anonymous police officer quoting an unnamed informant who overheard an unspecified complaint in a restaurant by a crook. You can't get away with that..."

EXCLUSIVE

The LEAA Report On Disorders And Terrorism

The March 2 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's (LEAA) "Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism" predicts increased terrorism of an ever more alarming nature, presents a blueprint for emergency powers as a law enforcement response to these situations, and in a special appendix presented by the BDM Corporation, details U.S. scenarios for a phased introduction into "high-technology" terrorism. As such, the Report is a manual for implementation of a U.S. police state, through a controlled terrorist onslaught against the American population.

The LEAA, created in 1968 on prompting from the Ford Foundation, has been the domestic police arm which has penetrated and entirely taken over operations against local law enforcement agencies. That unconstitutional role of the LEAA and other related agencies continues. The Task Force report proposes the integration of this LEAA function into a broader, state-by-state, city-by-city, "counter-terror" legislative apparatus.

Last week's Executive Intelligence Review identified the key individuals responsible for the Report; notably New Jersey Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Jerry V. Wilson, and the report's author: H.H.A. Cooper, and the reader is referred to that section and this issue's section on terrorist profilers, planners, controllers and institutions.

The Report was issued right before the Hanafi sect's siege in Washington, D.C. and other terrorist incidents around the country. The following quote, taken from the Report's concluding chapter, summarizes that theme:

"Given the historical character of civil disturbances in the United States it seems safe to predict that they will continue to recur with regularity, for much the same reasons as they have occurred in the past. Economic conditions and labor unrest must always be particular causes for concern. Many of the traditional indicators for disorders are clearly present and need but little stimulus to activate them. The contagion factor in civil distur-

bances is strong, and outbreaks of violence, especially in settings such as university campuses, quickly produce imitators elsewhere. The strength of ethnic sentiment over issues such as school busing should not be overlooked as a disorder-producing factor....Violence breeds violence, and in a potentially explosive atmosphere, sentiment over quite minor issues might well become difficult to control without recourse to repressive measures. The present tranquility is deceptive; it is urged that it not be taken as a sign that disorder in the United States is a thing of the past...."

The "Standards and Goals" of the Task Force Report are excerpted at length below and need little explanation. The excerpts are not intended to supply the reader with every facet of the 661-page report, but instead represent the key features of that report from two standpoints:

- 1) *Providing information that is indispensable for competent executive evaluation.*
- 2) *Identifying those aspects of the Report which stand out in glaring violation of the principles of the U.S. Constitution.*

Standards and Goals for Non-Criminal Justice System Civil Authorities

Employment of Military Force

Civil authorities should develop a clear, publicly declared policy on the calling out and employment of military forces in the event of an emergency situation involving civil disorder, terrorism, or other acts of extraordinary violence....

The appropriate military authorities should be included in the general interagency planning process....The civil authority, however, subject to these general considerations, should avoid interference with tactical and operational decisions that might need to be

taken by the military forces in implementation of their mandate to restore order....

The growing threat of international terrorism and its domestic imitators and the need for a response beyond the capabilities of the civil authority raises serious questions that need to be faced with realism. The United States thus far has not experienced the type of terrorism that has threatened the very existence of some Latin America countries or that has so radically altered the quality of life even in some quite stable European countries....Experience elsewhere has shown that when terrorism and political violence reach a certain level of intensity, the only appropriate response is a military one....

Standards and Goals for the Legislatures

Other Counterterrorist Measures Undertaken By Intelligence Units or Agencies

...A policy review board under the authority of the Attorney General of the United States or the State attorney general, where appropriate, should examine practices and procedures and lay down guidelines for the proper exercise of the powers conferred by the legislation.

Emergency Powers

In situations of emergency....it may be necessary to enact special laws conferring on the appropriate authorities a variety of emergency powers to cope with problems....

Emergency legislation is, by nature, promulgated to meet a sudden, unusual situation that calls for an unusually rapid response. Such legislation will not therefore, be the product of the full, public debate generally accorded issues of considerable importance under ordinary, democratic processes. Because of the urgency of the need, some of the procedures that would allow for the expression of differing viewpoints will have to be curtailed....

Some consideration should be given the possibility of standardizing emergency legislation nationally, so as to avoid the disparities of emergency powers that exist at present throughout the country....

Legislators should consider the desirability of providing law enforcement officers, under specified conditions of emergency, the power to arrest without warrant for probable cause in all cases where a serious offense has been committed by some person and power to detain and question persons for a reasonable period where it appears that certain specified offenses detrimental to the public security have been or are likely to be committed.

The threat of terrorism presents problems of search and seizure with which ordinary law enforcement powers may not be adequate to cope....

A legislative clarification and enlargement of law enforcement powers under clearly defined emergency conditions should be considered...

Emergency legislation should be contemplated that would give law enforcement officers, acting in pursuance of their duties, the power of search without warrant...

Emergency legislation should be considered that would give law enforcement officers, acting in pursuance of their duties, the power to detain any offender, where there has been a breach of the peace not amounting to a felony or a serious misdemeanor....

Standards and Goals for the Courts

Judicial Participation in Planning for Response to Extraordinary Violence

...Members or representatives of the judiciary (particularly administrative judges and their designees) should cooperate actively with police and other law enforcement agencies in devising:

a. plans for arrest, detention, and expeditious processing of large numbers of persons in mass disorder situations;

b. In general, the classic approach of American courts to the solution of management problems can be characterized as a fairly ad hoc approach, paralleling the case-by-case approach to the resolution of jurisprudential issues, which is an integral concept of Anglo-American law. This classic approach, while perhaps satisfactory for ordinary court business, is relatively dysfunctional in major law enforcement emergencies or in the course of judicial proceedings involving special risks. The thrust of this standard is in direct opposition to that ad hoc approach to problem solving....

Pretrial Release Policies for Disorder Emergencies

...It is recommended that, in emergencies involving large numbers of arrests, adoption of the following judicial policies and practices be considered:

1. Modification or suspension of judicially authorized pretrial early release procedures, such as collateral deposit or citation, which permit early release without court hearings in routine cases, when their use is inconsistent with emergency conditions....

5. Implementation of procedures permitting detention on the basis of danger to the community where authorized by legislation, in selected cases....

High Technology Terrorism Scenarios

Terrorism and New Technologies of Destruction: An Overview of the Potential Risk

R. W. Mengel, The BDM Corporation

The range of technologies available to terrorists and the potential consequences of its use are becoming progressively greater, to include deadly and often more exotic forms, such as chemical and biological agents, lasers, and precision-guided munitions....

Improved Technologies

Evidence supports the contention that terrorists are not availing themselves of the present technologies....However, the increased liaison among terrorist groups and heightened awareness of the possible application of improved technologies pose the

potential for escalation....

First, there probably will not be a significantly large technological jump made at any single point; rather, incremental improvements on existing technologies will occur. For example, the use of precision-guided weapons would probably be preceded by the introduction of large-caliber, longer range rockets or mortars as terrorist weapons. Second, improvements on existing technologies will primarily affect law enforcement rather than the community as a whole. The changes wrought by advancing types of technology will not materially change the nature of terrorism, the ends to be achieved, or the means; nor is it likely that the patterns of target selection will be significantly altered.

....Terrorists can be expected to employ explosives with greater destruction power in smaller quantities. Examples of other improvements along this continuum are: The introduction or upgrading of communications and jamming equipment; the use of remote control, even wireless command detonation units; the employment of wire-guided munitions; the development of computer models and simulations to anticipate law enforcement actions and to determine system vulnerabilities; and the use of advanced electronic systems to counter physical protection measures.

New Technologies

In the foreseeable future, new technologies that might be applied by terrorists appear to focus on the types of weaponry using nuclear, chemical, or biological materials....

In marked contrast to nuclear technologies, in which fabrication poses a greater difficulty than delivery, chemical technologies are rather easily developed, but actual delivery presents the most significant difficulty. Because of these delivery problems and the quantities of substances required, chemical technologies are potentially restricted to a much smaller scale in terms of application and casualty-producing effects.

There are many highly toxic substances usable for creating mass casualties whose components are commercially available to an apparently legitimate "front" organization. Three toxic chemicals exemplify the range of technologies available: the fluoroacetates, because preparation is relatively simple; the nerve gases, because they are so widely known; and botulinum toxin (BTX), because of its extreme lethality....

Unlike nuclear technologies, whose use is limited by the availability of material, and unlike chemical technologies, which are practically limited by delivery problems, biological technologies are quite adaptable to demonstration attacks on small, isolated targets, while retaining a capacity of a larger attack. The range of potential lethality within the spectrum of biological agents is indicative, in part, of the difficulty in preparation, delivery and dissemination problems, and resilience under differing environmental and meteorological conditions.

Objective Consequences

Requiring the least amount of resources to manufacture of the technologies examined, the use of chemical agents would result in the fewest casualties because of

the necessity for unique target vulnerability and the difficulty associated with dissemination. Four methods of dissemination appear plausible:

1. Covert contamination of foodstuffs or beverages with bulk agent;
2. Covert generation of lethal vapor concentrations in an enclosed area;
3. Covert dissemination of aerosols in an enclosed area;
4. Overt-covert attack in open areas....

An attack on a selected outside population target is extremely sensitive to environmental conditions, the nature of the agent, and the form of attack employed. For example, a chemical bomb exploded in a busy terminal would undoubtedly kill hundreds; an attack on a stadium full of football fans using a low-flying crop-duster-type aircraft might kill thousands; aerosol dissemination by means of a smoke generator located in a van cruising the streets might kill tens of thousands. However, to accomplish an attack on an outside target as outlined above with only a moderate degree of success would require tens of gallons of agent and appropriate, although not necessarily ideal, environmental conditions. Even rudimentary calculations of casualties and other effects are extremely difficult to arrive at, and even they would be tenuous. On balance, it is clear that, if an attack is kept within what a terrorist group might reasonably undertake, the practicalities of chemical technologies would limit the resultant exposure to no more than a few thousand individuals at one time....

Using either anthrax or cryptococcosis, an attacker might simply drive through a medium-sized city using a truck-mounted dispenser. During spring or summer this type of apparatus would not raise questions in most locales. Anyone exposed for 2 minutes would probably inhale enough to be infected. Not all the victims would receive lethal doses, but the medical care problems associated with tens of thousands of cases of anthrax infection in themselves would be catastrophic for a community.

Smaller attacks could be successfully launched against large crowds that remain in enclosed spaces for 2 or 3 hours. The proliferation of domed stadiums has provided a series of ideal targets. For football and baseball games, these structures usually seat more than 70,000 persons. Using approximately 1 fluid ounce of either anthrax or cryptococcosis in aerosol form would result in the inhalation of an infective dose within an hour....

Unlike the use of chemical and biological technologies, terrorist employment of nuclear technologies would involve delivery problems that are relatively easy to solve....

For comparison, plutonium is approximately 10 times as toxic as nerve gas; anthrax is about 10 times more toxic than plutonium; and BTX lethality, measured in submicrogram quantities, is more than a thousandfold greater than anthrax....

Assuming a surface burst of about 1 KT, using a truck as the probable means of delivery to the target, the damage in a downtown area of a major city would be in excess of 100,000 immediate fatalities from the blast and destruction totaling in the billions of dollars....

Subjective Consequences

An incident involving chemical, biological, or nuclear technologies would certainly have significant ramifications for local and higher level governmental officials. But it will be public reaction that would drive, to a great extent, these officials. Thus, it is important to at least place these subjective consequences in perspective with respect to threatened incidents prior to the first actual use of new technologies and the possible impact of that first incident upon subsequent events....

Once it is necessary to involve the entire community in countering threats of new-technology terrorism, the general fear level of the community will have been raised. Regardless of the outcome of that immediate threat, changes in society will have been wrought. Given the likely media coverage of a high-technology event, the effect of reacting on a community-wide basis would be experienced as a precedent by all local leaders involved with future threats, whether in the affected community or not. Equally as significant is the probability of an epidemic effect once it has been demonstrated that a threat resulted in a widespread reaction. As evidenced by event data on hijackings, bombings, and even kidnappings, often a rash of similar incidents or threats follows a widely publicized terrorist act.

Until a threat is actually carried out or a threat is permitted to impact on the community as a whole, it seems unlikely that any change in public fear will result. Although the nuclear safeguards debate has highlighted a full range of catastrophic dangers, there has been relatively little reaction from the public, including those communities in the vicinity of the 55 operational nuclear power plants. There is no evidence of a general exodus from plant areas nor even any sign of shrinking property values. Once an incident occurs, changes in public fear will be primarily a function of the damage, casualties, and societal psychological impact....

First, the local consequences of acts are far greater

than the nonlocal consequences. Particularly with respect to the overall level of concern and fear, locales impacted upon directly by events have reacted by taking preventive measures. Nonlocal populations have reacted with sympathy and even bitterness, but implementation of new measures has been limited. Second, it is unlikely that public fear will increase until after an event occurs. Threats have not resulted in significant societal changes....the communities subjected to new-technology terrorism will accept increased safeguards and the concomitant decrease in civil liberties. The paramount concern of society is to protect itself from known consequences. Society will seldom act until after some consequences have been demonstrated, particularly consequences of a local character, but society will be susceptible to changes in its norms, values, and structure once an event has been experienced.

Panic

Of greatest importance to law enforcement and local authorities are those conditions that are most conducive to creating panic situations. Foremost, the threat must be sudden and unexpected, posing a danger that would be sufficient enough to cause immediate and intense fear. The threat must be direct and localized. Other factors contributing to panic include a population that believes there is a danger for which they are unprepared and which is beyond the capacity of normal behavior responses to adequately treat. Elements of novelty or incomprehensibility increase the tendency to panic. Confusion with respect to the general situation and specifics, such as escape, avoidance, and counteraction, directly impact on the likelihood of community panic. Finally, not only must the population be aware of their helpless situation — no escape routes, no information, bewildering uncertainty — but community leadership in the form of an authoritative, realistic response must be absent....

'We Have Not Had A Massive Well-Directed Onslaught, But It Must Come.'

The following are highlights of a March 14 interview with Professor H. H. A. "Tony" Cooper, terrorist profiler and planner at American University Institute for Advanced Studies in Justice in Washington, D.C., who authored the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's March 2 "Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism." While the interview in many ways parallels the LEAA's report, the New York-based researcher who conducted the interview wanted to underline Cooper's personal disregard for the U.S. Constitution.

Professor Cooper, like many of the current terrorist

planners, profilers, and controllers in the U.S., is a British subject who has been granted covert Interpol responsibility for planning high-technology terrorism.

Q: Let me start with the recent LEAA report which I understand you took a part in.

A: Yes, I fear I was responsible for that.

Q: What are the key aspects of the report?

A: It depends on the audience you're addressing. If you're looking at this from the point of view of "responses to terrorism," which is what we were really