

# Is 'Aura Of Power' Admiral Turner An Intelligence Incompetent?

by Bob Cohen

Writing in the January 1977 issue of the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Jimmy Carter's nominee to head the CIA, explicitly defends the Schlesingerian doctrine of bluff to manipulate "Soviet perceptions" of U.S. military fighting effectiveness and then incredibly claims (against the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III's, public evaluation) a U.S. strategic advantage in "naval warfighting capability" over the Soviets.

Even more incredibly, he bases the latter "estimate" principally upon an alleged U.S. technological superiority — and, manages to completely ignore Soviet breakthroughs in laser and fusion technologies which retiring Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed now admits give the Soviets capability to inflict very serious damage on U.S. surveillance and communication satellites and leave the U.S. "dumb and blind" in a global war.

Turner, projecting his own *monetarist* axiomatic world-view onto the *industrially-based* USSR, also argues that the Soviets are fundamentally a new "nineteenth century imperialism" who model their strategy on the American (mercantilist) Admiral Mahan and "recall how Great Britain and the United States successfully supported imperialist adventures with their fleets in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."

Still thinking in the outmoded framework of the first two world wars, it is hardly surprising that the CFR Admiral in his article "The Naval Balance: Not Just A Numbers Game" fails to even discuss the question of the Soviets preparations and commitment to fight a total (integrated land-air-sea) thermonuclear war in any showdown confrontation with the U.S. (he argues from the incompetent view of mutual strategic deterrence) and he, of course, hysterically denies the existence of an (actual) Soviet marginal nuclear warfighting advantage.

In the event that the Trilateral Commission's Carter Administration manages to plunge or blunder a *deindustrialized* United States into a nuclear war in its desperate worldwide effort to collect the debt for Chase Manhattan, Turner offers the following Maginot line-like solace: "...our national purpose is principally to keep the peace if we can, and if we cannot, to protect ourselves from storms, and to help our friends to protect themselves."

The question naturally arises: should a man who demonstrates such a lack of competent grasp on fundamental strategic issues be entrusted with the highest intelligence post in the land?

## Who Is Admiral Turner?

The Trilateral Commission's effort to undermine U.S. intelligence capability in behalf of their insane nuclear confrontation-from-weakness policy, set back when conservative traditionalists shot down charlatan Theodore Sorensen, gained fresh momentum this past week as usually alert pro-development political, industrial, and military leading circles showed a foolish predisposition to swallow Jimmy Carter's nomination of Rockefeller Admiral and Council on Foreign Relations member, the dubious Stansfield Turner, to head the CIA — simply because of his military stripes.

The babbling puppet Carter himself announced the appointment with manic visions of World War III dancing in his peanut brain alluding to his nominee as "the next General Marshall" — a telling reference to the CFR's armchair World War II general who was also one of the architects of finance capitals' post-war proto-looting scheme which bears his name.

Indeed, Admiral Turner is the product of careful Eastern Establishment grooming — Oxford College in England, Harvard Business School, the presidency of the Naval War College (where he boasts of 'innovating' by bringing in 'intellectuals' like his friend Herman Wouk, author of the horrendous 'The Caine Mutiny'), membership in the CFR, writer for publications like *Foreign Affairs*, and so forth.

Not surprisingly, the *New York Times*, Trilateral columnist Carl Rowan, Naderite politician Sen. Gary Hart (D-Col), and Turner's sponsor Rockefeller Rhode Island Republican John Chafee led the hosannas for the CFR Admiral, hailing him as "the military man with a conscience," boosting Carter's "brilliant compromise appointment," and reassuring the Fabian faithful that the nomination "establishes no precedent for military leadership at the CIA."

Granting that Stansfield Turner is not a blithering idiot on the order of Theodore Sorensen, the Trilateral's first choice, and could *conceivably* be won to a national self-interest (Clausewitzian) strategic outlook — nonetheless, everything about Turner's background and stated fantasy-laden pro-financier views indicates that the likelihood is that *at best* he would serve as a hometown umpire in favor of the traitorous Rockefeller

bankrupt financial interests on close calls involving the national interest within the intelligence community.

#### *Aura of Power*

Congressmen concerned that the United States government receive an honest and high quality intelligence product will want to review Turner's Foreign Affairs article and ask the appropriate questions. One critical question is does Turner think the truth about the present (marginal) U.S. strategic inferiority and its economic and technological causes must be hidden from the nation in order to project a big bluff — a phony "aura of power"?

Turner's utopian monetarist psychological wargame approach to strategic intelligence is apparent throughout: "We even hear Paul Revere-style rhetoric: "The United States is being left behind with a second-rate navy!"

... "Whether or not any particular force succeeds in influencing the actions of others will depend on subjective perceptions which may be based on numbers, on superficial appearances (size of ships, new versus old, etc.), or techniques of employment, or simply on the rhetoric which accompanies the fleet's arrival. That perception may or may not be an accurate appraisal of what would happen if shells started flying. But if the bluff is called and fighting ensues, presence has failed and must be succeeded either by combat or by backing down..."

"And as our Navy constricts and draws back from traditional deployment patterns, the Soviet Navy has been demonstrating increasingly imaginative and frequent global deployment of forces in response to developments in international politics — as in Angola, Mozambique, the Indian Ocean and West Africa. It seems a confirmation of the claim that we are a declining sea power and that they are a growing and restive one. The invalidity of that claim is academic if it is universally believed.

"The nature of the debate in Washington over the budget tends to abet this impression. To ensure adequate appropriations for warfighting needs, our leaders point to the Soviet's naval expansion, their increasing presence in former Western preserves and their dedication to further naval growth...the formidable qualities of the threat are stressed; the available means to counter it perhaps slighted. We run the risk today of losing on the 'preience front' unless we counter these negative impressions by exercising care in our public discussions. A doomsday picture convincingly drawn for a congressional budgetary committee may negatively influence other nations' perceptions of our naval effectiveness..."

Since the Soviet leadership regularly reads *Foreign Affairs* who does Turner think he is fooling and why? What is he hiding and whose interests is he protecting?

#### *Fairy Tale Warfare*

The incompetence demonstrated in his discussion of genuine warfighting is just as shocking. As every sophomore not working for Rand or the CFR knows, if the Soviets are provoked by the insane Carter Trilateraloids (whose genocidal debt collection policies

create an *irrepressible conflict*) into attacking the U.S., they will launch a total air-land-sea first nuclear strike which among other things will kill 160 million Americans in the first hour of general war. Yet Turner's "assessment" of "the naval balance" fantastically abstracts from this reality and analyzes naval warfare in terms of four essentially formal and separate categories — strategic deterrence, naval presence, sea control, and projection of power ashore — giving the U.S. the advantage!

Turner suggests the Navy's mission should be denying "Soviet imperialism" sea lanes!

In terms of the one "category" he goes seriously into, "sea control" — which in the *real* warfighting described above means Soviet capability to thwart an American second strike retaliation from the critical U.S. nuclear submarine force — Turner at first remarks: "Sea denial is essentially guerrilla warfare at sea." Later Turner (in passing) lets reality finally seep through, contradicting his own thesis though he quickly backs off and covers-up: "...the Soviet's big advantage is their option to launch a preemptive strike. Ships of both navies regularly operate in the vicinity of one another since there are no boundaries at sea. An attack could be launched with virtually no warning from point-blank range. The timeliness and quality of intelligence estimates, and our ability to identify subtle changes in Soviet operational patterns, will determine whether or not the Soviets can successfully carry out such a preemptive strike. Present trends toward declining numbers of both submarines and carrier aircraft have to be faced in the glare of these facts."

#### *The Admiral's Trilateral Friends*

When Turner comes to the question of defining the Navy's mission, he uses all the key and code phrases that let his *Foreign Affairs* readership know that he is the fascist Trilateral Commission's boy.

First he advertises that he is in tune with the Carter Administration's deindustrialization program: "...meantime there is growing competition at home for military expenditures, especially when there are so many social demands on our national resources."

Then Turner puts out a call to the Marcus Raskin-Noam Chomsky Institute for Policy Studies Fabian crowd for help in containing savvy military professionals from arriving at a Clausewitzian approach to national policy: "Civilian thinkers, in turn, are not providing the help that they could. The estrangement of much of the intellectual and academic segment of our society from the professional military over the Vietnam War has damaged the respectability of defense as a worthy area of discussion, writing and study..."

"Professional opinion is pressed hard on the technical military issues; civilian opinion has to think hard on matters of national policy; and from this interaction arises the consensus essential to the support of whatever level of naval forces is selected."

Congress has a solemn responsibility to determine whether Admiral Stansfield Turner has the independence and competence to serve the national interest in one of the most important posts in government.