

The hoax embedded in the UN Inquiry report on the Rwanda genocide

by Linda de Hoyos

Since the Dec. 15, 1999 release of the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, the international media have used the report to place the blame on the United Nations peacekeeping forces for failing to stop the bloodletting that took the lives of more than 800,000 people in Rwanda in April to July 1994. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has also pointed the finger at the UN, and on Dec. 17 officially demanded formal apologies from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Rwandan people, for his responsibility for UN peacekeeping operations at the time. Two Rwandan families have taken action to sue the UN for its alleged failure to protect their family members, who were killed in the 1994 mass murder.

Careful examination of the UN report, however, belies the media and the RPF's portrayal of its contents. Certainly, it cannot be denied that 2,518 troops of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to protect many Rwandans from death. The UNAMIR was caught flat-footed, without mandate or means to effectively intervene to halt the chaotic bloodletting that took place throughout the country.

The media focus on the UN report is contrived to deflect attention from the truth: The murder of 800,000 Rwandans in 1994, as with the mass murder in 1996 of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Zaire war; as with the murder of another million Hutu Rwandans in post-1994 Rwanda; as with the murder of thousands in the eastern portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ongoing to this day, is the result of a plan coming not from within Rwanda, but from the former colonial powers, particularly the British monarchy, to seize control of the African Great Lakes region, and the enormous riches in minerals of the Great Rift Valley. For these purposes, all national institutions—for instance, governments, even weak ones—must be swept aside, the land must be cleared of its rightful owners who “squander” it on self-subsisting farming, and the people placed at the mercies of military dictatorships.

As *EIR* documented in “British Intelligence Set Up the Obliteration of Rwanda” (*EIR*, Aug. 19, 1994), the British Commonwealth case officer on the Rwandan operation was former Minister for Overseas Development Baroness Lynda Chalker. The operation began with the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the combined forces of the National Resistance

Army of Uganda, under President Yoweri Museveni; the Rwandan Patriotic Front, whose leaders were embedded in the Ugandan military command structure (current Rwandan Defense Minister and Vice President Paul Kagame was the deputy director of Ugandan military intelligence); and other deployables such as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the African National Congress—an event that receives barely a mention in the UN Inquiry report. The Rwandan government of President Juvenal Habyarimana had to go, to be replaced by the militarist Tutsi RPF, and Rwanda, along with Burundi and Uganda, was used as the springboard for the British Commonwealth's seizure of mineral-drenched Zaire.

Pawns in the game

The UN and UNAMIR were but pawns in the game.

On Oct. 5, 1993, as the Inquiry reports, the UN Security Council mandated the creation of UNAMIR and tasked it to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Signed on Aug. 4, 1993 by Rwanda's opposing forces, the accords called for the creation of a government of national unity, composed of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour de Developpment (MRND) of President Habyarimana, various parties of the unarmed but foreign-aided democratic opposition to Habyarimana, and the RPF. Among other jobs, the UNAMIR was to oversee compliance by the RPF and Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) with the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties.

However, although France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, whose ambassadors were on the scene in Rwanda working on forcing through implementation of the Arusha Accords, had appeared to sponsor the accords in an effort to stabilize Rwanda, the accords and UNAMIR's creation and presence were the cover for the colonialist-sponsored Ugandan-RPF plan underneath—which did not envision a state of permanent compromise.

The report verifies two factors that point to the real plan:

1. The murder of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Nyatiramana on April 6, 1994, was the event that precipitated the “genocide” of 1994; and
2. The consistent actions taken by the British, French, and Belgian governments, and sometimes by the United States government, blocked any effective UN mandate for military action that might have been able to halt the carnage.



Rwandan Defense Minister Paul Kagame (above). The Rwandan government blames the UN for failing to stop the bloodletting of 1994. But UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (left) said that he was “fighting alone” against the major powers of the UN Security Council, in efforts to get an effective UN force sent to the country.

The murder of Habyarimana

From January 1994 onward, after successive deadlines for the creation of the transitional government had been missed, the UN headquarters and certainly the governments of Britain, France, Belgium, and the United States, as well as that of Uganda, were aware of a steady deterioration in the security status of Rwanda. On Jan. 11, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander, had sent the now-famous cable to UN Military Adviser to the Secretary General Maurice Baril, requesting “Protection for Informant.” An informant, vouched for by Prime Minister-Designate Faustin Twagimirungu, had reported on the training of some 1,700 Hutu men in camps by the Hutu militia, the Interhamwe, the registration of Tutsis, and the stockpiling of 135 weapons, in evident preparation for a campaign of mass slaughter of Tutsis.

The contents of the report were presented to President Habyarimana by UN authorities, but the government took no action and did not report on any results of investigation. As the political deadlock continued to tighten, on Feb. 21 and 22, 1994, Felicien Gatabazi, Minister of Public Works and secretary general of the Parti Social Democrate (PSD), the second-largest opposition party, and Martin Bucyana, president of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), were murdered. The CDR had split away from Habyarimana because of the President’s moderate stance toward Tutsis.

The security situation worsened, with incidents of violence rife throughout the country and in Kigali. In a report dated Feb. 23, Dallaire wrote of numerous reports of weapons distribution, hit lists for death squads, and planning of civil unrest against the Arusha Accords. “Time does seem to be running out for political discussion,” he said, “*as any spark on the security side could have catastrophic consequences*” (emphasis added).

Such a spark was supplied. The murder of Habyarimana and Nytarimana was the event that propelled the extremist Hutus into their killing campaign across the country. However, and this is obscured by the UN Inquiry, it also precipitated:

1. major military action by the RPF, moving from the northern sector into the country at large toward Kigali;
2. a generalized terror in the population, both Hutu and Tutsi, brought on by both the assassination of the President and the RPF blitzkrieg south. The panic generated the “kill them before they kill you” mentality that engulfed the country, turning neighbor against neighbor, even child against child.

The generally accepted presumption is that the President’s plane was shot down by extremist Hutu elements in the President’s own extended family and intelligence services. It is presumed that this was done in order to forestall the President’s acquiescence to the Arusha Accords and to put

into action the murder plan revealed in the Jan. 11 cable of the informant's report. The only other evidence apparently offered is that the Presidential Guard sealed off the crash site, which was on the President's own lawn.

A launching pad into Zaire

The version presumed in the UN report is false. Habyarimana was killed by those who intended the full takeover of Rwanda, to use it as a launching pad into Zaire. A coalition government, as called for by the Arusha Accords, was an impediment to the British Crown plan. (The debate around this plan had already resulted in the murder of RPF leader Fred Rwigyema, who had no interests in Zaire and who was killed "in action" in the 1990 Ugandan invasion of Rwanda.)

Bernard Debré, French Minister of Cooperation from November 1994 to May 1995, testified in hearings before the French Parliament on June 2, 1998, that the Presidential plane had been shot down on April 6 by surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, which were not in the possession of the Rwandan government or armed forces. He testified that he was convinced that RPF troops under orders of Kagame had brought down the plane. Debré cited as his sources telegrams arriving at the French Foreign Ministry, memoranda of French intelligence services, and the newspapers at the time. (See <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/dossiers/rwanda/audpu10.htm>.)

The two Presidents had been attending a heads-of-state summit called by Ugandan President Museveni to discuss implementation of the Arusha Accords. Museveni, according to Debré, had insisted that Burundian President Ntaryamira join the Rwandan President as far as Kigali, with the idea that both would then come to Kampala on April 7 to meet with him. The summit ended later than scheduled, causing the Presidential plane to be landing at the Kigali airport after dark, when the airport was already under a nightfall curfew, and was officially closed. The plane was shot down as it was landing by two SAM-16 missiles, killing both Presidents, the Rwandan Army chief of staff, and the French crew of the plane.

The French Army in Rwanda, Debré said, had known for several months that the RPF possessed and used SAM missiles.

Debré further stated that the "communications of the RPF army that were heard, proved that the marching orders for the Tutsi army were given on the morning of April 6. The RPF army made its move to Kigali before the attack" on the President. The implication is that the RPF, along with Museveni, had planned and carried out the murder of the two Presidents, as well as the RPF blitzkrieg into Kigali.

Debré's reporting of the event is confirmed by well-placed American sources, as well as Ugandan and Rwandan sources, with the qualification that the major operational capability was in the hands of the Ugandan military.

In addition, the evidence even of hostile investigators

FIGURE 1
The Great Lakes region



shows that the leadership of the Interhamwe and other forces who carried out an organized bloodletting was not prepared for their own campaign, at the point that Habyarimana's plane was shot down.

No serious criminal investigation

There is little question of the complicity of the donor capitals in the assassinations of the two heads of state. To date, there has been no serious criminal investigation of the Presidents' deaths, either by the RPF government or by others who maintain that all the killings of April-July 1994 were deliberately planned and executed following the event, and who thereby concluded that President Habyarimana was killed by extremist Hutus in his own military. Nor has any international group, such as the UN itself, or regional grouping, such as the Organization for African Unity, called for such an investigation. The murders are not an issue for the Arusha Tribunal on genocide in Rwanda, convened to bring to account those who led the slaughters in 1994. London, Washington, and Brussels have been dormant. Even the French government, which lost nationals in the flight's crash, has not challenged the ongoing mythology. A shroud of silence thus remains over the "spark on the security side" that precipitated the most "catastrophic consequences."

It also cannot be argued that those who either plotted the murders of the two Presidents or those who were aware of

such a plot did not know the probable consequences of the assassinations. On Feb. 23, 1994, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Representative Michel Moussali had called for action to restore stability to Rwanda, warning of a “possible bloodbath of unparalleled proportions.” According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch, who was closely involved with the Rwandan opposition to the Habyarimana government, the United States and others “ignored a CIA study at the end of January 1994 which suggested that if combat were to begin in Rwanda, that it would include violence against civilians—with a worst-case scenario of the deaths of half a million people.” Although the U.S. State Department considered Habyarimana to be the major obstacle

to the implementation of the Arusha Accords, as State Department officials told regional diplomats at the time, it should have been obvious that even if that were the case, he was also the only possible force that might be able to continue to maintain a balance in the political scene that could prevent a bloodbath. With Habyarimana removed, the apocalyptic clash between the extremist wings—the Interhamwe leadership and the RPF, with the population caught in between—was inevitable.

With knowledge that the survival of Rwanda, particularly its Tutsi population, was so precarious, why would the RPF-Ugandan force contemplate such a risky option as the assassination of the President, which could only spark extreme and

London is biggest donor to Rwandan military regime

The donor community has “ignored reports of abuses and supported the Rwandan government generously,” reported the 1999 Human Rights Watch survey on Rwanda, with Britain the largest country donor. In 1999, some 45% of the Rwandan government budget was paid for by foreign aid, despite the fact that the Rwandan military is currently an aggressor country in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.), occupying areas of North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo.

To be sure, the Rwandan people, with 300,000 households headed by children, are in need of aid and a boost to begin to rebuild their lives, shattered by the catastrophes of 1994 onward. But there appear to be no conditionalities placed on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), either in terms of accountability or the domination of its aggressor-military. “Among the largest donors was the World Bank, which gave \$75 million of unrestricted funding over a period of ten years (plus \$5 million for another specific program), and the United Kingdom which pledged \$70 million of unrestricted funding over a period of ten years. The U.S. provided \$10 million to support social justice, \$3 million of it for a public relations campaign to win support for *gacaca* (local reconciliation process). The Netherlands contributed \$6.7 million for education and civil service reform. In July, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway all indicated that they would increase assistance to Rwanda.”

The donor money, in contrast to the siege against such countries as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, not to mention the D.R.C., is being given despite the evidence of

continuing abuse of the Rwandan population, evidence overlooked in the donors’ zeal to impose a collective guilt upon all Hutus.

The Human Rights Watch reports

The evidence of the RPF’s Nazi-like treatment of large sections of the Rwandan population is contained in the Human Rights Watch reports of 1998 and 1999, among other sources. The reports are corroborated by Rwandan sources outside the country who have fragile lines of communication with those within.

The Human Rights Watch report for 1998 states: “The Rwandan government and insurgents fought an increasingly brutal and costly war, killing probably tens of thousands of unarmed civilians during 1998. Based largely in the northwest, the insurgents also led major strikes against other regions. They attacked jails to free prisoners and they slaughtered members of the Tutsi minority, government officials, and others who refused to support the rebellion. Soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), equipped with helicopters, armored vehicles, and heavy weapons, killed unarmed civilians, sometimes in pursuit of insurgents, sometimes in places or at times where no rebels were present but where they suspected the population of supporting them. In an incident in late October that became known only near the end of 1997, RPA soldiers allegedly caused the deaths of hundreds and perhaps thousands of persons who had sought refuge in caves at Kanama [see “Kagame’s Killing Fields in Rwanda,” *EIR*, Dec. 12, 1997].

“Estimating the number killed in the course of the year was difficult. Investigators could not travel freely in the area and witnesses often refused to speak for fear of reprisals. Diplomats concluded that between 100,000 and 250,000 persons were unaccounted for out of a population of some 1,500,000 in the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Some 200,000 persons did not collect their

widespread violence? One clue is offered by Des Forges's 1999 case study of the Rwanda crisis published by Human Rights Watch, *Leave None To Tell the Story—Genocide in Rwanda*. Des Forges relates: "According to two highly placed RPF leaders, they anticipated that the international community would help defend civilians should killings be launched on a massive scale." This is corroborated by the introduction to *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996*, by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He reports that on April 19, 1994, during a telephone conversation with Ugandan President Museveni, Museveni "urged that UNAMIR be reinforced and retained in Rwanda. He asked me to convey his request to the Security Council which I did that

day. The President then added that he was attempting to arrange for troop contributions from countries in the region and that he personally was directing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between the RGA [Rwandan Government Forces] and the RPF. The President followed up this plea with an urgent request to the Council on April 21 that UNAMIR maintain its presence in Rwanda."

Therefore, either the Uganda-RPF grouping made a terrible miscalculation in taking the risk to proceed with the removal of Habyarimana, or they had received some form of guarantees by the relevant foreign powers—which guarantees clearly were not met. In fact, as is shown below, rejecting President Museveni's plea on April 21, under the leadership

required identity papers in Gisenyi, suggesting that they were either dead or living on the other side of the forest, or in areas controlled by rebels. Assessing responsibility for the slaughter of civilians was sometimes complicated by misinformation from witnesses or government sources. First reports said that 34 persons were slain by insurgents at Tare in July, for example, but eyewitnesses later said RPA soldiers were responsible for the crime.

"Early in 1998, the army began gathering residents of the northwest in supervised camps which by the end of October held some 480,000 persons. In some regions, soldiers ordered people to destroy banana plantations and other crops that might provide cover to the rebels, thus causing food production to fall. In addition, farmers were too afraid of attack from one side or the other to work their fields in some regions. Faced with food shortages and threats by insurgents, some persons willingly moved to the camps where they hoped to receive food and protection. Others were forced by soldiers to go there. In areas where the insurgency was strong, some residents moved close to rebel bases voluntarily and others were intimidated by the rebels into doing so."

People unable to return to their homes

The 1999 Human Rights Watch report indicates that the brutal repression of the insurgency has dampened the pace of atrocities against the population. Nevertheless, people are not permitted to return to their homes and farms, but have been herded into so-called villages, where there are no services and the means of livelihood is extremely insecure.

Human Rights Watch reports: "By late 1999, the Rwandan government had largely put down an insurgency which had operated out of northwestern Rwanda and adjacent areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the past eighteen months. In doing so, its troops killed tens of thousands of people, many of them civilians, and

forced hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to move into government-established villages. During 1998, as part of its effort to suppress the insurgency, the government moved hundreds of thousands of people in the two northwestern prefectures into supervised camps. At the end of 1998, the government ordered the displaced to relocate once more, this time to officially designated 'villages.' Since 1995, the government had been resettling Rwandans returned from outside the country and the internally displaced in 'villages,' refusing to allow them to live in the dispersed homes customary in Rwanda. They insisted that villagization would promote economic development and improve delivery of services to the population. As applied in the northwest, however, the program appeared to be meant primarily to reduce the likelihood of a new insurgency. By late 1999, 94% of the population of Kibungo and 60% of the population of Mutara, both prefectures in the east, had been moved into villages, as had 40% of the population of the prefecture surrounding the capital of Kigali. In addition, 94% of the people of the northwest who had been in camps had been moved into villages, and others, still in their homes, had been ordered to destroy them and move to the new sites, where they were obliged to live in temporary shelters, under plastic sheeting, while building new houses. People who resisted these orders were fined or imprisoned. Despite government promises, most sites offered no services (water, schools, clinics) and residents often had to walk much farther to cultivate their fields.

"By late 1999, many land claims from the relocations remained unresolved. Farmers in the northwestern prefecture of Ruhengeri were cultivating less than 60% of available arable land. About 60% of the population of the northwestern prefectures was malnourished (compared with 40% elsewhere in the country), and more than half a million still depended on foreign food aid near the end of the year."—*Linda de Hoyos*

of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, the UN Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR to a force of 270.

The real question then, is not: Why was the genocide not stopped by the UN peacekeeping force? The question is: Why did the major Western governments already deeply involved in the Rwandan crisis—Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the United States—do absolutely nothing to stop plans to assassinate President Habyarimana when it was clear that such an act would spark a bloodbath of unprecedented proportions? Why, once the bloodbath had started, did those same powers act to block effective action by the United Nations?

UN Security Council blocks deployment

Although the UN Inquiry was mandated to focus attention on the UN's deficiencies in meeting the challenges posed by the Rwanda crisis, the report brings to light the fact that the efforts of then-UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, UNAMIR Commander Dallaire, Nigerian Ambassador to the UN Ibrahim Gambari (acting on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), and the African Caucus at the UN to increase UNAMIR's forces and expand its mandate, were continually thwarted, not by the Habyarimana government, nor even by the RPF, but by the Western governments which were determined to reshape Rwanda's political terrain.

On Jan 14, 1994, the ambassadors of France, Belgium, Tanzania, and the United States, acting in coordination with the UN Secretary General, met with President Habyarimana to pressure him to fully comply with the Arusha Accords and establish the new government. These accords—which greatly weakened the President's own power, and put it on an equal stance with the RPF and the opposition parties, and further gave the RPF, which represented a very small fraction of the population, 50% of the officer corps in the military—were not easy for the Rwandan President to implement, with extremist Hutus pressuring him from the other side to rip up the accords and go for total war against the RPF. On the telephone the same day as the Western ambassadors met with Habyarimana, Boutros-Ghali told the President that “unless there was progress, the UN would be obliged to withdraw its presence. The President said that this would be a disaster for his country.”

As the situation in Kigali and the country continued to deteriorate, on Feb. 14, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes wrote to Boutros-Ghali arguing for a stronger mandate for UNAMIR. However, the letter did not spark even discussion, and appears not to have been followed up. On March 30, the Security Council extended UNAMIR's mandate for four months, although the Secretary General had requested a six-month extension. “In fact,” notes the UN report, “key members of the Security Council were reluctant to accept such a long mandate extension.”

One week later, President Habyarimana was murdered,

the RPF forces were on their way to Kigali, and the mass murdering had begun. After 12 of their troops were killed by anti-Tutsi forces, the Belgian government announced its unilateral withdrawal from UNAMIR. “The requirements to pursue a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were no longer met, the Arusha Plan was dead, and there were no means for a dialogue between the parties; consequently, the UN should suspend UNAMIR,” the Belgian government argued. The Belgian force of 400 was the third-largest national group in UNAMIR. The UNAMIR force decreased from 2,165 to 1,515, in what Dallaire called a “terrible blow to the mission.”

In contrast to UNAMIR's floundering, over the course of April 8-10, France and Belgium acted efficiently to evacuate their nationals. Six hundred French troops arrived over April 8-9 to remove French nationals, and Belgium launched Operation Silver Back for its citizens. As the UN Inquiry report states: “The rapidity of the response, whereby the French operation was dispatched within hours of the shooting down of the [Habyarimana] aircraft, also shows a disconnect in the analysis of the situation between the key member-states of the UN and UNAMIR. Immediately upon receipt of the information about the crash, France, Belgium, the United States, and Italy evidently believed the situation so volatile as to warrant immediate evacuation of their nationals.”

Urgent action demanded

The Security Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations on April 9 and 11 on the extremely grave situation in Rwanda. What ensued within the UN was a fight for a greater UNAMIR mandate for action to stop the killing, led by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the African Caucus, with Great Britain and the United States successfully resisting it.

On April 12, the African Group at the UN met and “urged the Council to take urgent actions to help protect the lives and property of civilians in Rwanda, and to consider expanding the size and mandate of UNAMIR,” as reported in the 1996 book *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*. On April 13, Nigeria presented a draft resolution in the Security Council for a strengthening of UNAMIR. The Council was debating two options: maintaining UNAMIR at least through May 6, or an immediate reduction to only one company of troops and a small contingent of advisers and military observers.

The United States argued for the second option, along with Britain and Russia.

Given reports from the ground, the Secretary General further proposed the strengthening of UNAMIR and its mandate. To Nigerian Ambassador Gambari's plea to Boutros-Ghali to strengthen UNAMIR, the Secretary General declared that he felt he was “fighting alone,” and, according to the UN report, he urged Gambari to organize the African members to “write letters against a withdrawal.”

UFDR: UN Inquiry leaves many questions unasked

The Union of Rwandan Democratic Forces (UFDR) called upon the United Nations to put an end to the genocide ongoing in Rwanda, in a release on the UN Inquiry Report. The UFDR's chairman is Faustin Twagimurungu, the first Prime Minister of the new Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) regime, who left Rwanda in 1995 along with then-Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, because of the widespread killing of Hutus and others by the RPF. The UFDR is a coalition of the Resistance Forces for Democracy, the Group Initiative for Reconciliation, and the Rally for the Return of the Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda. Here are excerpts from the UFDR statement of Jan. 5:

In its report, the Commission [of Inquiry] emphasizes the grave failings of the Security Council, of the UN Secretary General, as well as the responsibility of some countries such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. On this general point of view, the report constitutes an important element that should have come earlier.

However, this element is particularly useful today, because it corroborates the position many times expressed by UFDR member organizations on one side, and allows

on the other side, to understand the disconcerting apathy of the United Nations Organization and the destabilizing role of some countries in the terrible crisis currently devastating the African Great Lakes region.

The UFDR, however, considers that many questions that should have been addressed by the Commission were held in abeyance, notably that of the perpetrator and possible accomplices in the murder attempt that claimed the lives of two heads of state, the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira. That attack, as pointed out in many parts of this Commission's report, served as a detonator of the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, the UFDR finds regrettable the fact that the Commission has confined itself on the April to July 1994 period, whereas the UNAMIR mission goes well beyond this point.

The UFDR is also amazed that on the Rwandan side, the report is based on evidence collected from one side in the conflict, that is, the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its collaborators. Until proven otherwise, one may think that the Commission has deliberately refused to meet personalities in exile who were members of the two successive transition governments before the assassination of President Habyarimana, as well as members of the first RPF government who had to flee the country due to the deliberate RPF policy of pursuing the massacres of innocent civilian populations. Such an attitude cannot in any way contribute to the reconciliation.

On April 21, the Council voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to 270. The British responded to the African and Non-Aligned Movement position by declaring that strengthening UNAMIR was not feasible because of "the lesson drawn from Somalia that conditions on the ground could evolve rapidly and dangerously."

On May 3, the United States gained some support to send a Security Council team to the region, "an idea the United Kingdom objected to, and which was not pursued. The Council president suggested that the Council write to the Secretary General asking him to submit contingency planning to the Council and a recommendation on the mandate for an expanded UN presence. At the suggestion of the United Kingdom, the request was not formalized but worded as a request for a non-paper." The letter further stipulated that the Council "did not expect any firm or definitive recommendations."

However, on May 4, from Rwanda the UNAMIR command was demanding strengthening of the peacekeeping force in order to "first and foremost be enabled to stop the killings, and secondly, continue efforts to reach a cease-fire." But the non-paper for the Security Council called for a 5,000-

man force mandated "to provide support and ensure safety for displaced and other affected persons and for safe delivery of humanitarian assistance."

The RPF declared on May 12 that a UNAMIR force of 5,000 was too large and only 2,500 were required, and those could only be deployed in zones not under the control of the RPF.

Nevertheless, on June 8, the Security Council adopted Resolution 905, which expanded UNAMIR for the humanitarian mission and extended its mandate to Dec. 9. But this proved to be impossible to organize. By June 19, the UN had only been able to recruit a force of 503. At this point, France and Senegal stepped in with an offer to send their own forces to carry out the UNAMIR mission and to "establish safe, humanitarian zones," until such point as UNAMIR could be deployed. On June 22, at the urging of the Secretary General, the Security Council authorized the French-Senegalese mission, or Operation Turquoise, and by the end of the month the French were carving out a "safe zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda, where they briefly clashed with the RPF on July 3.

The RPF, meanwhile, had been continuing its advance across the country. On July 4, Kigali fell. On July 11, the interim government's stronghold of Ruhengeri fell, and on July 17, the last stronghold, Gisenyi, fell.

The Arusha Accords were dead. So also were hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.

The flaws of the UN Inquiry

At the least, the UN Inquiry report shows that a United Nations peacekeeping force is no match for operations carried out by powerful intelligence agencies, or factions thereof. The UNAMIR could not have possibly stopped the genocide in Rwanda, because it was hamstrung in its mandate by the foreign governments with an interest in Rwanda. On the ground, intelligence operations fielded by a wide assortment of forces effectively ran circles around it, politically and militarily.

By focussing on the UN, or on Rwanda as such, which most English-language investigations of the events of Rwanda in 1994 do, such inquiries have already blocked those lines of investigation that might get to the truth, and thereby give political leaders of good will an advantage in stopping such operations in the future.

But even in its own terms, the UN Inquiry is wracked with flaws:

- Annex II of the report lists all the persons interviewed by the Inquiry. These included many officers of the United Nations in the relevant locations; officials of relevant governments—the current RPF government of Rwanda, Uganda, Belgium, Kenya, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, the Czech Republic, and the United States; various survivors of the 1994 slaughters; the families of the ten Belgian peacekeepers killed on April 7; various non-governmental organizations in Rwanda today; nine “academics and experts”; and the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The UN Inquiry made no attempt to interview any Rwandan involved in the former Habyarimana government, or who was in Rwanda at the time but is now in exile. It did not even interview Faustin Twagimirungu, who vouched for the informant of the famous Jan. 11 cable. The Inquiry had thus determined that it would close the door on one important side of the truth.

- The UN Inquiry, as stated, does not probe or even call for a serious investigation into the assassination of President Habyarimana—which did happen under the nose of the UN peacekeeping force and did, as the report states, precipitate the slaughter.

- The UN Inquiry lends credence to the idea that a systematic genocide of Tutsis and Hutu “moderates” was all that occurred in Rwanda during April-July 1994, rather than a general panic. As reported in the *The United Nations and Rwanda*, way before the July exodus of 1 million people into Zaire which gained so much media attention, throughout the month of April “vast groups of people were fleeing their

homes in all areas of the country. They crowded into public places and other shelters with little food, poor sanitation, and no security. In late April 1994, there were some 250,000 displaced persons in the north, 65,000 in the east and 1.2 million in the south and southwest of Rwanda. By that time, as many as 400,000 Rwandan refugees had fled to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zaire. As many as 30,000 displaced persons had taken refuge in the city's [Kigali] public places and religious sanctuaries.”

Embedded within this general chaos, there was a hard-core operation to kill Rwanda's Tutsis as an alleged fifth column of the RPF. There was also the murder of the many Hutus who resisted the murder campaign. There were also mass killings carried out by the RPF—not only of Hutus suspected of involvement in the genocide, but also of local leaders who had opposed Habyarimana. These killings were largely out of public view until Robert Gersony led a team from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees to Rwanda in August. Gersony, based on his and the team's travels throughout Rwanda, which were the most extensive of any foreign group, gathered information showing that the RPF had committed the murder/executions of 25,000 to 45,000 people through the course of April through July. The decision was made by the UN, with the United States giving official sanction, to suppress this information.

Conclusion

In short, the UN Inquiry report does not clarify the terrible events of Rwanda 1994, but rather, maintains the confusion surrounding them. The RPF, carrying out a policy of revanchist revenge within Rwanda and eastern Congo, has never come under international pressure to cease its targetting of civilians, either in Rwanda or in eastern Congo. Hence, the RPF was protected when it carried out the slaughter of thousands at Kibeho camp in southwestern Rwanda in 1995; it was protected when it invaded Zaire in 1996-97 and carried out the systematic hunting down and murder of thousands of Hutu refugees, more than half of them children; it was protected when it killed thousands more civilians inside Rwanda, as attested to by Mr. Twagimirungu and others who were there after the RPF took power; or again in 1998-99, in crushing the insurgency its own vengeful policies had created; it is protected today as its Rally for Democracy for Congo-Goma faction continues its policy of reprisals on civilians for any attack on its occupation force in the Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The murder continues because the policies of the donor powers remain what they were in 1990—the sacrifice of the people of east Africa to the plundering of the region. This is the issue the United Nations must address, and until it does so, its self-criticisms only serve to continue the cover-up and protect a policy of indiscriminate and wanton murder of the African people.