

## Arbatov: "We Need A Cuban Missile Crisis To Strengthen Detente"

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., May 19 (IPS) — "Personally, I feel what we really need to strengthen detente is a good international crisis — a Cuban missile crisis."

This statement exemplifies the speech given this week at the Harvard Center for International Affairs by Georgii A. Arbatov, head of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and leader of the USSR delegation to the yearly Dartmouth Conference held several weeks ago in Arizona with David Rockefeller as a featured participant. Arbatov has been touring university "international affairs" institutes and other CIA think-tanks in the U.S. making such speeches ever since the Dartmouth Conference. In this case, however, he was rudely and directly confronted with the convergence of his statements and anti-Soviet Rockefeller policies, especially the Schlesinger Doctrine tactical nuclear madness, by U.S. Labor Party candidate for U.S. Senate from Massachusetts Graham Lowry.

Arbatov was introduced to the Arms Control Seminar of the Harvard Center for International Affairs by a moderator who described him as "an architect of detente" and the "single-handed" founder of the 300-man USA-Canada Institute in 1968. "His institute," the moderator reminded the assembled CIA strategists, "is an obligatory stop for those of us engaged in international affairs whenever we are in Moscow."

Arbatov began his talk by emphasizing the alleged "relaxation of tensions" now underway in the world. He discounted the significance of Henry Kissinger's provocative actions in the Middle East and Europe, his antagonism to Communist participation in European governments such as Italy, and the whole array of current NATO war posturing. Calling detente and "healthy competition" the only practical policy, Arbatov put down his text, removed his glasses, and called for a new Cuban missile crisis.

Returning to his text, Arbatov then said "I don't believe in the cold war of (Secretary of State) Kissinger and Kline (former CIA Deputy Director Ray Kline who was recently attacked in the Soviet party newspaper, Pravda), slipbacks may occur, and cost a lot, perhaps a further intensification of the arms race. . . and who can guarantee that there would not be some form of international crisis we would not be able to control. . . . Let me say I am in complete disagreement with the President of the United States, who has recently quoted George Washington that 'to prepare for war is the most effective means of preserving peace.' No, we need more arms control. One problem is that the progress of military technology grows much quicker than the process of negotiations. We must agree not to deploy new weapons systems, new instruments of mass destruction. Who runs after what in the arms race? We (the Soviet Union). . . after

the hard facts of life. The United States, it seems, after what Soviet military might would look like 10 to 15 years from now."

Arbatov made repeated statements aside, of the "I personally. . ." variety, to distinctly locate his views well away from actual Soviet policy — "I wouldn't care if the United States went ahead and built the B-1 bomber. . . but the official Soviet response, I'm afraid. . . ."

"Maybe we're in such a strategic deadlock that it makes no difference, if we don't deploy a new weapon for two years — this would speed up SALT II talks and then we could think about SALT III. . . ." Arbatov went through a broad cataloging of potential and actual weapons systems, most of them militarily coherent only with a Rand Corporation-Schlesinger developed "limited tactical nuclear war" orientation. At no point did he make any references to the actual political situation in the world. The first several questions from the floor were almost designed to permit him to maintain this semblance of ignorance. The moderator then called on U.S. Labor Party spokesman Graham Lowry.

"Mr. Arbatov," Lowry began, "the most striking thing about what you've said here today is that it bears no relationship to the current official policy of the Soviet Union, and it eliminates any of the considerations which would determine Soviet use of its warfighting capacity." A nervous shuffling and then quiet swept over the room. Lowry continued: "You'll be interested to know, I'm sure, that the headline in today's Pravda reads 'Nelson Rockefeller, The Warmonger. . .

"We of the U.S. Labor Party have consistently exposed and mobilized our political forces against the Rockefeller-Kissinger drive for nuclear war. The question further raised by your presentation, Mr. Arbatov, since your position is much more than of former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger than anything originating in actual Soviet policy circles, is whom you are speaking for, and what your actual loyalties are." Lowry took his seat.

Arbatov was visibly upset, fumbled with the microphone, and attempted a reply in, at first, barely audible tones. "Well, uh, as for Pravda. . . I haven't seen that. . . I did see Mr. Rockefeller's Berlin speech and. . . yes. . . I think that's very dangerous, bad for detente, and it's also an insult to the people of West Germany and their government. . . . The Middle East. . . I don't know quite what to say. . . . The Soviet Union has proposed a settlement in a larger context. . . there are some bad situations there, and some hopeful ones. . . . Step-by-step negotiations are fine. . . but. . . the U.S. has now adopted a policy of exclusively step-by-step. . . without any larger context for settlement. So that's not so good. . . . As for my loyalties, I have to leave that up to the KGB."