

for debt moratorium" deal both safeguards Japanese oil supplies against the U.S. cartels' manipulation and represents a continuation of Japan's efforts to steadily improve relations with OPEC, of which Indonesia is a member.

The government has also come out recently in support

of the Soviet efforts to ban the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, a proposal NATO officially denounced. The government announced on Dec. 10 that Takuya Kubo, a major opponent of the pro-Schlesinger head of the nation's Defense Agency, would be appointed the director of the Cabinets National Defense Council, Japan's supreme policymaking body for defense affairs.

## Confounded, Western "China Watchers" Become Blind, Deaf, Dumb

Dec. 15 — A series of NSIPS interviews has confirmed the impression given by the commentaries and analytical articles printed since the anti-Maoist purge began on Oct. 7 of this year — events are changing much faster in China than the minds of China watchers can keep up with.

Very few analysts have discerned the unmistakable evidence of a raging faction fight at the central level in Peking, or the clear emergence of a new ruling group from the Army largely based on long-time personal ties going back to the 1920s and 30s. In fact, this Army-centered grouping, with support from most of the Party, and grouped around remaining old marshals, Long March generals, and their immediate subordinates, is the driving force behind the purge of the Maoists, and is currently extending the purge to chastise, remove, and punish thousands of lower-level Maoist followers throughout the country. This purge is designed to undercut any possible base for the remaining former Maoists still in the leadership, in preparation for completing the top-level purge only begun by the arrest of Mao's widow and her three closest collaborators.

Meanwhile, a "Great Debate" is raging among China watchers over Sino-Soviet "remarriage" prospects. The debate runs the gamut from A to B: will the divorcées remarry, merely resume speaking terms, or heighten their mutual hostility, and where does the silent member of the "triangle," the United States, fit in? No one has yet guessed that there is almost certainly a faction fight over this issue, with the hegemonic army grouping having no more use for Mao's foreign than for his domestic policies. It has not occurred to any member of the China club that developments in the Third World, Japan, and Europe, for example, might totally alter the terms of discussion on the Sino-Soviet question and extend the options beyond simple "rapprochement" or the status quo.

A new right-wing "China lobby" has emerged in defense of Taiwan and opposed to U.S. diplomatic ties with Peking that require breaking with Taiwan. C. Martin Wilbur, a retired Columbia professor of Chinese studies, avoided altogether the touchy issue of whether American stonewalling on dumping Taiwan in order to normalize relations with Peking might not impel China more strongly toward the Soviet Union, and pushed for a

"two Germanys"-type formula *even if* Peking totally opposes it. John Husband, Washington-based coordinator of the large pro-Taiwan conference at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. on Dec. 1, gave a more sophisticated "analysis." He told NSIPS that "there are some very good reasons why Peking needs the U.S." He cited Chinese "fear of the Soviets, especially after Czechoslovakia," "a desire (by China) to break out of isolation," and their need for trade and technology. So, he concluded, there is no danger of encouraging a rapprochement with Moscow by refusing to dump Taiwan. A minority position among those attending the Mayflower Conference was expressed by Franz Michael, who reiterated to NSIPS his long-held view that, in essence, "a communist is a communist" and that without Mao, China will soon reestablish close relations with the Soviet Union. He said the border issue is a trivial one to solve and he expects it to be solved very shortly. Therefore, he believes, there is nothing to gain by dumping Taiwan to recognize Peking.

An obsolete profiling of the Soviet Union by former Rand analyst Donald Zagoria yielded the novel interpretation that the *Soviets* are the main roadblock to improved relations: "I don't think the Russians are prepared to pull troops back from the border...they are not really capable of making the concessions necessary. They muffed it with China, they muffed it with Japan. They've got a fixation on the territorial status quo. They are the last remaining empire...The Russians see the Chinese as a long-range threat...The China threat is useful for all sorts of people in Moscow; to the military types to jack up the defense budget; to the conservatives in the apparat who want to prevent any real reforms and need to have enemies on both fronts; and the liberals and intellectuals want to go toward the West." Zagoria foresaw the likelihood of eventual war between the two countries and said the Soviet Union sees China, not the United States, as the greater ultimate enemy.

Another very well-known analyst who asked not to be identified agreed that the Chinese military, especially the Army, was the most anti-Soviet: "If anything, the Army is more pro-American; the Navy is more anti-American." Chen Hsi-lien, the former commander of Manchuria, which borders on the Soviet Union, "has not

the slightest doubt of what the (Soviet) threat is," he said, adding that the Army is anti-Soviet because they have the border to defend. This analyst, as did Zagoria, foresaw "a thawing in relations" and said "they will not be heated enemies...the thing is going to become more rational, with a lesser likelihood of war...but both sides will find the illusion of being adversaries more useful than the illusion of friendship (sic), so the basic split will continue. On the Taiwan question, he said that Taiwan was a major issue for the now-purged Maoists, not the "moderates," so for the U.S., "Taiwan can be put on the back burner." Normalization isn't necessary, he said, because "China *won't* go toward the Soviets."

A more realistic assessment of the Soviet side was provided by former Rand and State Department analyst Allen Whiting, now at the University of Michigan. He said the Soviets are very serious about moving toward some kind of détente with Peking, commenting "The Soviets are willing to deal on fairly serious terms," and said that one major reason is the strong Soviet desire for Japanese investment in Siberia. Japan will not invest

there unless there is some progress on easing Sino-Soviet hostility he said. He also didn't see a Sino-Soviet thaw as "necessarily dangerous" because it might aid world peace. But he dismissed close ties, saying "I don't see any analyst projecting real friendship; the competition in third countries will continue, party to party relations will remain frozen." He said that the Army was in favor of eliminating border tensions, but that there are *no* actually *pro*-Soviet people in the country: "All Chinese are anti-Soviet."

Michael Oksenberg, a noted analyst also from Michigan, was concerned that the "momentum of the (U.S.-China) relation is gone...there is a need to restore momentum to our relations with China." He did not think the U.S. could sit back complacently and assume the Sino-Soviet split would go on forever. He concluded that the militaries of both sides want to end at least the border tensions, and that relations, while still being hostile to a degree, will be such that "they will become trustworthy adversaries" — the hysterical pitch now prevailing will disappear.