

Rumsfeld Acknowledges Soviet 'War-Winning' Strategy

Sept. 29 (NSIPS) — At a press conference Sept. 27 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld became the first U.S. official to publicly acknowledge that the Soviet Union — on the basis of superior technology — has adopted and is improving a "war-winning capability" as its strategic policy. In an interview published on the same day in the West German weekly Der Spiegel, Rumsfeld also flatly contradicted the line retailed earlier this year in the Rockefeller press that the appointment of "civilian" Dimitri Ustinov as Soviet Defense Minister heralded a softening of Soviet policy. Rumsfeld's realistic assessment of Soviet policy and U.S. capability represents a last line of defense against the Rockefeller-Kissinger drive for thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviets.

The relevant excerpts from Rumsfeld's remarks are as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C.

RUMSFELD: Well, it seems to me that a reasonable person can look at the (weapons development) effort of the Soviet Union and the product of that effort and conclude that they're clearly striving to not be on the losing side in the event that those weapons are used. That, I think, is clear from the numbers and types and improvements as well as their civil defense activities. That is to say, put a slightly different way, that they appear to people who observe this, to be interested themselves in seeing obviously that they have a deterrent they need, but also in the event of an exchange that they are not on the losing side.

Q: Are you saying then that they're working for a war winning capability?

RUMSFELD: Well, you know, you start getting into these code

words and all that, I guess people will have to make their own judgments on that. I think that I can assert what I've asserted here very comfortably — that the pattern as I've described, suggests that they're undertaking a program that reflects a concern on their part as to which side would prevail at the end of a conflict, using these weapons.

Q: Is that different from the U.S. policy in its missile forces?

RUMSFELD: I think that our emphasis, if one looks at the numbers, and our capabilities, and our relative inattention to things like civil defense, could more precisely be characterized as being determined to see that we have a strong healthy strategic nuclear deterrent.

Q: Should we try to build a force to win a nuclear war?

RUMSFELD: It seems to be what we should try to do is see that the strategic nuclear deterrent stays healthy, and that we achieve the kinds of force modernizations that will be necessary in the period between now and the mid-1980s, so that in fact there is an acceptable strategic nuclear balance. That is why the proposals are before the Congress with respect to the SLBM and the bomber force; it's why we have been doing research and development with respect to the ICBM.

Q: Do you think that there is a good chance of getting a new SALT agreement before the interim pact expires in October 1977?

RUMSFELD: Well, you know obviously that's our goal. Our goal is to face the reality that the interim agreement expires in October 1977 and that we would like to achieve an agreement, a SALT II agreement, that would be consistent with our national security.

EXCLUSIVE

GLOBAL COVERAGE

- The Collapse of the Eurodollar
- Moves for a New World Economic Order
- Translations from Socialist Sector and Non-Aligned Press
- Detailed Exposés of the Rockefeller-Kissinger International Terror Networks

CAN YOU AFFORD TO BE WITHOUT IT?

New Solidarity International Press Service Weekly Report \$225 per year

New Solidarity (twice weekly) \$20 per year

Send check or money order to: Campaigner Publications, P.O. Box 1972 GPO, N.Y., N.Y. 10001