

## ICLC Strategic Studies:

# Soviet Softliners Dumbly Provoke War

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BONN, April 16 (IPS) — Contrary to the antiquated conceits in some parts of the Harriman-Ball faction, the current appearance of a dominant soft-liner posture in the Soviet party daily, Pravda, and so forth is absolutely not a contribution toward maintaining peace. All of us from well-informed leading political circles either know or damned well ought to know what exactly the opposite is true.

That fact is most easily illustrated by referring our attention to the "Schlesinger doctrine."

The Schlesinger doctrine so-called has two basic premises. The first premise: At this time the USA and NATO forces combined could not conceivably win a thermonuclear war against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces. However, Schlesinger's well-known key second premise asserts, the political leadership in Moscow is so soft and frightenable that it will capitulate without fighting under either thermonuclear confrontation or even limited thermonuclear attack.

Until recently, the Harriman-Ball faction and other USA-NATO factions understood this point more or less clearly. At the turn of the year, Averell Harriman and Ted Kennedy made a CBS-TV appearance to emphasize that the complementary confrontationist policies of the Rockefeller twins, "Mutt" Schlesinger and "Jeff" Kissinger, were outright insanity. Earlier, beginning the spring of 1975, key Harriman plus some key Republican forces proceeded from the same correct charge of Rockefeller insanity to reduce the immediate war danger and push Schlesinger out of the Defense Department.

Harriman's remarks during the cited TV appearance are most relevant. Harriman insisted that the Soviet leadership remains essentially hard-line "Stalinist," and would fight if confronted in the adventurous manner advocated either by Schlesinger or Kissinger. Harriman's argument, which is supported by most top-level military circles outside the Rockefeller "Utopian" faction, has repeatedly mobilized White House and other forces to cause a pullback from Rockefeller-directed confrontationist escapades.

Harriman's characterization of the present Soviet leadership as essentially "hard-line Stalinist," is a simplification of the reality, but otherwise, as a strategic rule-of-thumb, is a useful shorthand way of making an otherwise correct point.

Harriman's arguments prevailed during 1975 and early 1976 factional struggles because the Soviet leadership was then making very clear signals concerning its basic strategic postures. Now, the Soviet leadership is giving out political signals which seem to vindicate the Schlesinger doctrine. The immediate and inevitable consequence of such Soviet folly is to push the Rockefeller-Kissinger-Schlesinger faction back toward a dominant position, and thus to accelerate the date at which thermonuclear war becomes highly probable.

The point Harriman made in his TV address remains oversimplified but otherwise essentially correct. Every bit of

political intelligence received from the Warsaw Pact side shows that the Soviet political leadership is engaged in a massive, crash build-up of its general thermonuclear war-fighting capabilities. Relevant Warsaw Pact military publications, most notably the Soviet Army daily, Red Star, and East German military sources, emphasize that both the regular military leadership and political leaders responsible for military policy are currently conditioning Warsaw Pact troops for a prospect of winning an early "justifiable" general war. Despite the soft-liner façade being displayed by Moscow Pravda and other publications, and despite a muting of the Bulgarian and Czech party congresses under Soviet majority pressures, underneath the strategic policy is a very, very hard line.

The deceptive soft-line façade being shown by the Soviets thus has the effect of luring certain factions of the Atlanticists into over-confidence along the lines suggested by the Schlesinger doctrine. The inevitable consequence of this is a resurgence of the Rockefeller-Kissinger forces, and an acceleration of provocative deployments leading quickly toward probable thermonuclear war.

### On The Soviet Side

In basics, the current Soviet position is simple. However, those basic facts are enormously complicated in detail once we begin to take into account certain features of a merely secondary or tertiary strategic importance. Part of the overall present problem is the fact that key Atlanticist strategic analysts have confused such complex secondary and tertiary features of Soviet internal factional developments with those considerations which remain strategically primary. The result of such confusion is an emerging misestimation of Soviet policy, a misestimation leading directly toward horrifying strategic miscalculations.

The simple fact is that Soviet policy is currently operating on two levels. The basic Soviet policy is that of preparing to win a general thermonuclear war at an early time. Meanwhile, with some echoes of *deja vu* from the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact, on the surface Soviet short-term political strategy is to grasp wildly at straws, in desperate search for some political alternative to general war.

Certain leading Soviet circles have made plain their desperate wish to believe that, at best, the Harriman-Ball and British factional forces among the Atlanticists might stop the buildup toward war, or, at worst, that Harriman-Ball, the British and so forth might at least delay the danger of war long enough to favor Soviet military buildup to a decisive of capability. This is complicated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's reported new fight against illness, which coincides with a temporary muzzling of hardliners Suslov, Grechko et al., and provides a short-lived field day for the "White Communist" antics of USA-Canada Institute head Arbatov, Zagladin and other CIA-linked "submarine" forces

within the Warsaw Pact's political command structure.

Overall, this generally misunderstood mixture of sundry primary, secondary and tertiary considerations has the effect of seducing certain Atlanticist strategists into making adventures whose consequence would be actual general thermonuclear war.

The contributing stupidity on the Soviet side is the argument by the soft-line faction that a soft political posture is the preferred "non-provocative" appearance to be maintained to minimize military reactions from the Atlanticist side. Their incredibly weak-brained oversight is that such soft-line façades in fact have an effect on the Atlanticists similar to that of pornographic posturing by a woman before a sex-starved paranoid: it is the most provocative of all policies, a veritable incitement to a rape-attack. Moscow should listen more attentively to those Latin American and Portuguese Communist leaders who better understand West Hemispheric sexual practices. A display of apparent political weakness to the odd Mr. Henry Kissinger is an incitement to sodomic assault.

### The Soviet Mentality

One should attempt to see the world outside the Soviet bloc as the Soviet leaders generally view recent developments.

First of all, to Moscow analysts, outside the Comecon bloc plus a few exceptions the Soviets have no direct and reliable political support but chiefly the Comecon forces. Except for Luxemburg, Austria (and possibly the Liechtenstein post office), there is not a single official Communist party of the advanced capitalist sector which is not under top-down control of capitalist political intelligence agencies. In the developing sector it is only slightly better from Moscow's standpoint.

In the developing sector, there is the Cunhal-led Portuguese Party, the Spanish Communist Workers Party led by General Lister, the Communist Party of India, and a few other notable, but less influential cases. Half or so of the Communist Party of Peru, perhaps two-thirds of the Communist Party of Colombia, most of the exiled Chilean Communist Party, and a few other Havana-oriented forces might be regarded as actually communist by Moscow's criteria. The official Communist Party of Spain under NATO agent Carrillo, the Communist Party of Mexico, the Communist Party of Venezuela, and so forth are totally under top-down control of the U.S. National Security Council and NATO intelligence.

At the same time, Moscow has lost every one of its major Middle East friends, with the exception of the Communist Party of Israel and left-wing groups among the Palestinians and so forth. Since Rambouillet and Manila, Iraq has conditionally capitulated to Atlanticist pressures, Syria is effective Kissinger-Saudi controlled, Egypt's government is in Rockefeller's pocket for the moment, and is being used as part of a complex directed against early attempted crushing of the Libyan government.

In brief, with some notable few exceptions not aggregately sufficient to be strategically significant, Moscow has politically written off almost the entirety of the world outside the Comecon-Warsaw Pact itself.

Such facts ought to send a cold chill down the spines of every leading official within the capitalist advanced and developing sector. This successful containment offensive by the Atlanticist forces has not merely driven the Moscow leadership predominantly into an Oblomovist fear and rage, but has put most of that leadership into a state of mind in

which few parts of the advanced-capitalist and developing sector are any better than a potential battlefield for thermonuclear confrontation and war between the Warsaw Pact and Atlanticist military forces.

Under these conditions, political softness among Soviet leaders quickly becomes a ferociously nationalistic fervor. To the extent that political containment of the Soviet leadership destroys its sense of identification with the working-class struggle within the capitalist sector and so forth, the inevitable consequence is to drive Soviet leadership majorities into a perfervid "Mother Russia" outlook.

These nationalists say, then: "To hell with the working class forces of the advanced capitalist sector; they have betrayed us! To hell with the realpolitiking opportunist nationalists of the developing sector, who sell out their Soviet friends on the turn of a dime! They do not care about us; then, we shall not care how many of them must unfortunately die in wars, radioactive clouds and biological catastrophe in order to save even one additional Soviet village or individual Red Army soldier's life!" Those attitudes are, in fact clearly emerging in current Warsaw Pact indoctrination of military cadres.

At the same time that a hard core of the Soviet Soviet majority proceeds to develop such world-outlooks, those leaders become the most byzantine in their diplomatic and other political maneuverings. The period from 1938 onward, following the Munich Pact among Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler, becomes the paradigm. Drive them hard enough within the Warsaw Pact itself, and they will do almost anything to enhance the marginal strategical war-winning capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces.

### The Soviet Majority's Political Stupidity

It is notable, but not accidental that Pravda's coverage of the internal political situation within the United States has been continuously a legitimate object for ridicule by both laymen and informed persons within the USA itself. This fact typifies the circumstance that Soviet military-strategic conceptions are in fact more advanced than those of the "utopianism"-disoriented USA and NATO command structures, while Soviet political strategy toward the advanced capitalist and developing sectors is so abysmally ill-formed and even often downright stupid. It is that contradictory reality of Soviet military strategic excellence and political strategic childishness which dictates that from the Soviet side the only possible outcome, in reality, for the present crisis would be a general thermonuclear war during no later than 1977 and possibly as early as this year.

There are two complementary reasons for Soviet political incompetence concerning the United States itself. The more basic problem within the Soviet leading circles is a perfervid conservatism in adherence to a tragically simplistic mechanistic and actually pseudo-Marxian political and economic doctrine. The complicating further basic problem is a successful Atlanticist political intelligence agencies' penetration of certain leading Soviet party circles, notably through the covers of the CIA-controlled Italian and U.S. Communist parties! (To localize the CIA penetration of leading Soviet circles to those parties is something of a simplification, but nonetheless good enough as a short-hand way of putting the point.)

The latter problem can be easily identified. Zagladin, Arbatov, and a certain "economics" institute typify a hard-core of "American" agent influences around Moscow.

There is hard evidence that the political lineage of various of these characters is well known to the Soviet KGB and other Eastern European political security agencies; but there is also hard evidence that the leading political forces involved tend to misestimate the significance of such conduits. For example, despite the Czech Party's listing of the Communist Parties of the USA and West Germany under the category of most friendly parties, there is the hardest evidence that both the CPUSA and DKP leaderships are known there to be under the effective control of Atlanticist political intelligence services.

In general two things must be said concerning the current surfacing of Atlanticist "White Communist" agents in Pravda and other Soviet channels. We make direct reference to a lead item, by-lined David Shipler, in the New York Times of April 15.

As the writer of that article suggests, the surfacing of such agents as Arbatov does in fact reflect a current factional combination. If the writer had been less euphoric concerning the Harriman line, he would have examined certain internal features of the Soviet leadership prior to and during the recent 25th Congress, and juxtaposed those facts to the post-Congress military policy of key Warsaw Pact nations.

There is also an element of byzantine prankishness in Soviet licensing of such "smoke screen" displays of the "American" faction. For this, certain eerie Soviet propaganda and related postures of the 1939-spring 1941 period should be studied for reference.

We repeat this point: the "American" element within the current Soviet ostensible majority is both an actual constituent of the faction's forces and also a pack of persons known to be agents by the Soviet KGB, persons now being prominently displayed for byzantine tactical political purposes.

The broader byzantine aspects of this matter can be summed up as follows.

As Pravda has emphasized, current Soviet political realpolitik proceeds from the assumption that the Harriman, Ball, Kennedy and similar Atlanticist forces within the USA, plus certain British Atlanticist factional elements, represent the chief internal political force within the advanced capitalist sector for preventing an early thermonuclear confrontation. Although the Harriman-linked forces were impelled to check the Rockefeller pro-war faction principally because of a fear of Soviet hard-liner dominance, the Soviet leadership majority has come around to the weird judgement that the way to keep Harriman et al. "friendly to peace" is to feed Harriman et al. with the display of a Soviet soft political line.

The Soviet leadership is filling the Harriman faction's eyes with a performance which the leadership believes will "keep Averell and Company" happy — thus actually shifting the internal Atlanticist alignment within the USA and among West German "junior yankees" toward the Rockefeller faction and the "Schlesinger doctrine."

Out of such pathetic tragi-comedies of error arise those wars whose chain-reaction occurrence is inexplicable to the principals involved.

#### **Soviet Intelligence On The USA**

As we have emphasized before, a significant part of the nonsensical reporting on the U.S. in Pravda is directly a result of the delusions associated with the slogan, "Gus Hall is a personal friend of Brezhnev." The direct key to the worst

of Pravda's coverage on the U.S. internal situation is found by comparing such gibberish with the corresponding items in the CIA-controlled pages of the Daily World.

In general, the Soviet leadership has been so desperate in its concern to find friendly, peace-loving voices from within the Democratic Party and Eastern Establishment that it has foolishly gobbled up the prepared bait provided by Morgan-controlled and other channels of the Atlanticists' Eastern Establishment. The CIA penetrations of Soviet circles through such covers as the Pugwash conferences are exemplary.

On such counts, the miserable Sidney Hook and Richard Loewentals have succeeded very well in continuing the traditional efforts of their former sponsors and predecessors, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Admiral Canaris and so forth.

This credulity of Soviet Oblomovs — an influence substantially based on Oblomovist susceptibilities defined by Tavistock's H.V. Dicks and others — is partly a Soviet reaction-formation problem and also a reflection of the professional incompetence of most leading Soviet circles on questions of political and economic theory. The simple-minded misinterpretation of U.S. internal economic and political life we meet in Pravda is not only a consequence of disinformation fed into Moscow through CIA-controlled conduits such as the CPUSA leadership, but is more readily accepted in Moscow because such disinformation is designed to coincide with the simple-minded mechanistic theoretical world-outlook which predominates among the more sentimental and "practical varieties" of Soviet official strata.

For example, the Soviet leadership, on the basis of leading published materials, is shown conclusively to lack a semblance of competence concerning the actual dynamics and political consequences of financial capitalist interests. The level of understanding of economic theory evidenced could be justly deprecated as worthy of a pre-Komsomol kindergarten class in Marxian economics.

The typical Soviet economic analysis of crisis developments in the capitalist sector is a plodding, schoolboyish recitation of one half-digested truism and shallow-minded agitational slogan after the other, without a disturbing tinge of conceptual insight into the actual processes involved. There is, overall, a pathetic resemblance to the hoary, tiresome refrains of the DeLeonist cults, concerning "the woikahs and the cap-pit-talists." In general, it is "theory" on the abysmal level of one of Kautsky's short popular tracts or Daniel DeLeon's wretched homilies.

A notable corollary of this is the absence of any genuine understanding of either dialectical method in general, or of Lenin's political method in particular, from the right-wing and center components of the Soviet leadership. The most lurid illustration of this point is Soviet publication of an article by NATO agent Robert Steigerwald on the eve of the 25th Soviet Congress.

Steigerwald's article was in fact a classical imitation of the anti-Bolshevik rhetoric of Hamilton Fish Armstrong's old tame Mensheviks. In strict conformity with the Menshevik tradition from the time of the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, Steigerwald attacks Lenin's "voluntarism" in the pages of Pravda!

The notable circumstantial feature of the publication of agent Steigerwald's piece is that the writer merely carried to an extreme the doctrine of mechanistic "objectivism" which otherwise does in fact predominate in leading right-wing and

center factional currents in the Soviet leadership. The relevance of this is that it would be sufficient crucial evidence by itself to show that the majority of the Soviet leadership lacks even rudimentary competence for understanding the dynamics of political processes and struggles within the capitalist sector.

Believing such pseudo-Marxian nonsense as they openly profess, it is not mysterious that they have been so consistently and extensively duped in such matters by Atlanticist political intelligence conduits.

#### **Failures of 1975 Soviet Strategy**

The cited feature item in the New York Times tries to reinforce the idiotic arguments actually being circulated by the current Soviet majority faction. The argument is that unduly aggressive postures by Soviet hard-liners caused significant setbacks to Soviet detente policy up to the 25th Congress. In fact, exactly the opposite is true.

First, to the extent that the hard-liners appeared to have a growing influence in the Soviet leadership, that fact conspicuously discredited the Schlesinger doctrine, a doctrine whose essential presumption was the predominance of a soft-brained centrist faction within the Soviet leadership. In fact, but for the hard line postures, there might have already been a Schlesinger doctrine-goaded general thermonuclear confrontation at some point between March, 1975 and the recent 25th Soviet Party Congress.

Second, communist setbacks in Portugal and recent massive losses of Soviet friends from within the Arab and other parts of the developing sector are directly the result of Soviet *softness* during 1975. The debt issue is central to this.

By September 1975, either Portugal enjoyed a financial debt moratorium or the communists in Portugal had to be, inevitably, set back in a major way or even totally crushed. Either Egypt enjoyed a financial debt moratorium, or Egypt was forced to capitulate to the Rockefeller camp. Either there was a debt moratorium or the current regime in Argentina was inevitable, Peru would face internal right-wing coups, and the "Second War of the Pacific" would become almost inevitable. Either there would be debt moratoria or the anti-imperialist faction within the Group of 77 and UNC-77 would variously be quickly crushed or capitulate. Given

the weaknesses of the bonapartists and others, and given the pro-fascist desperation of both the forces of Lower Manhattan, both the Rockefeller and Harriman factions, it was Soviet stupidity concerning the issue of developing sector debt moratoria which has in fact brought the world close to the brink of both thermonuclear war and the beginnings of an austerity-caused global biological catastrophe.

The kernel of Soviet stupidity on this point is that, given the institution of Schachtian austerity in both the advanced capitalist and developing sectors, a project Wall Street intends to be completed by June 30, 1976, no matter whether the Rockefeller or the Harriman faction is on top, within a short time the emergence of militarized Schachtian order in the capitalist sector creates the irreversible preconditions for both thermonuclear war and biological catastrophe. Soviet Oblovists; in attempting to play foolish games among the Rockefeller and Harriman factions — presumably against the relatively minor force of Southwestern-rim dinosaurs — cannot and could not accomplish any result but that of tending to make general thermonuclear war inevitable during the short- to intermediate-term period.

This pathetic Soviet blundering, which has recently been aggravated in the extreme, leaves the responsibility for saving the human race chiefly in the hands of the U.S. Labor Party and French Gaullists in the advanced sector, and a dwindling handful of courageous developing nations' governments and political forces. It is the strength of the U.S. Labor Party, on the one hand, and the sabotage of Atlanticist military and fascist schemes by the re-mobilized "pure" Gaullist forces on the other hand, which have been the recent key developments sabotaging and delaying the preconditions for the combined thermonuclear and biological extermination of civilization.

Yet, neither the Gaullists nor the Labor Party head a government at this moment! What an awful responsibility the stupidity of the Soviet leadership and the cowardice of terrified developing sector forces has placed on the fragile resources of the Labor Party, the Gaullists and a handful of developing sector nations! If those fragile forces fall, then thermonuclear war by this year or next is inevitable.